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I NTRODUCTI ON
The purpose of this study is to analyse (1) the aims, objectives
and assumptions of religious education in present-day Catholic and
secular traditions, (2) to examine comparatively the similarities
and dissimilarities of approach to religious education by each
tradition and (3) to explore some of the issues relating to
spiritual development as they arise in religious education in
Catholic and secular traditions. It is the underlying thesis of this
study that it is in comparing the approaches of each tradition to
understanding religious education that it becomes possible to reach
a fuller knowledge of what the concerns of religious education are,
both in themselves, and also in the approaches and assumptions of
the two traditions which are here examined.
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This research centres around the generic philosophical and
educational epistemologies of each tradition. In particular, three
areas of study are considered;
1. The philosophical and epistemological background for the
Catholic and secular traditions' concepts of knowledge.
2. The implications of these respective philosophical and
epistemological approaches for religious education in
each tradition.
3. The deeper understanding of the processes of religious
education provided through a comparative analysis of the
two traditions' approaches to spiritual development as
it relates to religious education.
To this structure a fourth element is then added. This is the
comparative analysis which determines by way of a concluding
reflection those similarities and dissimilarities between Catholic
and secular tradition that provide an insight into the aims,
objectives and assumptions of religious education in each tradition.
The subject-matter for this study comprises Catholic theology
(especially with reference to revelation and epistemological theory)
and secular religious education (in the context of educational
epistemology). The methodology used in this study is both analytic
and comparative. It is analytic in the sense that it investigates
the inherent assumptions which Catholic theology and secular
education necessarily use in their respective accounts of reality.
It is comparative in the sense that it subsequently compares the
approach of each tradition to religious education in the light of
those assumptions and philosophies. The ultimate methodology of this
study is that of reflection. Thus, it is considered to be the case
iii
that by reflecting upon the data that has been collected and
analysed in this thesis that the aims of this study are upheld. In
practical terms this study is limited to present-day approaches to
religious education in each tradition.
Research into some parts of this area of study has been
undertaken already by Catholic, 	 non-Catholic and secular
educationalists, working from both generic and differentiated
perspectives. Among the modern Catholics scholars of note who have
contributed in varying ways to the subject-matter of this study are
James Arthur, Hugh Duffy, Thomas Groome, Edward Hulmes, V Alan
McClelland, Gabriel Moran and David Warner. Reference should also be
made to a scholar of a much earlier generation; Cardinal Newman. His
contribution to the subject-matter of this study remains
significant. It has also been researched by a number of secular and
non-Catholic scholars, notably James Fowler, Michael Grimmitt, John
Hammond, David Hay, John Hull, Lawrence Kohlberg and Derek Webster.
In addition Dudley Plunkett, although a Catholic scholar, has
contributed to secular' religious education research in the field
of values in education.
This thesis owes a debt to much of the work of scholars such as
these, as will be made implicit in the subsequent chapters of this
study. That debt is here formally acknowledged.
The structure of this thesis, which comprises this introduction
and the three chapters which follow, is intended to present an
argument based on three distinct levels of approach. The first level
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is a methodological one. Thus, at the first level, the first two
chapters of this thesis are concerned with the philosophical,
theological and epistemological presuppositions of each tradition in
the light of education theory in general, and religious education
theory in particular. The second level is a philosophical and
reflective one. Accordingly, the third chapter of this thesis
compares some of those areas which refer to the relationship of a
deeper sense of spirituality and development to the concerns of
religious education in both traditions than was possible in the
first two chapters. The third level is a reflective and critical
one. Thus, the last chapter of this thesis presents some critical
and reasoned reflections on the research undertaken in the previous
two levels.
The two methodological chapters of this thesis provide an
important guide to the initial (and detailed) presuppositions which
inform Catholic and secular education theory, and which, in turn,
have an equally profound effect on each tradition's concept of
religious education.	 Chapter One,	 therefore,	 examines the
philosophical methodology which underpins the approaches of present-
day Catholic and secular traditions to religious education. As such
it is concerned with the educational presuppositions which exist in
the approach of each tradition to this area. The first section of
this chapter is divided into two parts. Part one looks at the
concept of revelation in the Church today. It explores the
relationship of Scripture to tradition, and examines the implication
Vof the Sacred Constitution Del Verburn on the Church's understanding
of revelation. From this analysis, the first chapter moves on to
consider how Catholic theology understands the dignity of the human
person in the light of revelation. The first half of this chapter
ends with an examination of the wholism of Catholic education theory
in the light of revelation and the dignity of the human person. A
three-fold structure is thus established for Catholic education;
revelation, leading to the call to human dignity, finding its
educational noesis in the wholism of Catholic educational theory.
This is contrasted, in Part Two of the chapter, with an
exploration of secular theories of education. Two specific areas are
considered, which may be said to have a concern with secular
education. First, rational concepts which owe their origins to the
time of the Enlightenment are discussed. These include consideration
of what might be described typically as the traditional
philosophical concepts of idealism and realism. Second, various
cultural and political concepts are examined. These include the
sociological models of Mannheim and Durkheim, Marxist theory,
postmodernism and its discontents. A comparative discussion follows.
Chapter Two considers the place of religious education in
Catholic and secular traditions. In particular, the methodological
presuppositions in those traditions which inform the theories of
religious education as an educational process are studied. This
chapter, therefore, first identifies and analyses the theological
and educational presuppositions which underline Catholic religious
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education theory. In doing this, the Conciliar and Post-conciliar
documents of the Church are subjected to scrutiny. Having
established a structural base for religious education, (which arises
from the threefold structure for Catholic education, discussed in
Chapter One), this chapter reflects upon some secular approaches to
religious education. It considers and compares the work of a number
of significant religious education theorists, notably the work of
the University of Birmingham's Centre for Religious Education
Development and Research, but also the work of experiential
theorists such as John Hay and David Hammond. It also explores the
implications for secular religious education of some areas of
postmodern theology and theory, epitomized by the position of the
'Sea of Faith' school of theologians. A comparison of Catholic and
secular presuppositions follows.
In the first two chapters of this thesis, the educational and
philosophical presuppositions which lay behind Catholic and secular
religious education were analysed. In the second chapter in
particular, reference was made to the spiritual dimensions of
religious education which exist in both traditions. Chapter Three
identifies and reflects upon some of the contexts in which the
spiritual dimensions operate. It also analyses the place of
spirituality within religious education, from Catholic and secular
perspectives.
The first part of the chapter explores some aspects of Catholic
theological and educational thought which centre around the issues
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of spirituality and catechesis. After defining spirituality and
catechesis, the concepts are placed in an educational context. An
analysis is made of the interrelationship of these concepts to
religious education, and bridges between these concepts and Catholic
religious education are explored.
The second part of this chapter considers what it might mean to
speak of the spiritual in the context of secular religious
education. Secular definitions of the spiritual are explored, and
these themes are then placed in an educational context. Here
recourse is made to the models of secular religious education
explored in Chapter Two. The themes of spiritual development are
analysed as they arise in the work of Griminitt, the experientialists
and the non-realists. The chapter concludes with a comparison and
contrast of the positions of the two traditions.
The thesis concludes with a reflection on the similarities and
dissimilarities of the assumptions of Catholic and secular
traditions as they are identified as a result of this study.
Parallels of approach are shown to exist between the traditions.
However, fundamental differences are also shown to exist.
CHAPTER I
The Methodological Presuppositions of Education in Catholic and
Secular Traditions
This chapter considers the philosophical methodologies which
underpin the approaches of present-day Catholic and secular
traditions to education. Its purpose will be twofold. First, this
chapter will analyse and discuss the respective rationale and
argument which each tradition gives for undertaking education.
Second, this chapter will critically compare the philosophical
approaches of two traditions, highlighting both agreements and
disagreements between each tradition.1
Particular attention will be paid to the conceptual noesis which
both Catholicism and secular education attribute to education. This
will be explored in two ways. First a generic overview of the
assumptions on which each tradition bases its education theories
will be explored and discussed. Second these conceptual assumptions
will be examined, compared and commented upon.
2Accordingly, this chapter begins by exploring the Catholic
concept of education in its theological sense, in three of its
categories; first in that of the concept of revelation being the
basis of the Church's self-understanding, then in that of the
Church's understanding of humanity, and finally reaching a review of
the Church's wholist theology of education in the light of these two
concepts. This will involve an examination and discussion of the
interplay of these concepts, with particular attention given to the
Church's perception of the relationship between reason and
revelation.
This chapter will turn next to an analysis of secular education
theory. Two general theoretical models will be examined; first,
those approaches which form a rational model for education, second,
those approaches which fall under the concept of cultural and
political theories of education.
The chapter will conclude by making a comparison between Catholic
and secular theoretical models of education within the setting of
their respective generic educational contexts. The relationship of
this chapter to the thesis will also be noted.
3i. Catholic Education.
1. Revelation as the basis of the Church's self-understanding.
Christ, the Second Vatican Council reminds us, is the light of
humanity, which shines out from the Church for all the world to see
(Lumen Gentium, art. 1). It is from this opening premise of the
Council's Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, that the Catholic
Church's understanding of the world of culture, science and
religious expression is derived, and to which the Church's
interpretation of that understanding tends (cf. Gravissimum
Educationis, art. 3; Gaudium et Spes, arts. 19, 57-59 passim). As
such, education (and with it religious education) is to be found
within the same sphere as those other areas of human knowledge,
namely, within a Christological framework.
The Church's perception of this Christological genesis of
knowledge and pedagogical enquiry, presented within the context of
the conciliar documents, makes initial reference, therefore, to
revelation as the source of divine knowledge. 'God, who creates and
conserves all things by his Word, provides men with constant
evidence of himself in created realities' (Dei Verbuni, art. 3). The
Dogmatic Constitution supports this claim with a reference to Romans
1: 19-20; knowledge and understanding of the divine can be
recognized in the realities of creation. Thus, the human desire and
4capacity for knowledge - humanity's faculty for education - is to be
given expression from the moment of creation.
The processes of learning, (the ability to make sense of the
world and of the individual's interaction with the world), when seen
Christologically in the context of creation, leads properly to the
Catholic concept of revelation. Since the Church teaches that God
created humanity in the image of himself, and since, in addition,
the Church teaches that God made himself known definitively to
humanity (Del Verbura, art. 2; cf. CCC. art. 27), it would be correct
to say that an analysis of Catholic principles in education must
begin with an examination of the Church's understanding of
revelation.
The opening words of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine
Revelation provide a key to understanding the Catholic theology of
revelation as espoused by the Second Vatican Council: t1Iearing the
Word of God with reverence and proclaiming it with faith...' (Dei
Verbum, art. 1). They stress that God has communicated to humanity
in a real and meaningful way. The phrase the Word of God' refers
first to the event of revelation proper: the action of the immanent
Trinity, in which God unveils himself in self-disclosure to
creation. But it also refers to the way of revelation: a thing to be
announced and proclaimed throughout the Church. On the part of the
human Church it is an event both of hearing and proclaiming.
At the outset three further points may be made. First, the
Council is careful to stress that the Word of God is met, in the
5human milieu, by a state of receptivity appropriate to the message;
that of reverence. Similarly, it is with an appropriate state of
action that the Church responds to God's self-communication; faith.
Second, it is significant here that the Council speaks of
revelation as being an event, to which the human response finds its
mechanics mirroring precisely the same actions and processes as
those of the Magisterium of the Church. The action in each case
consists of a self-same hearing and responding (or in the case of
the Magisterium, proclaiming) of the Word of God. Revelation thereby
becomes linked to the missionary life of the Church (cf. Latourelle,
1966, p. 456).
Third, it should be noted that the Constitution's reference to
Romans 1: 19-20 must be seen in the context of two forms of
revelation which are said to exist; revelation by grace, and
revelation by nature. This distinction is made clear by Duffy in his
thesis Liberal Education and Catholic Theology. Duffy describes
revelation by grace as being 'contained in the Scriptures and in the
Church's tradition.' Revelation in its second form - by nature - (is
the knowledge we have of the Creator through the works of creation'
(Duffy, 1989, p. 36).
The use of this type of religious language raises questions as to
the extent to which expressions which touch on human actions and
events, relate to the theological values which underpin them. In
attempting to address this, some comment must be made about the
traditions of the Magisterium regarding revelation.
6The First Vatican Council determined that the principal truths of
faith and morals fell within the remit of its declaration of
infallibility. These truths of faith and morals were further
declared to be revealed for the whole Church, in the sense of being
revealed to the apostles by Christ. These teachings were made
available, says the Council, to the apostles. Once the last
surviving apostle died, the period of revelation closed permanently.
From then on it was the duty and purpose of the Church to continue
to proclaim the truths which had been handed down to it, and to
explain those truths in ever new ways, and in ever differing
contexts (Chirico, 1983, p. 166).
It will be clear from this that it was not the intention of the
First Vatican Council to enter with any sophistication into debates
about the manifold philosophical issues which such simplistic and
anthropomorphic language raise. The Council spoke of revelation as
being a verbal event, a kerygmatic presentation of a message. As
such, the Council regarded such matters as being an issue of truth,
not of debate (Chirico, 1983, ibid.).
Nevertheless, when comparison is made with the statements on
revelation found in the documents of the Second Vatican Council, a
clear Christological focus becomes apparent. Revelation finds its
principal source in the event of the risen Christ (cf. DS 3006; Dei
Verbum, arts. 1, 2). It is in the risen Christ that a link may be
said to exist between the God who is revealed, and the worldly
sphere in which that revelation takes place. God is revealed to
7human beings to the extent that revelation happens in the world. But
revelation happens in the world only because of the prior action of
the God who wills his self-disclosure to come about. The reality of
God's communication to humanity is expressed within the context of
the created world. In this sense, God's action in revelation may be
said to be mediated to human beings through the event of the risen
Christ. This event is, in itself, the mediated point of contact
between God and humanity (Del Verbum arts. 3, 6; cf. Baithasar,
1990, pp. 212-213). This must be seen within the overall context of
the economy of redemption; God reveals himself to humanity through
the risen Christ in order that the reconciliation of the human to
the divine in the resurrection may lead to humanity's ultimate
redemption. To the extent that revelation is God's call to humanity
to return to God, the resurrection takes on the significance of
being the central event of revelation (CCC. art. 51).
Having established a Christological link between the God who
reveals, and the creatures to whom revelation is made, we must now
address the question of how it is possible for humanity to know God
in his revelation. The traditional teaching of the Church suggests
that the answer to this question lies in the ontological event of
the creation: human beings desire God because they are in possession
of an ineluctable yearning for God, which has come about not because
of human endeavour, but because humanity is created both by and for
God. The search for God comes from the desire for God, which finds
its origin in the God who created this desire in men in the first
8place. Since the Fall, God has been calling humanity continually
back into relationship with God (CCC. art. 27).2
This yearning to know God, it is suggested, is found in the
religious expression of countless generations. Prayer rituals,
sacrificial actions and beliefs about deities are common across
cultures to the extent that traditional Catholic teaching has
suggested that this shows that humanity is really homo religiosus
(CCC. art. 28). Receptivity to God's revelation is part of human
nature.3
Having established the traditions regarding human receptivity,
the focus now shifts to the question of how the receptive homo
religiosus comes to know God. According to the Catechism, God can be
known from the created medium, principally via two processes; the
world and the human person. In general terms, the former process
relates to five particular ways in which God may be known from
creation: movement, becoming, contingency, order and beauty (CCC.
art. 31). 4 The latter concerns the human capacity for receptivity to
God, which has been mentioned above. Humanity is possessed of a
critical openness to truth and beauty. Sometimes that openness may
become restricted through an overt identification by humanity with
the materialism of the created world. Nevertheless, it is as
autonomous beings, and with right and informed consciences, that God
may be discerned by humanity. This is accomplished through the
medium of that which God - as God - has created. In particular, it
is precisely because human beings are created beings, made in the
9image of God that they retain a capacity to discover signs and
symbolic epiphanies of the soul within them (CCC. art. 33).
A word of caution must be expressed here. The Church does not
permit, nor could it allow an identification to be made between the
God who creates on the one hand, and the world and humanity who have
been created on the other hand. To do this in the name of natural
theology would be both heretical to the Christian tradition, and
also philosophically inadequate. God would be reduced to a
relativised category of being. If God's prevenience is to be
preserved, this cannot be allowed to happen. Humanity and the world
are said, therefore, to participate in, but not to identify with
God's being, which alone remains the absolute transcendent, thereby
preserving God's sovereignty (CCC. art. 34).5
Mention must now be made of the way in which Scripture and
Tradition are said to contain revelation, and, in general terms, of
the r1e of faith in relation to revelation.
Scripture is always seen in Catholic tradition as God's word.
Indeed this identification is so strong that it is included as one
of the five particular ways in which Christ becomes truly present in
liturgical celebrations. 6 As God's word, it is held to be free from
error, and perpetually valid for all times (cf. DS 1501; 3292, Dei
Verburn art. 11). As a result, Scripture should always be seen as
being the primary source for Catholic theology, and treated
accordingly with reverence and faith. 7 This concept of Scripture
being a primary source of God's word, and thus free from error
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implies, therefore a connection between Scripture and revelation.
Scripture is said to contain revelation, but not to be the sum total
of revelation (Dei Verbum art. 7). A clear distinction is drawn
between revelation encountered in the pre-apostolic age, and that of
the post-apostolic age. Even if considered uncritically, it is
immediately apparent from this that Scripture per se does not find
an ontological identification with the origin of the event of
revelation. Scripture therefore must remain a part of the post-
apostolic age, and so act as a bearer of the message of revelation,
albeit the most important testimony to revelation that there is. The
written record always differs from the lived reality of the
revelation event (O'Collins, 1981, p. 202).
Tradition, on the other hand, whilst quite clearly originating in
the post-apostolic era, cannot make equal claims to the pre-eminence
which the Church gives to Scripture (Kiing, 1964, 106). Tradition,
according to the Council of Trent means the handing on of the Gospel
to new generations (DS 1501). Tradition cannot claim its origin in
inspiration, which is what the Catholic Church has always asserted
about Scripture. 8
 Its relationship to Scripture and revelation must
always be seen in the context in which the Council of Trent
understood these concepts; namely a relationship held in the sole
sway of the divine. As a source of revelation, all things human must
first be discounted, both in the apostolic and post-apostolic ages
(DS 1501, cf. King, 1964, p. 108), before it can be said that what
is left is the revelation of God contained in Tradition. However,
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this is not to say that Tradition takes on a status which puts it
into a co-primate relationship with Scripture. For Tradition takes
as its reference point Scripture, which in itself acts as the
referee and guarantor of Tradition. Since the Church has always held
that Scripture alone is inspired by the work of the Spirit, and thus
contains the unmediated word of God, Tradition, being Tradition,
which is deposited in the credal, papal, conciliar and episcopal
documents and acts of the Church, is mediated, through these human
actions of representation, and so can be said to contain the
revealed word of God mediately (King, 1964, pp. 110-111).
It will be apparent from what has been said above that revelation
is seen to come ab extra; God takes the initiative in engaging with
humanity (Dei Verbum art. 2). This engagement takes on the
perspective of an inter-personal encounter, in which revelation
seems to be imposed upon creation as a whole. It is as a result of
this encounter that faith becomes the suitable response for humanity
(Dei Verbum art. 5). This concept of faith demands not only the
exercise of the human will in order for it to be freely expressed,
but it also requires a willingness on the part of men to abandon
themselves completely to God in an obedience of faith' (Dei Verbum
art. 5). Such demands are very great, and do not precisely correlate
to human faculties, but, as numerous conciliar documents attest,
relate to the inner, spiritual dimension of each individual.
It is in this context that grace is encountered. For faith, being
a reality which comes about in the encounter between God and
12
creation, is enriched by the grace of God, through the actions of
the Spirit on the inner human dimension. In this way, revelation is
more clearly understood, and in this way faith is illuminated and
developed (Wojtyla, 1979, pp. 19-21).
Mention of faith and of the encounter between God and creation
leads to the notion of mystery. For if creation has encountered God
in the act of revelation, and if that encounter is both concrete (in
the sense that the full complementarity of creation takes part in
this encounter), and also spiritual (in the sense that the inner
spiritual soul of each individual is touched and enriched by this
event), whilst, still in this event of revelation, God, being God,
remains transcendently beyond humanity's perception, then the only
suitable way of speaking of this paradox is to talk of mystery.
Mystery implies that that which is happening, takes place beyond our
true perceptions. Mystery indicates the limits of what we are able
to say about God, and about ourselves in relation to God and to each
other. Mystery hints at matters which touch on reality, but which
are greater than reality. As such, our language about this mystery
cannot remain propositional, but must embrace some element of
symbolism and analogy.9
Recognition of this mystery impinging upon our language, although
not new to Catholic theology,' 0 led to a certain amount of new
reasoning about how to think and speak about revelation more
appropriately. The influence of Paul Tillich is notably present in
the work of modern Catholic theologians today. In particular his
13
conceptual principle that human causality can be interpreted
symbolically has found serious proponents among Catholic theologians
today, 11
Avery Dulles in his major study Models of Revelation has
identified a number of theologians, who, following similar lines
have sought to re-express the concept of revelation including Baum,
Mackey, Moran, de Chardin and Rahner. For them revelation can best
be described as a breaking through of humanity to a higher level of
consciousness, as humanity is drawn ever more deeply into the divine
creativity (Dulles, 1992, pp. 98-109. For a detailed bibliography
for these theologians see the notes accompanying chapter seven of
Dulles' work, pp. 301-304). The new consciousness which is finally
achieved Dulles calls faith (Dulles, 1992, p. 109).
The content of revelation consists in the divine, which is to be
found in everything, whether Christologically present in Christ as
the incarnation of all reality, or on a more universalist model in
which natural theology, (or indeed religious anthropology such as
Moran's 'primordial receptiveness'), leads to an ever more un-
focussed object to the content of revelation (Dulles, 1992, p.
104) 12
Dulles has tried to present a new approach to this concept of
revelation, in the light of the attempt of the theologians mentioned
above to describe the relationship of the encounter between God and
humanity. As such Dulles clearly uses metaphorical language. In
using this language as such an endeavour would require it, Dulles is
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led to propose his notion of symbolic mediation, as the key to
speaking about revelation in a Catholic sense. Here Christ is
proposed as the metaphor, and revelation takes on the character of a
mediated symbol of Christ's relationship with creation and with God
(Dulles, 1992, pp. 131-173, especially pp. 156-160). Although
clearly attractive in its attempt at preserving the limits we can
put on meaning, it does seem indistinguishable from certain of the
'new awareness' concepts described above, particularly those of
Teilhard de Chardin and Karl Rahner (cf. Dulles, 1992, pp. 99-103).
Finally,	 whereas	 traditional	 Catholic	 theology	 worked
propositionally from its perceived derived authority, the more
recent Catholic theology of revelation outlined very briefly above
can be criticised precisely on the very grounds of authority.
It is in the light of the current arguments about the nature of
revelation in the world, and, corresponding to that issue, the
nature of the world in the light of revelation, that we can speak
here of a second category by which the Church comes to an
educational theory which can be called Catholic, namely the Church's
understanding of the world.
15
2. The Church's understanding of the world.
For the purposes of this study, close reference will now be made
to some ways in which the Church claims to have an understanding of
humanity and the world. We have already commented above on the
relationship that the Church sees existing between the revelation of
God and the created realities which form the human setting. A link,
then, is already established in Catholic theology, between God and
humanity. Having examined the first side of this relationship, we
now turn to the second, anthropological side.
This section will examine how the Church understands the dignity
of the human person, and how that understanding is fully defined
with reference to the paschal mystery. Initially , the Church's
teleological concerns will be addressed. Accordingly, attention will
be paid to the Church's concept of human dignity, and to the
rational grounds which the Church finds for this concept.
Second, this section will subsequently explore the Church's
theological regard for the actions of humanity. Accordingly the
relationship of humanity to the paschal mystery will be explored.
This will involve a brief analysis of how the concept of salvation
impinges upon our understanding of human dignity.
The Church has consistently taught that humanity possesses of
itself a dignity which finds its origin and its summation in the
creative and communicative realities of God. Thus the Church states
that it is in the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of
16
God that we find dignitas rooted to the core of humanity. Humanity
possess dignity only because God has made humanity to be like
Himself (CCC. art. 1700). At the centre of human dignity is to be
found the imago Dei.
The concept of the imago Dei begins with the Church's teachings
on the relationship of God to the created realities of existence.
Thus it can be noted in a great number of major Church documents and
Councils that a consistently high significance is placed in the
concept of the creation of the whole world (that is, the sum
totality of created reality, both material and spiritual) in a
single act freely undertaken by God. This act is ontically temporal
in its origin, and is generated from and of nothing in terms of its
formation. 13
Although finding its origin in the Scriptural tradition of
Genesis 1:27,14 the concept developed in reaction to the
consistently serious threat posed to Catholic orthodoxy by a number
of quasi-gnostic heresies, most notably those of the Origenists, of
Manichaeism and of pantheism. Of particular concern to the Church in
confronting these attitudes was the fear on the part of the Church
that human nature and the human soul would be separated irrevocably
through the dichotomous dualism which these heresies seemed to
share, albeit generically. If we were to survey briefly the history
of Church councils we can see a consistent attempt by them all to
retain and preserve a deep and integral unity at the heart of the
human person; human nature and the human soul were one.
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Thus we can see, for example at the Provincial Council of
Constantinople (543) a condemnation of the Origenist view15
 that
souls had an existence which was separate from the body. This view
held further that human souls had first existed as independent
heavenly spirits, who, growing bored of God's love (apopsugeisas)
thus became souls (psuchai). As a punishment, God sent them to earth
into human bodies (DS 403). In condemning this view, the Church
based its anathema on three particular problems. First this view
separated the body-soul unity on which the Church's definition of
the human person depended. Second, the Council considered that the
Origenists' semantic connection between apopsugeisas and psuchai was
false. Third, and most seriously, the Origenists' view implies that
the creation of the world was not a contingent act, but a necessary
one, which, of its necessity, limited God's freedom to act (DS 410).
Similarly,	 the Council of Braga (561),
	 condemning the
Priscillianists, (originally a Spanish sect who held strongly
Manichaean principles) further defined what it was that human
dignity comprised; human souls were independent of God (DS 455), but
were to be found in the unity of body and soul which makes up a
human person, which, being created by God is intrinsically a good
thing (passim DS 456, 457, 461, 462, 463, if taken cumulatively). In
essence, the Council sought to reject a dualism of nature and
matter, and the accompanying contempt such a view had of the human
body. We begin here to see more clearly the Church's understanding
of human dignity; it is rooted in the goodness of God's physical
18
creation, which cannot be condemned because, coming from God, it is
good.
It is in stressing this same concept that Innocent III, fighting
against a form of French Manichaeism (which became known after 1180
as the Albigensian heresy), presented his Profession of Faith
Prescribed to the Waldensians of 1208.16 The key article touching on
the question of human dignity is undeniably the prescription
required of all who return from this heresy to the Church which
states categorically that God, who created all things, visible and
invisible, remains the single unifying factor of the created
realities. Once again, it is in the denial of dualism in all its
aspects, and in the affirmation of God as the soul author of
everything, including humanity, that the basis of human dignity may
be understood (DS 790). Seven years later the fourth Laterari Council
reaffirmed Innocent III's Profession, and added some trinitarian and
ecciesiological points: thus, God, as the one Trinity, is presented
as the unique principle of creation (DS 800); the Incarnation is the
work of the whole Trinity (DS 801); finally, (and for the first
time) the Church's character as a sacrificial and eucharistic
community is affirmed (DS 802).
The issue of the unity of the human person, and the anti-dualism
of Church doctrine continued to be challenged, forcing the Church
again and again to define the dignity of being a human in terms of
these concepts. Accordingly we find in 1311-1312 the Council of
Vienna condemning the teachings of the followers of the Franciscan
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John Olieu, which tended to separate the realities of history and
human nature from the human tspirit, effectively making the human
person subject to dualist separation. In condemning this teaching we
find that the Council stresses that the spiritual soul was the
principle of organic life, and that the human person cannot exist
unless it is in this unity of soul and body (DS 902). This unity is
stressed again in 1442 at the Council of Florence, being linked here
to the goodness of God's creation - a creation which involves all
things in participation in the goodness of God - ( DS 1333, 1336).
Similarly, concern over asserting the fundamental unity of the
intellectual (and hence spiritual) with the organic is reinforced at
the fifth Council of the Lateran of 1513. In its Bull Apostolici
Regiminis the Council sought to condemn the views of the Paduan
philosopher Pietro Pomponazzi (1464-1525). He suggested that since
humans could apprehend universal ideas, this general ability
indicated that the spiritual soul, being traditionally related to
the intellect, was not an independent nor individual entity: it was
ubiquitous to human nature. At death, therefore, individual identity
is lost, with the human person dissolving into the universal spirit.
Any organic features of human nature cease to exist at death, being
bound up with matter. The Council's condemnation of this view rested
on two premises; (1) human nature is both individual and immortal,
and (2) human nature is fundamentally one, comprising the unity of
the intellectual with the organic (DS 1440).
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Thus far we have seen that the Church's teaching on the dignity
of the human person resides with the concepts of the integral
goodness of all creation, and in the profound unity of the soul with
matter. We have seen further that this teaching was derived for the
most part from the anathemata declared against various forms of
Manichaean heresy. However, by the nineteenth century the wind of
social revolution brought with it some new challenges to the
Church's teaching on the human person. Whereas the previous danger
had come from a view which had sought to separate the physical world
from God, the new dangers of pantheism sought to bring the divine
into absolute identification with the physical realities. What the
human person was and what God was became indistinguishable through
such thought. Thus in 1864, pantheism became one of the targets of
Pius IX's Syllabus of Condemned Errors. Pius IX was able to develop
the Church's teaching on the dignity of the human person by
asserting that not only did an all-wise, omniprovident divine being
(numen) exist, distinct from all creation, but also that this being
did not 'become' Himself in human form, since this would both deny
the full humanity of Christ, and also imply that God was subject to
the categories of change (DS 2901). At the same time, however, Pius
IX sought to ensure that this did not lead to the equally prevalent
heresy of Deism; just because God should not be identified with
creation does not mean that God does not care about humanity, nor
does not act in the created order (DS 2902).
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We come here close to the heart of the Church's understanding of
the dignity of the human person; being made in the image and
likeness of God does not mean an absolute identification between the
human person and God. Nor yet does it indicate that there is no
connection with God, for being created (i.e. creaturely), the human
person, albeit an independent existence, owes its origins to the
creative will of God. Since that created will is intrinsically good,
it necessarily follows that creation is also good.
This can be seen most clearly in the Constitution Dei Filius of
the First Vatican Council (1870). Basing itself closely on the work
of the Fourth Lateran Council (cf. DS 800), the Council, among other
matters, looked closely at creation and the role of God in creation.
Thus, the Council stated quite clearly that it was in order to
demonstrate God's perfection through the benefits given to creation
that both at once, and out of nothing, God created spiritual and
corporeal creatures. Of particular concern to us is that the Council
categorically declared that the human creature shares in both the
spiritual and the corporeal life (DS 3002).
In terms of God's actions on and in creation, the Council goes on
to state that God protects and governs all which he has made (DS
3003). Since that act was freely undertaken by God, no necessity was
involved (DS 3025). Similarly, it is precisely because the action of
creation was contingent, that humanity could not be said to emanate
from God's substance. A contingent act of creation requires an
independent entity to be the subject of creation (cf. DS 3024).
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Ultimately, the Council concluded, humanity and creation as a whole,
were created for the glory of God (DS 3O25).'
The Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar makes the point that
it is this glory of God, which is, in essence, the conformity of
humanity to God (Baithasar, 1982, p.455). The creation begins the
whole narrative of salvation history. The revelation of God, which
was discussed in the previous section, finds its physical expression
in the physical sphere of humanity (ibid., p.441f.). But this
physical expression of revelation remains necessarily hidden, since,
although the human person finds his or her dignity in the fact that
he or she was created in the image and likeness of God, there
remains an inviolable and unreachable chasm between God and the
creature. Human knowledge can only extend so far. Our analysis of
human dignity, which will lead us eventually into an assessment of
the presumptions of Catholic education theory, presents us for now
with a conundrum. In a real and absolute sense humanity is part of
the created realities; part, indeed, of nature as a whole. But given
this, it is equally true to say that nature, in relation to
humanity, transcends human understanding and existence. Baithasar
calls this Cthe law of "nature", which surpasses and contains all
forms of social and individual human activity...the law of reality,
of the Being of the world as such' (Balthasar, ibid., p.446). For
this reason, Balthasar suggests, the concept of mystery must be
employed; and in employing this concept, Balthasar proposes faith as
a partner in science, to objective knowledge (Balthasar, ibid.).'8
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Christologically, Balthasar goes further still. Not only is
revelation given by God in creation, albeit in mystery, but,
moreover, this revelation continues to play a part in the questions
of human identity and dignity despite, (or, indeed, because of),
humanity's fallen nature; 'it is, unconditionally, the interior and
organic fulfilment of God's original plan, even if its ultimate form
in this world is the Cross and the glorifying light of the Holy
Spirit that falls on the Cross' (Balthasar, ibid., p.453). It is in
this redeeming action of the Cross on humanity that we can see in
its definitive form the true meaning of human dignity; in the
Incarnation, not only is the divine disclosed to humanity but also
humanity itself is similarly disclosed (Baithasar, ibid., pp.458f.).
In the Cross, not only is Christ's glory revealed as Redeemer, but
human nature is also revealed as being glorified through this action
(Baithasar, ibid., pp.460f.). It is in this sense that we can say
that human dignity is defined as humanity, sharing in God's glory as
the image and likeness of God, revealed in and redeemed by Christ.
This chapter will go on to explore how this definition of human
dignity can help to clarify an understanding of Catholic education
theory. In doing so, it will be readily seen that the concept both
of revelation and human dignity form part of a threefold structure
which underpins Catholic educational noesis, and which, as will be
seen in the subsequent chapters to this thesis, informs the
assumptions which underlie Catholic religious education.
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3. Catholic Education.
In the sections discussed above, two major themes of revelation
and the meaning of the human dignity of the person were explored in
the light of the Church's teachings. These two areas form part of a
threefold noesis of a theology of Catholic education, as the
following section will seek to show. This present section, then,
will be concerned specifically with the concept of 'Catholic
education'. It will analyse the concept of Catholic education as a
generic term, and will pay attention to the teachings of the Second
Vatican Council, and in particular to the key education document of
the Council, Gravissimum Educationis.19
Analysis of Catholic education begins, then, 	 with an
investigation into the meaning of education, as understood from the
perspective of the Catholic Church's own perception of the term. The
Catholic concept of education may be recognized in two senses. The
first sense is of education perceived in a generic form, broadly
conceived. Thus, education may be spoken of taking place in the
context of the influence of society on the individual, in all its
forms. When such influences begin to shape the human individual, we
might justifiably call this a learning event. Thus, in its non-
specific sense, education may be said to be that process whereby the
influences which a person encounters bring about a change or
development in his or her values, ideologies, proficiencies,
competencies, beliefs and behaviour. Accordingly, in its generic
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state, such a process will usually remain unplanned and unforeseen.
Similarly, because of its non-specific nature, this process of
education could be said to be found in any human encounter with
reality, and to extend into any form of social or physical
interaction with the world.
The Church in part accepts the validity of this form of education
as a means of personal and social development. Thus, Pope John Paul
II was able to affirm that 'all human activity takes place within a
culture and interacts with culture'. The Pope goes on to state that
it is in the exercise of 'creativity, intelligence and knowledge of
the world and of people' that true cultural development occurs. The
Church, however, transcends culture and ideology in the sense that
it teaches the truth about the created order and redemption to
humanity. Thereby it gives to humanity the Church's unique
contribution to the educational process (John Paul II, 1991, p.
37) 20
In its second form, education may be understood as a specific
task-driven activity. Limited in scope, this form of educational
process confines itself to the deliberate, sentient, purposeful and
intended actions of individuals and institutions upon others, in
order that those individuals being acted upon might be influenced in
one or other particular manner. Such intentional influencing of
individuals will usually be planned with a desired outcome in mind.
On account of the limited nature of this process, planned outcomes
may well be small scale in comparison to the unplanned, generic
26
process mentioned above, but taken cumulatively and over an extended
period of time, the learning outcomes may become substantial in
scope and detailed in content.
The Church accepts this more specific form of education,
involving good pedagogic techniques, as an acceptable means of human
education, and, most significantly, as a means of assisting
individuals to develop more deeply as human persons (Cf. Sacred
Congregation for Catholic Education, 1982, p. 9-14, especially arts.
21-22). In particular, in this planned pedagogy the Church
identifies not merely the value of the communication of a corpus of
knowledge, but also the fostering of a sense of community among
individuals, most especially within the context of an institution
(Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, 1982, p. 14).
In recognising the authenticity of cultural and social
development, in both its generic and specific forms, the Church
makes a statement about its own role in society, and also, as a
result, presents its understanding of this generic process of
education. Society does have a rle to play in the educational and
social development of the human person. But transcending that
process lies another form of education, with access to the ultimate
truths about human nature. Since the Church's mission is to
communicate these truths to the whole world (cf. Mt 28: 16-20), this
higher form of education takes on an universal significance:
Catholic education.
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In his significant book Towards a Civilisation of Love, Cardinal
Hume, speaking of Catholic education states that 'we have a coherent
philosophy and a vision of education that we believe to be of
universal significance...God is the heart of religious education and
the purpose of all education' (Hume, 1988, pp. 105-106). Hume goes
on to explain that in putting God at the centre of the Catholic
educational thought his intention is not to limit our understanding
of education. All education, he contends, must have within it a
continuously richer Christian awareness of the Trinity and of the
Judaeo-Christian understanding of creation: 'a vivid and all-
embracing awareness of creation as a single and continuing
expression of God's overwhelming goodness and love must, of
necessity, affect all knowledge and all values' (flume, 1988,
p. 106).
In this sense, Hume stands in the same theological line as J. H.
Newman. Newman spoke about the integral unity of knowledge, which
the mind or intellect could begin to perceive as a whole: '[the
intellect] makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing
else...giving them one definite meaning' (Newman, 1976, pp. 122-
123). In his approach, Newman seeks to link liberal education to
Catholic theology. For while a liberal education was for Newman
principally a means of 'the cultivation of the intellect as such',
this cultivation or enlargement of the mind should be carefully
distinguished from the mere acquisition of knowledge (Newman, 1956,
p. 100). The characterising feature of liberal education for Newman
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is its wholistic quality, which enables the individual to see the
educational and experiential reality 'as a whole' (Newman, ibid.,
p. 114).
In saying this, Newman is careful to focus into the heart of his
concept of liberal education; liberal education remains independent
of any influence beyond itself, and refuses to be confused or
compromised by some other form of systeinatisation. It is truly
wholistic when it presents itself to us as a contemplation of all
reality (cf. Newman, ibid., p. 88).
Now since all knowledge for Newman is essentially whole, this
raises the question of how we come to differentiate the sciences (in
the broadest sense of that term) from each other. To answer this,
Newman presents the circle of knowledge. If the object of all
knowledge is truth, then truth must be defined as facts and their
relations. These facts and their relations may be reduced and
fragmented into the sciences; forms of knowledge. When the intellect
engages with these sciences, it categorises them into different
compartments. In effect, Newman argues, what is happening is that
the intellect creates a record of this or that part of the whole of
knowledge (Newman, ibid., p. 37; cf. Duffy, 1989, pp. 25-26).
To this presentation Newman brings Catholic theology. For Newman,
theology has to be included within the process whereby the mind
categorises the wholistic subject matter of knowledge. For theology
deals with creation and the Creator. To avoid it would bring down
the whole edifice of the circle of knowledge (Duffy, ibid., p. 26;
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Newman, 1976, P. 38). Indeed, as Ian Ker has commented, Newman based
his concept of an intellectual catholicity out of his argument for
the study of theology, albeit that this should be seen in the
context of the unlimited scope of the circle of knowledge (Ker,
1990, p. 23. See also passim Ker, 1988, p. 392).21 To remove
theology from knowledge would cast the circle into ta far worse
confusion' than even the removal of human interaction with the
t circle of universal science' (Newman, 1976, p. 63).
Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that Newman speaks of the
relationship of religious knowledge to the circle of knowledge, not
in terms of religious knowledge's categorisation within the circle,
but as a tcondition of general knowledge' (Newman, 1956, p. 54).
Duffy establishes that Newman is able to link liberal education with
religious knowledge by the former's ability to bring to the latter a
reasoned and eirenic approach to the subject-matter of theology. But
Duffy goes on to make the significant point that tsecular sciences
and Catholic theology are derived from the same source; namely, the
Creator' (Duffy, 1989, p. 27). The revelation of the creative God,
then, provides for Newman the datum for all knowledge. The wholism
of knowledge stems precisely from this one event.
Cardinal Hume, speaking of the relationship of love to knowledge
develops Newman's wholistic theory of education by pointing out that
the distinguishing expression of our humanity is to know and to
love. But that capacity is brought about only through the intellect
and will, which, conforming to the image and likeness of God, allows
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us to share in God's life. Knowing the world takes on this religious
dimension: when we come to engage our love and our knowledge with
the world, we are engaging ultimately in a contemplation of God's
creation, and in particular, of creation's relationship to God
(Hume, 1988, pp. 103, 106).
But in practical terms, this educational engagement with creation
involves some issue of human rights. If human dignity is to be
upheld, then, as V. Alan McClelland remarks in his comments on the
Second Vatican Council's key education document Gravissimum
Educationis, all humans have the inalienable right to education, a
right which is irrespective of race, age, sex or societal
conditions. Similarly, given the revealed nature of Christianity, it
follows that there exists an inalienable right to a Christian
education. Thirdly, given the pre-eminence of the relationship of
parents to their children, there exist the rights of parents to be
involved first and foremost in the nurture, upbringing and education
of their children (McClelland, 1992, pp. 9-10). The Church also has
a place in this process, most notably in its action and rle as the
custodian of the deposit of faith concerning revelation, and in its
proclamation of the universal salvation revealed in the life of
Christ (Gravissimum Educationis arts. 2, 3).
At the centre of the wholism of Catholic education, then, lies
the Christological focus of the datum of revelation, interpreted by
the Catholic community through a process of contemplation of
creation and redemption, and fully realised through the gift of
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faith. As Edward Hulmes comments, 'Catholic education is about dis-
covering Christ, or it is nothing' (Hulmes, 1995, p. 5).22
The question of the relationship of education with the gift of
faith is addressed in the Conciliar declaration Gravissimum
Educationis. In particular the issue of catechesis is raised as a
natural implication of sharing in a contemplation of creation.23
Thus catechetical instruction is described as a process which
'illumines and strengthens the faith' in a way which 'stimulates a
constant and fervent participation in the liturgical mystery'
(Gravissimum Educationis, art. 2). McClelland notes that, as a
result, this catechesis clearly indicates that Catholic schools (as
the foremost Catholic educational institutions) have a dual rle of
engaging in the development of intellectual skills among pupils, and
in the nurturing of faith in those pupils (McClelland, 1992, p. 10;
cf. Gravissirnum Educationis, art. 5). Similarly, Gravissimum
Educationis develops a second and equally important principle for
Catholic education, namely that it retains a particularly
communitarian function. Thus the Conciliar declaration states that
it is 'the special function of the Catholic school to develop in the
school community an atmosphere animated by a spirit of liberty and
charity, based on the Gospel' (Gravissimum Educationis, art. 8).
McClelland sees here the essential integral wholeness of Catholic
education being made manifest. Catholic education finds its ultimate
context in the community of saints to which the whole body of the
Church is called: 'we use the term "communion of saints" to embrace
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this theological concept, this idea of organic connection with the
whole human family of God's creation in Christo' (McClelland, 1992,
p . 10).
A summary may now be drawn up of Catholic education as a whole,
linked noetically to the two previous sections of this chapter. For
Catholic education is the manifestation of the human intellectual
response to a divine initiative (cf. Hulmes, 1995, p . 6). It finds
its origin linked to the event of revelation. It is shown its
subject-matter in the life, death and resurrection of Christ. It is
made real for us within the intrinsic goodness of creation, and in
contemplation of the unity of the soul and body which is to be found
in the dignity of the human person. Catholic education completes the
process whereby the human response - natural theology - returns to
God the love which God first revealed. Seen in this context,
Catholic education takes on a particular significance in the life of
the Church. Its deep coherence must surely remain one of the
Church's greatest treasures.
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Thus far, this thesis has attempted to explain in general terms
the structure which informs both the theology and the theory of
Catholic education. At the core of this structure is the revelation
of God in creation and in the redemption from which the whole
argument of Catholic educational thought develops. Humanity, whose
dignity it is to be made in the image and likeness of God are able
to respond to this event of revelation through the intellectual
faculties, and by the nurturing of the gift of faith. In this
regard, Cardinal Newman's significant contribution to Catholic
educational thought has been discussed. Finally, the wholistic and
communitarian principles of Catholic education have been
demonstrated.
The second part of this chapter will analyse ways in which
secular theories of education have been presented. Like Catholic
education theory, secular education theory attempts to make sense of
reality. Numerous approaches to this problem have been undertaken in
the past, but it would be both inappropriate and indeed impossible,
given the scope of this study adequately to analyse all these
contributions. Accordingly, what follows is an attempt to isolate
and discuss some of the more significant themes which have a direct
bearing on modern secular education theory.
But even with this aim in mind, many difficulties are to be
encountered, unless the terms of reference are more particularly
defined. For whereas the first part of this chapter concentrated on
an analysis of Catholic education, and was able to identify this
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term within the context of the teaching office and conciliar
pronouncements of the Church, 24
 it becomes much more difficult to
define what is meant by secular education.
Correspondingly, it will be assumed throughout that secular
education is to be understood within the context of a world view
that (1) refuses to permit the actions of a deity or theological
system to inform the structures of reality as perceived by secular
practitioners, and (2) claims to draw largely upon post-
Enlightenment and postmodernist thinking to make or deconstruct its
claims about reality. However, even in this context, secular
education theory should not be considered in an univocal sense. Many
streams of thought flow into secular educational theory, and it
would be unwise to regard secular education theory as a monolith.
The second part of this chapter will reflect on two areas which
may be said to touch secular education. First rational concepts
which owe their origins to the time of the Enlightenment will be
discussed. Second cultural and political concepts will be examined.
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ii. Secular Education.
a. Rational concepts in secular education: two traditional
approaches to the philosophy of education.
The great intellectual watershed of European thought, the
Enlightenment, which can with justification be called the birth of
modern philosophical discourse is characterised both by negative and
positive aspects. In its negative sense, the Enlightenment
demonstrated the beginnings of hostility to ecclesial thought in
general, and to religious conceptual language in particular. In its
positive sense, the Enlightenment brought about the rise and
development of scientific theory (cf. Russell, 1991, p. 479).
The roots of the Enlightenment, and the subsequent rise of
rational processes of thought are at once complicated and confused.
As a conceptual process, the Enlightenment is extremely difficult to
date, (a problem common to most eras of thinking). Nevertheless, its
principal flowering can be placed generally in the eighteenth
century, although its origins are to be found much earlier with
thinkers such as Francis Bacon (1561-1650) and Rene Descartes (1596-
1650). The Enlightenment was to find its great conclusion in the
work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). As a period of epistemic
philosophy, it represented a pinnacle of human self-confidence, but
one which Cohn Gunton among others believes to have brought about
an alienation of humans from true intelligent thought (Gunton, 1985,
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pp. 3f., 153). Its impact upon subsequent Western educational
theories was profound.
Naturally enough, the Enlightenment itself had its intellectual
forebears. As a rationalist tradition of thought, the Enlightenment
found much of its antecedents in the often lively debate between
classical idealism and realism first given concrete form in the work
of Plato with respect for the former, and Aristotle for the latter.
According to Plato, it was Heraclitus who first suggested
seriously that the world was in constant flux or change. Once humans
became aware of this decay as a reality in their lives, they began
to doubt whether the sense experience of the world could be relied
upon any longer to provide certainty about the world.
Two sorts of worlds existed. Principally, and above all else
stood the noumenal world of 'Ideas' or 'Forms' in which no part of
knowledge could be changed or altered, and in which all truth
resided. Our world stood in relation to this world. In our world
phenomena occurred which showed reality to us as a continually
changing, never certain set of events, which operated as shadows and
adumbrations of the fixed world of 'Ideas'.
Whilst Platonist Idealism distinguished between knowledge of
everyday things which changed and were temporal, and knowledge of
permanent 'Ideas' or 'Forms' which inhabited a separate and
unattainable eternal world and only therefore accorded the title of
'Truth', the Rationalist thinkers of the Enlightenment created an
even wider dichotomy between rationality and perception (Gunton,
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1985, PP. 11-12; cf. Grimmitt, 1987, PP. 18-19). The world of sense
experience, which was claimed to be both psychologically and
materially unpredictable, was not to be trusted. Only that which was
verifiable, and thus part of the rational (and ultimately
propositional) knowledge-world was capable of being apprehe
(Grimmitt, 1987, ibid., p. 19).
Within this same model of knowledge, the Empiricists such as
Locke and Hume, noting what they saw as an inevitable difficulty for
the Rationalist account of knowledge, sought to re-introduce a
functional use for sense-experience in the processes of knowledge.
Whilst reason remained still the final arbiter in the process of the
verification of given factual information, that information was
derived as such, through the experiential encounter of the subject
with the objective world (Grimmitt, 1987, ibid.).
Inherent within the three positions outlined above is the notion
of value. In Platonic tradition, it is clear that the world of human
knowledge fell largely into a category of valuelessness. The human
world was perceived as a shadow or representation of the world of
t Ideas	 or tForms, (i.e. the eternal,	 True' world). In the
Rationalist approach no value can be accorded to the findings of
sense-experience, which cannot be trusted. It is better to take
rational verification as a true indicator of reality. 	 But the
extreme response epitomised in the materialism of the Post-
Enlightenment Empiricists led to a further value related difficulty.
If it really was the case that the physical and material world was
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all there was, then this allowed human freedom to become reduced to
a nihilistic objectivism, in which the whole purpose and aim of
knowing and coming to knowledge within an educational context was
lost (Harris, 1979, pp. 3_4).25 Such an end for education was in
direct contrast to the aims of those supporters of idealism who saw
pedagogy in terms of human development over and above objective
materialism.
The American educationalist Edward J. Power has suggested a
schemata for the philosophical principles of these forms of
idealism, and, seeing in them some traditional forms of educational
philosophy, has placed them into an educational context. Dividing
his philosophical analysis into four constituent parts, Power begins
by asking of idealism what it says of the person. He finds that at
the centre of idealist philosophy is the belief that the human
person is rational, with both a capability for independent thought
and the individual use of the will. This use of the mind and will
indicates that there exists something' to be apprehended.
It is for this reason that Power's second philosophical category
touches on the nature of reality. Power maintains that idealist
philosophy has to retain a belief in the world as intrinsically
spiritual, or at least that the spiritual is all that can be
apprehended. Power identi.fies two kinds of idealism at work here;
absolute idealism and critical idealism. In the case of absolute
realism, only the spiritual exists: t[o]bjects of sensations are
ideas. First, they are ideas in finite (human) minds. These ideas
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are not created by finite minds but are imprinted on or presented to
them by a perpetual divine activity...On a lower level, they exist
when human minds perceive them as ideas' (Power, 1982, p. 76). As a
rejection of materialist interpretations of reality, critical
idealism rejects the strictly evidential approach of the empirical
rationalism of Locke and Hume, in favour of sensory perception. Yet
in so doing this, critical idealism allows for the existence of a
real world. Critical idealists, as Power notes, uphold belief in
'the conviction that knowledge of something is possible' (Power,
ibid., p. 77). But critical idealism is unwilling to accept that
sense perception of the world provides us with an account of truth.
According to critical idealists, all sensory perception is mediated
through the experience of each individual, who makes sense of the
data out for that experience. Reality as it truly is can never
therefore be understood. Reality is 'real' to us ultimately only in
a spiritual sense. Knowledge of the world as it really is remains,
therefore, beyond us. 26 As such, the nature of knowledge is largely
intuitive or recollective. Interpretation of the world takes the
form of belief in reality. Indeed, some idealists would argue that
even if we were to underpin our belief in something over nothing by
recourse to descriptive narrative, we would be no nearer to
possessing absolute truth, Access to the world as ding-an-sich is
permanently blocked. Knowledge becomes a possibility only to the
extent that opinion and belief becomes the ruling methodological
tool for making sense of reality. At its highest expression, the
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idealist possession of knowledge is possible to a very few
intellectually gifted individuals who are able to step beyond mere
sensory perception to reach the spiritual reality of ideas or forms
(cf. Power, ibid, pp. 77_78).27
The act of knowing and acting in the world leads to the question
of ethics and morality; in a world in which we can never truly
comprehend reality as it is, why should we follow one moral
principle over another? According to Kant, it was precisely because
the noumena and phenomena remained separate, and that, as a result
only the world of appearances could be known, that the phenomena
could be apprehended. The categories of space, time and
understanding are not examples of things as they are - the noumena -
but establish possibilities of experience. Kant takes recourse in
the categorical imperative; practical reason is forced to legislate
orthopraxis for itself, based upon the ideology of belief. Limits
are established beyond which reason should not journey (cf. Kant,
1933, passim).28
The educational context in which Power sets idealism is that of
the cultivation of the mind (Power, 1982, pp. 80-81). This is
determined in part by the evident concern of idealism to promote the
importance of the mind over material reality. If it is true to say
that the capacity to think and to understand is a condition of
experience, then concern with a deepening cultivation of the mind
which engages in experience, is essentially the only suitable
educative demand. But similarly, just as the social cultivation of
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tradition is communicated in the idealist model through tattitudes
and ideals, in ways of acting [and] in customs and conventions...',
so too do idealist concepts of education touch on questions of
individualism and human uniqueness	 (Power,	 1982, p.	 81).
Socialisation, the coming to terms with and participation in the
social and cultural heritage of each group of peoples, necessarily
involves the individual in the processes of maturation. 29 The
capacities and talents of each person must be allowed to develop in
relation to the growth of socialisation and societal development.
But since idealism regards the world as appearance only, the
education of the individual is not aimed at developing skills or
even objective knowledge. 3 ° If idealist education theory has any
particular aim for the individual, its principal purpose must be a
moral one. Thus Power suggests that idealist education theory is
most concerned with the development of character and personality
(Power, 1982, ibid.). 3 ' The individual, in interaction with others
comes to experience the transcendence of the world of appearance,
and in so doing, interiorises meaning. A two way procedure has
commenced. On the one hand the participation in social action lends
itself to furthering the good of society. But, equally importantly,
it is in the experience of this participation with society that the
individual begins to recognise their singular rle within the realm
of participatory experience. As a result they become' good citizens
(Power, 1982, ibid.).
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From this arises the idealist concept of the student and teacher.
Idealism recognises the significance of individual human uniqueness,
because socialisation and interior growth both retain a personal
aspect. Personal growth requires individual nurture, and therefore
the need for there being a r1e to play for both student and teacher
ensues. Strict idealist philosophy of education demands that
materialist interpretations of the subject of education are denied.
The school and the student are not engaged in the physical
development of matter, but concentration takes place, instead, on
the human mind. This is implied, naturally enough in the affirmation
by idealist philosophy of both human personality and the spiritual
over the material. But, in addition, if we are to reject the
determinism of a materialistic universe, we are left with human
autonomy as the essential human experience of the world of sensory
participation. Humans experience a whole range of social and
interiorised conflicts, which require one choice of action to be
taken over another. In a non-determined universe, the possibilities
of those choices are entirely free from moral restriction, since the
pre-eminence of the spiritual over the sense world of the physical
implies freedom from material restrictions. In other words, idealist
thought cannot allow moral value, nor an objective moral ontology,
based on materialist interpretations of the world. To do so would
deny the idealists' chief tenet that the world of sense experience
is precisely that; appearance of reality, not reality itself.
Questions of morality must reside instead, then, in the conceptual
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thought processes of individuals. A moral decision is required to be
taken, therefore, by the human person in each and every event which
is experienced as a legitimate moment of decision. Moral order
would, presumably, be determined through a question of weighing up
what was the best action, both for society and for the individual.
Such a decision would be learned through the sense experiences of
each individual life. In practice this would result in doing good
and avoiding evil, and would imply that good and evil could be
identified by idealists in terms of what was best both for societal
development and individual maturation and interior growth. 32 The
r'le of the student in this context is to recognise and utilise his
self autonomy, in order that he could subsequently develop his own
personality and talents (Power, 1982, p. 89).
Idealist educational philosophy, it was stated above, is
concerned with both the intellectual and spiritual. It is,
therefore, recollective and experiential. Given this, it might be
suggested that there could be no meaningful rle accorded to the
teacher. If the main methodology of idealist education is the
movement towards seif-realisation and self-recognition, then the
external teacher, who is by virtue of human nature a different
individual, is unable to share in the self-same experiences as the
student. However, in general, idealist thought gives genuine
significance and value to the role of the teacher. Thus, as Power
suggests, the idealist teacher begins not with the notion of
altering the nature of the student, but with a recognition of that
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nature (Power, 1982, P. 84). To do otherwise would be to move the
focus of educational thought from the aims of societal and interior
maturation, to the mechanistic process of skills learning, and a
corresponding concentration on the results of the acts and events
undertaken by the student. This would be far removed from the
idealist concept of the individual recognition of the transcendent,
spiritual and intellectual realm.
In order to avoid this, and to preserve idealist philosophical
integrity, idealism requires the teacher to attempt to co-operate
with human nature. Education becomes e-ducare, the leading out of
the student that which is already within, the creation of a suitable
and educational environment for the student, and the use of careful
guidance and, indeed, the withdrawal of the teacher from the
learning process, where that is held to be appropriate. Indeed,
idealism would suggest that the teacher should recognise that as
students increase in maturity, they develop their personalities more
and more independently. Ultimately the rle of the teacher becomes
one where the teacher acts in co-operation with nature, and one
where he or she engages in partnership with the processes of human
development. In so doing, they act as facilitators of that
development. Finding itself placed in an intellectualist and
spiritual context, idealist education theory denies the r'le both of
the physical and the physiological in education. The rational
processes of ideas, mental development and the psychology of the
mind take precedence over the acquisition of facts and knowledge. At
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its heart lies a belief in an absolute respect for the dignity of
each individual. The teacher and the student do not engage in
copying or representing social life within the school, but instead
share together in the preparation of students for engagement with
society as good citizens, ruled by the processes of thought (Power,
1982, pp. 84, 86).
In contrast to the idealism discussed above, realism, the second
stream of rationalist thought, presents a very different picture
both of reality and of education. Standing in antithesis to the
dualist, spiritual and material-dualist interpretations of idealism,
realism operates from a unified concept of the person. At its core,
the mind and body are one.
Philosophical realism may be consistently traced back to the work
of Aristotle. In particular, Aristotle's understanding of the
relationship between the soul and the body provides a clear
indication of his realist concerns. Thus, Aristotle states with some
precision that nothing existed in the mind before it existed in the
senses. 33 The soul, which Aristotle sees as being both the principle
of life, and the power of rational and deliberate thought, is
considered by him to be no more essential to human beings than the
body itself. The soul and body co-exist as a unified concept in
Aristotelian thought (cf. Aristotle, De Anima, pars 402a), but is no
more an essential element in the make-up of a human being, than is
the body. For Aristotle, both are equally united in the unitive
concept of human person.
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As the principle of rational and deliberate thought, the soul, in
unity with the body, brings about in humans the desire to know.
Knowledge of the world is achieved through the encounter with
reality. Aristotle's model of epistemology does not allow us to
create our own realities. Such noesis occurs precisely because it is
the world - created as a reality independent of our own existence -
which permits us to come into an experiential connection with it.
Our knowledge of it arises both from our empirical data gathering,
and also F roni our organisation of that data into an ordered and
rational scheme. As a guard against falling into error in its
interpretation of reality, humans work within a system of logics.
Error remains possible, of course, but the human capacity and desire
for truth assists in minimising that possibility (cF. Aristotle,
Metaphysics, pars. 980ai).
In time, Aristotelian philosophy came under the influence first
of Christianity, and then of Islam. Religious presuppositions began
to play a rle in shaping from Aristotle's original realism a
mystical, and largely theocentric understanding of reality,
especially of the natural sciences. The subsequent growth in Greek
and Western	 philosophical	 thought,	 and	 its	 concomitant
popularisation, especially by such schools of thought as
Epicureanism and that of the Cynics and Stoics, led to a diminution
in influence for Aristotelian philosophy. Put simply, the fact that
such Greek ideas which were heavily dependent (sometimes mistakenly
so) on Aristotelianism, and given also that they were becoming
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inimical to Christian and Islamic theology, meant, in consequence
that Aristotelian thought itself began to wane in influence amongst
the Christian and Muslim worlds. Thus Aristotelian realism was to
remain, until its great renaissance in the work of Thomas Aquinas
(see Coplestone, 1965, pp. 423-434).
From this point onwards, realism was to engage in a constant
debate with idealism. This encounter was to last up to the
beginnings of the Western age of discovery. As the militarily more
advanced West began to discover and ultimately to destroy the
indigenous peoples of what became known as the New World, the
economic strength of the West began to demand for itself more
accurate scientific knowledge of both navigation and geography.
These were needed especially for the sake of increased expansion and
trade. The philosophical abstractions of idealism began to look
increasingly irrelevant to a world grown hard by imperial and
monetary ambition. Realism began to increase in influence in the
West, as a direct result of these changes. Thus, even amongst such
idealist luminaries as Descartes and Kant, we begin to see some
inclusion in their thought, of the physical world as a reality which
exists independently of the observer. 34 The realist debate about the
person, knowledge and education stems from such a background.
In generic terms, the realist philosophical understanding of the
person, is defined by the capability for mental action, and, in
particular, by the capacity for logical thought. In terms of the
question arising as to whether human autonomy is present in such
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actions, it should be noted that there exists here an ambiguity. It
could be argued that humans engage in such mental processes and
actions as a result of their free choice in deciding what to think
about, and when to think it.
However, it will become immediately apparent to the casual
observer that mental processes are often brought about in the
individual quite independently of that individual wishing them to
happen. A person may well choose to think upon one certain matter.
Yet, an event, sense experience or other indicator may intervene in
that thought process, to bring about a quite different thought
process and outcome.
Similarly, it could be argued that when a person engages in a
mathematical or other logical process, that activity may well be
said to result in the human thinking under the conditions of
determinism. One cannot, for example wish for a simple mathematical
process such as the addition of two whole numbers to produce a
numeric value which would be against the laws of logic.35
Philosophical realism cannot allow the human to think in a way which
was logically impossible. Accordingly, when realism speaks of humans
thinking and acting, those thoughts and activities are both freely
undertaken, and determined by circumstance and logical necessity.
The human person, then, is both autonomous and determined.
Corresponding to this understanding of the person, realism in its
generic form relates reality in its structural aspect, to the idea
of the person. Indeed, as Power notes, so many attempts have been
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made by realists to describe reality, that a general approximation
of reality will only touch the surface of an adequate definition
(Power, 1982, p. 94). However, Power is able to contend that at the
heart of all philosophical attempts by realists to describe reality,
lies the question of what is knowledge, and how does knowledge
interact with reality (Power, ibid.).
Power identifies three particular ways in which realists might
speak of reality. First he suggests the concept of monist
materialism. This consists in the view that only that which is
real' is a part of nature. Such a model, which incorporates the
belief that all that is in the natural world is strictly material,
suggests the existence of an evolutionary process at work. In this
account of reality, the great versatility of existing matter is
perceived of as being evidence of the great changes in variation of
the physical world, rather than new outcomes of mechanistic actions;
differences of degree, not of kind (Power, ibid.).
Second, Power proposes a dualist-materialist account of reality.
Here reality is to be found both in the material world, a well as
the spiritual. Indeed, the wholeness of reality is itself comprised
of both. Thus the brain, although material, displays activity which
is not only organic, (that is, material), but also spiritual, (that
is, beyond the explanation of materialist interpretations of
reality) 36
Power identifies a third realist account of reality which he
calls pluralism. On this model, the differences to be found in
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reality are perceived of as stemming from the difference in
substance of each entity. Each exists in reality, but each is unique
in terms of its substance. Because these forms of the same reality
differ from each other in their nature, they become unclassifiable.
As a result, some philosophers are prepared to abandon any attempt
to define the nature of reality, choosing instead to concentrate on
the logical and social constructions which make up our understanding
of what we encounter (Power, ibid.; see also Berger, 1967, pp. 30-
31).
Such diverse explanations, of which monist, dualist and pluralist
interpretations are all possible ways for realists to approach the
question of the nature of reality, raise serious questions about how
the principles of realism may be reflected in ethical behaviour. If,
as realists continue to assert, reality can be known objectively,
and if our knowing reality does not alter it, then we can be
reasonably secure in claiming that we may have a dependable
knowledge of reality.
Ethically, the individual would be able to claim that morality
and the demands of ethical behaviour were interlinked with the
principles of natural law and tested convention. As it has been
stated above, realism allows the raie of logical thought to shape
the ways in which we determine the veracity of our interpretations
of what we experience. Certainty the reality of what is interpreted,
lends itself to ethics. If we can know that the worlds of nature and
social convention follow clear and predictable patterns, which are
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replicated because the world remains both really and perpetually as
it actually is, then ethical demands should be met on these
grounds. 37
Given the insistence of realism on the dependable knowledge which
we may have of the world of reality about us, it is possible to
sketch a realist educational theory, which arises from these
concerns. Indeed, it is precisely realism's specific commitment to
epistemology that allows such a theory to be developed.
As its educational principle, realism allies itself with the need
to prepare individuals for life. It finds its contextual rationale
for this principle in its belief that reality is not dependent upon
human thought, but exists separately to our cognition of it. Because
of its inherently independent nature, it can be known through
experience and encounter. In order for humans to exist and to live
at as effectively as possible, it is important for humans to
understand and respond to the reality in which they find themselves.
In educational terms, this means that humans need to be prepared for
life in general, through an epistemic engagement with this
reality. 38
To this end, social contexts do play a rle in shaping the
education and preparation of individuals. The expectations and needs
for the life-preparations of individuals are defined by the societal
contexts in which those individuals are placed, and into which they
will grow. The relative complexities of differing social classes and
groups will also impinge upon this model. Simpler social structures
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will tend to give rise to less complex educational processes. More
elaborate social structures will give rise to an increasingly
involved institutionalised system of life-preparation.
Within this context it is appropriate to speak of the roles which
are proper both to the student and to the teacher. This arises from
the strictly empirical process with which realism engages with the
individual. The individual is understood primarily through what they
do. Given the insistence by realism of the material reality of the
world, and in opposition to idealist thought, human behaviour
becomes observable, quantifiable and ultimately predictable. This is
so, most particularly since, on realism's own terms, human behaviour
is a partial demonstration, of the material objectivity of the
material world (Power, 1982, p. 102). The student belongs to this
observable universe.
As an observable entity, students are held by realists to be
capable of thought. This may arise from the determinist processes
which underpin the realist model of the world, or indeed from
attempts at social autonomy within the material framework. The
method of coming to know is secondary to the realist belief that
there exists a dependable field of knowledge which the student is
capable of apprehending through the tools and skills at his or her
disposal.
Since students are capable of objectively coming to know the
universe, it becomes essential that they receive the correct
preparation and education to be able to act and live in such an
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environment. This may, of course, be achieved in many differing
ways. For example, some students may wish to engage in scientific
positivism; by learning about the mechanics of the material
universe, knowledge is gained, which may subsequently be acted upon.
Some students, however, may learn to live in an objective universe,
through a study of social relations and contexts. The underlying
principle remains the same: the student interacts with an objective
and dependable body of knowledge. Such activities imply that the
student is not a passive learner, but an active one. It is human
nature for the mind to actively search out new knowledge, and
remains a responsibility for the student to undertake (Power, ibid.,
p . 103).
The rle of the teacher in realist philosophies of education is
an awesome one, given the crucially significant objectivity of
knowledge. Knowledge is dependable. It is trustworthy. It gives
truth about the universe, and it provides a means of growth for the
individual. A teacher of such objectivity must, therefore, have a
thorough grasp of this knowledge. To fail to do so would render the
educative praxis vacuous. Imperative to this is the teacher's
capacity to impart the information gained. The teacher must be able
to teach, both accurately and technically. As such, their principle
role is that of being an instructor.
What is to be instructed? Put quite simply, anything which
provides an essential contribution to living according to the
demands of the physical and social context of the individual (Power,
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ibid., p. 104). Such demands, however, cannot be met by idealist
claims which suggest that a formal schooling system could be removed
from the learning system. On their model of education, students and
teachers engage in a joint voyage of psychological discovery, the
world of sense perception being largely distrusted. Realism cannot
permit such a reliance on sense perception. The student cannot
create his or her own knowledge. Teachers cannot allow students to
do this. Knowledge remains tthe other' against which the student and
teacher are placed, and to which the student and teacher relate.
Knowledge must, therefore be apprehended first, before it is passed
on to the student by the teacher.
Realism, then, presents education as a material process in which
individuals engage with an objective universe, and try to understand
it from the context of its ontology. Students and teachers engage in
a singular process of the transmission of information from teacher
to student. Despite many differing social and economic contexts,
this process remains the same. As such it stands in direct
opposition to idealist thought.
Other attempts have been made to provide satisfactory models for
education, and these models have been used by the secular tradition
in an attempt to create a coherent philosophical explanation for
education. Some of these models will now be examined.
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b. Socio-cultural and political concepts in secular education.
In the section above, two traditional, opposing forms of
educational philosophy were examined. Despite their contradictory
approaches to the question of how the human being apprehends
knowledge, both idealism and realism share a similar concern with
rational thought, and how to live a rational life. Both seek to give
a framework of meaning to human life, and both use rational
processes to come to - albeit differing - statements of belief about
reality, and about the relationship of human beings to knowledge.39
This section will explore another philosophical approach to
education, that of socio-cultural theory, which, thanks both to the
development of theories of deconstruction and the resurgence of
hermeneutic enquiry, has come to dominate much of Western
postmodernist thought. Its significance for educational enquiry is
its seemingly non-rational base. Indeed, to talk of there being a
'base' to socio-cultural theory may be a contradictory assertion,
given the uncertainties such theory accords to fundamental
statements concerning knowledge.
At the outset it should be stated clearly that there abounds a
great plethora a concerns and approaches, which labour under the
portmanteau term 'cultural theory'. Thus, marxist, feminist, psycho-
analytic and social theory all fall under cultural theory's generic
scope. Cultural theories of education are similarly manifold and
diverse in nature. Given the limits of this research project, it
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would be both unrealistic and unreasonable to analyse all these
themes satisfactorily. Therefore, this chapter will examine one
particular area of cultural theory, as it touches on educational
philosophy, namely that of the social context and (de-)construction
of meaning, and apply it to its educational setting.
In his book Ideology and Utopia, the great sociologist Karl
Mannheim (1893-1947) describes a principle tenet of the sociology of
education in the following 'perspectivistic' terms:
'[the concept "human knowledge"] signifies the manner in which
one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one
construes it in his own thinking. Perspective, therefore, is
something more than a merely formal determination of thinking.
It refers also to qualitative elements in the structure of
thought, elements which must necessarily be overlooked by a
purely formal logic. It is precisely these factors which are
responsible for the fact that two persons, even if they apply
the same formal-logical rules, e.g., the law of contradiction
or the formula of the syllogism, in an identical manner, may
judge the same object very differently' (Mannheim, 1936, p.
244).
In this sense, Mannheim's initial sociological approach to
education may be described as relativist. We give meaning to our
lives relative to our own unique social and cultural perspectives.
Elsewhere Mannheim speaks of knowledge (he uses the term
'substantial rationality') as 'intelligent conduct based upon one's
own insight into the connections between events' (Mannheim, 1940, p.
53, also cited, critically, in Dearden, et al, 1972, pp. 194-195).
In both cases, Mannheim is careful to stress that the individual
operates alone, when it comes to ascribing meaning to experience. In
both cases it is one's own personal insights which dictate meaning,
(and thus value,	 presumably),	 to one's	 experiential and
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episteniological life. Meaning takes on a relative status for human
beings, and, for that reason, cannot be accorded universal
commonality between individuals. What I take and give in terms of
meaning for my experiences must remain cut off and unattainable to
access for others.
This is not to say that any number of individuals may share an
approximate, or indeed seemingly identical meaning for a given
experience. On one level, there may exist some common reaction
between individuals. Thus, for example, from any five people chosen
at random, three of whom may exhibit some degree of arachnophobia,
it could be shown that if those three were placed in a room with a
spider, they might all demonstrate a reaction of fear. It might be
argued from this, that all three individuals shared a common sense
of meaning, (i.e. arachnophobia), when comparison is made of their
common fears. However, this is to misunderstand Mannheim's
sociological theory.	 Mannheim's theory allows for common
experiences, but does not allow for common interpretations of those
experiences. This is because, according to Mannheim, our reactions,
and our sense of meaning is derived from our own unique and
individual insights gained through our own life-time. Since we can
only live our own life's experiences and relationships, and not
those of others, the mechanism whereby we gain insights remain
unique. According to Manrtheiin, it is because there are no such
things as common insights, that ultimately, there can be no common
meaning.
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This sociological theory of education contains in it some clear
difficulties	 for	 educational	 theorists	 and	 practitioners.
Essentially, if Mannheim is granted his relativist perspective on
knowledge, truth becomes relative for each individual, since the
individual determines truth, solely on the basis of individual
insight gained through individual experience. This raises very
serious questions about the processes and purposes of education. If
questions of empirical truth become obscured through the
relationships and lives of individuals, to the extent that the
individual's experience of society alone provides meaning, then
education becomes a relativised and relativising activity. Education
would no longer be a thing that is 'taught', nor indeed
'experienced' as an objective process. Instead, education would
cease to have a function per Se, and would thereby be reduced into a
set of opportunities through which individuals live in a voyage of
socially mediated self-discovery. Why this process should be called
'education', as opposed to a more vague term such as 'living one's
life', is open to question. Indeed, the assumption that such an
educational model might be correct, raises the fundamental question
of whether there can be such a thing as an education process, which
of itself, and on its own terms, might change human beings.
Mannheim's own terminology is equally open to criticism. 40
 As M.
Black has noted, (Dearden, et al, 1972, pp. 194-195), what does
Mannheim mean when he speaks of 'one's own insight' being used to
determine the veracity of experience? It is certainly questionable
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to what extent this phrase makes it clear that rules of social
behaviour are identifiable. Indeed, Mannheim's relativist model
raises doubts as to whether any such rules can exist. Secondly,
Mannheim's description of human conduct being 'intelligent' raises
similar questions of meaning. If knowledge is relative to individual
experience, to what extent is it possible to speak of intel1igent
conduct', as opposed to, for example, unintelligent conduct?
Mannheim's terminology is not helpful here, perhaps deliberately so.
Difficulties such as these stem, paradoxically, from the legacy
to sociological theory of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). At the heart
of Durkheim's sociological thought is the contention that society,
which is made up according to him of individuals, is, nevertheless,
distinct from the individuals who make it up. There exists for
Durkheim a 'social' dimension to reality, just as much as an
'individual' dimension. As such, society and the individual possess
a qualitatively different identity from each other (Durkheim, 1964,
passim).
Durkheim's contention is that it is an impossible task adequately
to anticipate or understand the variety of individual expression
which occurs in the universe of events. Accordingly, Durkheim
chooses to concentrate the focus of his study upon linguistic,
cultural, moral and legal systems, and in particular, the inherent
social dimension of each, which he believes to stand distinct from
the individual who partakes within that system. Education is not
exempt from this form of analysis, since, for Durkheim, education
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has to do with socialisation. If education has something to do with
development, then to a very great extent, development is itself a
social activity (Dearden, et al, 1972, p. 113).
Before examining Durkheim's sociological theory of education in a
little more detail, it is important to understand what it is that
Durkheim means when he speaks of the social'.
As with many terms used in sociological discourse, the key
concept is multifarious in meaning, operating at several levels of
complexity. On one level, Durkheim uses the term simply to denote
anything which is general, or collective. Thus, it might be argued
that throughout human history, certain beliefs, concepts and values
have been maintained continually across different societies, down
the ages. Indeed, it could be said that, even though the individual
has died, the values which existed in their social environment have
survived beyond that individual's lives. The social exists distinct
from the individual (Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 8).
As an example of this, Durkheim suggests the concept of religious
belief; the basis for mythological interpretations of reality, which
Durkheim finds in a great variety of forms amongst religions, but
which is the universal and objective cause of these sensations sui
generis out of which religious experience is made, is society' (cf.
Durkheim, 1961, pp. 52-56). In essence, then, Durkheiin's first use
of the concept of the social relates to this commonality of values
and beliefs, which are ultimately derived from the society in which
individuals are found.
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It will be clear from what has been said above, that Durkheim's
initial concept of the social has already introduced some questions
of complexity. For Durkheim is not prepared to complete his
sociological theory with the notion that society is only the common
core of values which are manifest amongst all individuals from the
earliest times to the present. For one thing, some values do change.
As new values enter into social circulation, the common core in turn
begins to change. What was once common now becomes less general,
more specific. Moreover, as these changes occur, some individuals
may begin to decide that they no longer wish to enter into the
common core of shared values. If Durkheim's theory of the social is
to be maintained, it must mean more than the simple common heritage
of all peoples.
To this end, Durkheim introduces his theory of constraint.
Individuals, he claims, are limited by the pressures of social
existence. This might be most particularly experienced in the area
of morality. 4 ' Thus, an individual, who wished to act against the
commonly held system of beliefs and values of society, (that is, a
set of values which that individual had no hand in making), might
choose not to follow his or her own desired course of actions, but
choose to conform instead to the values of society against which his
or her wishes were opposed. This conforming by an individual to a
pre-determined, yet opposing set of values, may have at its root any
number of causes. These may include hope of reward, fear of
punishment, or a desire to please. But there may, indeed be an
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imperative desire in the individual who conforms, to do so because
they feel it is something that ought to be done. Conforming to
predetermined rules may, therefore, have both an external (societal)
cause, and an internal (personal) cause. When such an event occurs,
it draws the individual into society; it is socialisation'.
It has been shown above how Durkheim perceives the social on two
levels. First, society is distinct from the individual. Second,
society can help to change and develop individuals, especially in
the area of behaviour and morality. To these two levels, Durkheim
adds a third. Society, as Durkheim stated in the quotation above,
which touched on religious belief, is a reality which exists sui
generis. It has, in other words, an ontological identity. It exists
as a Thou to the I of the individual. It changes individuals, so
that it could be argued that individuals relate to it. Just as the
laws of nature and physics operate in such a way as to constrain
humans to what is naturally and physically possible, so too does
society constrain humans to actions and relationships of the
possible. Indeed, the social' takes on for Durkheim a character
which is almost metaphysical. Thus we could replace the term 'God'
with that of 'society', and very little else might change; just as
God is held by some to exist over and above humanity, so for
Durkheim, society exists over and above humanity. Just as conformity
to the will of God lead to the life of grace, so for Durkheim,
conformity to society leads to fulness of life. Durkheim's virtual
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divinisation of society is thus complete (cf. Blackledge and Hunt,
1985, ibid.).
Durkheiin's theory of education stems from these concepts. But one
should be wary of suggesting that for Durkheim, education is solely
to be equated with socialisation. It has to do with socialisation,
but is not completely identical with it. This assertion is supported
in part, by Durkheim's claim that those generic areas traditionally
associated with education; knowledge and values, skills and methods,
are not found within the individual, but are acquired by the
individual, through the processes of socialisation, from the common
core inherited by society (cf. Durkhei,n, 1956, pp. 71f.).
At once the objection might be raised that this is to imply that
education must therefore involve introducing the individual to all
forms of societal behaviour and experience, both those commonly held
to be moral, and those commonly held to be immoral. To leave
education at this juncture, would be tantamount to approving the
educational value of encountering those very areas of morality which
society as a whole would seek to condemn. Accordingly, Durkheim is
obliged here to introduce the issue of value. Rather than confront
the individual with the whole gamut of moral and immoral actions
which occur in the social world, the educator is required to educate
the individual in ways which are considered of value in any given
society. In order for this to happen, Durkheim suggests, two
particular principles take place. First, the content of any
education will be found to conform with the values, beliefs and
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attitudes of a given society. Education acts, therefore, as a
catalyst for societal homogeneity. Second, education will be found
to conform to the demands of the setting in which it is found. This
implies that different forms of education are suitable for the
different needs and situations in which that education takes place
(Durkheim, 1956, ibid., cf. Dearden, 1972, p. 115).
Durkheim's sociological theory, and his application of it to
education has been criticised on a number of counts. P. A. White has
noted that it is unclear whether Durkheim intended that what he
stated about education should be applied to any particular form of
society, or to the generic concept of society as a whole (Dearden,
1972, p. 116). To the extent that a specific society might be one in
which some values, beliefs and attitudes were generally shared,
whilst there also existed a plurality of values, and beliefs which
were different to others is not, ultimately, to say very much about
the society in which those phenomena occur.
Similarly, Durkheim's educational theories provide little
information regarding the nature and role of the autonomous
individual. White comments on the suggestion of some scholars that
Durkheim shifted his position later, to favour more significance
being placed on the rle of autonomy in the education process.
However, he suggests that it would be inappropriate to attempt to
trace such a line of thought in Durkheim, since Durkheim himself
does not develop his thought on the matter (Dearden, 1972, ibid.,
cf. Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 9)42
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Lastly, it is by no means clear that what Durkheim took to be the
aim of education, namely the transmission of values, cultural norms
and intellectual abilities, is indeed the aim as such. Certainly
there appear to be few commonly held ideals either amongst
educationalists or indeed amongst educators which are deemed
essential for the education process. Indeed, in applying moral
values to the educational process, which, albeit implicitly, is
precisely what Durkheim introduces into the debate with his two
educational principles, he assumes that there exist clearly
identifiable common values and normative moral desires within
society. However, if this assumption is applied to society as we
find it today, it becomes very difficult to identify any deeply held
common values, beyond the vague and the general. In contrast to
Durkheim's stated belief in a common core of values, it is often
individual self-interest which appears to dominate attitudes and
beliefs.
A second significant sociological approach to education is that
of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and of Marxism. At the heart of Marxist
social theory is the view that there is no such thing as a given
epistemological fact, but only social relations which create social
consciousness. Knowledge is constructed, operating in individuals as
a mode of response to social conditions around them (cf. Kalve,
1994, p. 9). Classically defined by Marx, social consciousness is
formed by the social and economic existence of each individual: 'It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but
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their social existence that determines their consciousness' (Marx,
1970, P. 21). Similarly, in the preface to the second German edition
of the first volume of Marx's monumental analysis of economics,
Capital, he compares his approach to consciousness with the idealism
of Hegel. He writes
'[Hegel's concept of] the process of thinking, which, under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent
subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world
is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me,
on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material
world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of
thought' (Marx, 1977, p. 29).
This stress on the material reality which informs consciousness,
which Marx provides as the basis of his theory of dialectical
materialism, leads Marx, ultimately, to the conclusion that society
itself is nothing less than material reality. In opposition to
idealism, Marx understood materialism within the context of the
material and economic conditions of social life. 43 In this sense,
materialists hold that there exists independent of our perceptions a
world, which is reflected in some way in our perceptions. Here
materialism would appear to be in agreement with the form of realism
outlined in the section above. But in addition to possessing some
basic realist assumptions, such as a belief in a material world
which is sustained through material causes, and a belief in the
objective reality of matter which is open to apprehension through
material processes of thought, Marxist materialism goes further
still. Marx suggests that realism as it stands is too mechanistic to
explain social relations adequately;
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t The materialist [i.e. realist] doctrine that men are products
of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed
men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing,
forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the
educator must himself be educated' (Marx and Engels, 1976, pp.
618-619).
Put simply, Marx is here suggesting that if our understanding of
society bases itself solely on the results of circumstance, that
would imply that accident and circumstance were the dominant causal
effects in society; chaos would result. However, it is a fundamental
tenet of Marxist theory that chaos does not control society. People
are able to change circumstance, and indeed, there exist certain
laws of development, which arise from the material interconnections
and interdependence of reality, which prevent any degeneration into
chaos.
In the light of what has been said above, Marx decided that the
key to understanding the control of circumstance by humans is to be
found in the underlying actions which keep people alive in society.
For Marx, that base structure is economic activity and production.
On top of this structure are found the institutions of society;
politics, education, religion, the family, values and beliefs
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 113).
However, as with Durkheim, so with Marx there exists an ambiguity
concerning the distinction between society as a determined subject
on the one hand, and the autonomy and will of the individual on the
other. Thus, on the one hand it could be argued that it is the
economic base which determines the nature and direction of the
institutional forms of society. Similarly, as Marx himself
68
suggested, if the economic base itself changes, then this will tlead
sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense
superstructure' (Marx, 1970, P. 21).
However, as Barry Hunt has noted, Marx's determinist account of
social institutions can be challenged by the view taken by his life-
long collaborator, Engels (1820-1895). Engels suggests that rather
than limiting the movement of development from the economic base to
the superstructure of society, one should instead work from the
perception that there exists a steady interaction between the
economic and the social, in such a way that each conditions, and is
conditioned, by the other. Thus, a dialectical relationship is
established between the economic base and the social superstructure,
with a complementary dependence being established. Hunt comments
that most Marxists who support this view would add that the economic
base retains some pre-eminence in this relationship, being,
according to Engels, the stronger and most decisive of the two
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 115; cf. Marx and Engels, 1979, p.
525ff.). 44 The debate about this, as with much of Marxism is not
concluded, nor is it likely to be so.
Given the great many interpretations of Marxism that abound
today, it is difficult to provide a precise account of Marxist
education theory in the light of Marxist sociology. What follows
will be a brief and approximate account of some possible Marxist
expositions of education theory. This will by no means exclude other
explanations.
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The tensions between determinist and voluntarist models of
Marxism extend into the questions about the concepts of education
theory. Thus, if the determinist approach to Marxism is applied to
education, the Marxist practitioner would understand education to
belong, in the capitalist mode of existence, to the means of direct
production, or, more accurately, direct reproduction. 'Education's
raison d'etre is to perpetuate or "reproduce" the capitalist system'
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 135). In other words, education
within the processes of capitalism is seen by determinist Marxists
as being a social institution, which does not change society, but
sustains the existing social and economic order in which it occurs
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, ibid.).
Because of the dialectical nature of the historical materialism
of determinist Marxism, in which the needs of the capitalist class
are pitted against the opposition of the working class, education
is, therefore, seen as a way of maintaining the capitalist system.
As such, education reproduces the pre-existing class structure of
society. This is achieved in two ways. First it creates a
justification for the existing class structure by encouraging an
attitude in society that lauds economic success as direct product of
a 'good education, be that through the development of skills or
intellectual abilities. Second, it perpetuates capitalist structures
by providing a content which creates the necessary skills and
abilities needed to maintain the capitalist system (Blackledge and
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Hunt, 1985, P. 137). In these circumstances, education is held to be
functional.
Such strict theories of direct reproduction are tempered somewhat
by the voluntarist Marxism of those who wish to give some rle to
the notion of relative autonomy within society. Thus, to present
education in the bleakest of functionalist terms is to ignore the
creative and cultural freedom in which pupils find themselves.
Citing Michael Apple, Barry Hunt suggests that voluntarist Marxists
would seek to stress the mediating milieu of a classroom or school
culture through which any demands from a hidden curriculum are
filtered (Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 179, citing Apple, 1982, p.
14). Indeed, it is precisely in the clash of these cultures with the
demands and expectations of the capitalist class that the dialectic
movement is to be found. Similarly, to let the determinism of
history dominate the direction of the lives of individuals is to
ignore that humans make history. The desires of the human will play
A
as much a role in shaping culture and attitudes as does the economic
and social structure. 45 It is in this sense that education can
involve some element of human autonomy; in adapting the curriculum
through its cultural filtration in the school setting, pupils
express their own dialectic, whilst at the same time encountering
the demands of the theory of reproduction mentioned above. Such
reproduction occurs indirectly, and should be placed within the
context of cultural resistance (Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 195).
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Criticisms may be levelled, however, against these theoretical
models. Barry Hunt suggests that two particular difficulties arise
with the main tenet of historical materialism. The first opposes
economic determinism. The example of the economic chaos of the
Soviet Union in the years immediately following the Russian
Revolution of 1917, (and, indeed, the eventual demise of that State
barely seventy years after the event), demonstrated on the part of
the revolutionaries an idealism in which the true economic
sacrifices and events never mirrored the determinist desires of
scientific socialism'. The theoretical model of relative autonomy
fares no better. This model seems to indicate that the economic base
is not the only determining factor in the social construction of
reality, but that the political, cultural, religious, moral and
intellectual elements also play a significant rle in this matter.
Accordingly, it could be argued that this theoretical model is no
theory at all, but mere, banal commonplace (Blackledge and Hunt,
1985, pp. 198ff.; cf. Carew Hunt, 1963, pp. 67-80).
In addition, Hunt notes that the same kinds of criticism may be
made against the implications of Marxist theory for education. The
relatively decentralised education system in the United Kingdom
reduces the validity of Marxist claims that there is a
correspondence between educational structures and capitalist
economic demands. In addition, but generically, attitudes to work do
not seem to have been greatly influenced by education. Similarly,
the cultural attitudes of pupils have not been found to provide
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opposition to the existing social and economic order. Lastly,
Marxist theory over-simplifies the relationship of the state to
capitalist structures. Hunt notes that today there exists a
plurality of differing groups, each in positions of power in
society, operating within a complex societal web (Blackledge and
Hunt, pp. 226ff.).
The dissolution of what was known as the Eastern bloc, followed
by the decline of Marxist influence amongst the intellectual
communities, marked the collapse of the Marxist ideal. The
certainties of modernity seem now to be regarded as an intellectual
conceit. Indeed, this sense among thinkers, of the end of the
twentieth century as being a fin de siecle has led some to question
the very reality of historicism (cf. Fukuyama, 1989, pp. 3_l7).46
This questioning has led, in turn to new ways of attempting to
understand reality. One significant approach to this issue is that
of postmodernism and deconstruction.
Postmodernism and deconstruction are notoriously difficult to
define, not least because of their increasingly fashionable status
as portmanteau terms, which are often misunderstood, and therefore
mis-used. Like the other conceptual models examined in this section,
postmodernist deconstruction relies upon a particular understanding
of society and identity for its base structure. In an article which
is generally critical in tone of postmodernism, Hugo Meynell
provides a very useful attempt at explaining its method of approach.
73
Meynell contends that both Postmodernism and deconstruction are
'destructive of norms for coming to know what is really true and do
what is really good' (Meynell, 1995, p. 128). 	 This, he contends,
is because they rest upon the assumption that 'the notion that there
is an independently existing cosmos which makes [our] beliefs and
statements about it true or false, is fundementally mistaken'
(Meynell, 1995, p. 126). This assumption is grounded in the belief
that any scientific attempt at explaining a world as it is, comes to
grief on its failure to reflect on the fact that 'human societies
each constitute their own cosmos' (Meynell, 1995, ibid.). Not only
is the attempt to move objectively outside our own thoughts and
language in order to understand reality as it is, an irrelevant
desire, but it is also an impossible task. We could never be sure
that the hierarchy of reality which we believe to be objectively
real is actually real. 'To say that some beliefs or statements are
"true" and others "false" is simply to confer social approval on the
former, and to stigmatize the latter as socially unacceptable'
(Meynell, 1995, ibid.).
As such, postmodernism is claimed by its proponents to be a
language of deconstruction, aimed at undermining the claimed
authority of the language being deconstructed. But postmodernism is
not intended to be a purely destructive, negative force. For
example, although it has been criticised by some for its implied
suppression - or indeed repression - of values, (particularly
because of its refusal to provide an alternative vocabulary in
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substitution for this loss), postmodernism's defenders would argue
that it does not supress vocabulary, so much as interpret it tas
directing us to nothing beyond or outside its own discourse' (Soper,
1991, P. 121).
Postmodernism, then, has profound implications for the way
rational discourse is to be approached. Its deconstructive mode of
approach results in a constant questioning and self-questioning of
authority and received tradition. And in doing this, it establishes
and disestablishes at the same time: it questions itself, and is
therefore intended to be self-contradictory. As deconstruction, it
attempts to reply to the t logocentrism' of the text, (that view
which invests the ontology of truth within the spoken word,
tradition or logos). Postmodern culture states, and at the same time
questions that which it has stated. In a memorable phrase Linda
Hutcheon suggests postmodernist statements are trather like saying
something while at the same time putting inverted commas around what
is said' (Hutcheon, 1989, pp. 1-2; also cited in Meyne1l, 1995, p.
127).
This in turn has profound repercussions for education theory. If
there are no certainties to be apprehended, and if social discourse
does not possess any norms and standards by which human development
can be understood, nor indeed guaranteed, then knowledge becomes a
continuing and changing multiplicity of t truths', in which any
claims to a priori assumptions about reality are to be discounted,
because of their uncertainty. As such, a postmodern education theory
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would leave a dangerous legacy. Its particular distrust of relative
values, leaves the educator in the unenviable position of being
forced by the postmodern condition to choose between pre-determined
values and goods, (which for the postmodernist are logocentric by
virtue	 of their	 pre-determined	 authority,	 and	 therefore
unverifiable), or to choose 'a pragmatic acceptance of the loss of
values' (Soper, 1991, pp. 122-123), and accept what must ultimately
be an amoral, and ultimately incommunicable philosophy.
The choice is a stark one. In an attempt to reply to the
accusations of postmodernism, some educationalists have tried to
provide a basis whereby education theory may operate with more
confidence than postmodernism will allow. Thus Paul Hirst proposes
four models for education, the last of which he believes may give
grounds for such optimism.
Hirst takes education to be 'the process by which each of us
becomes the particular person he does, with his own distinctive way
of life'. Thus it is 'concerned with becoming a distinctive human
being' (Felderhof, 1985, pp. 5, 6). Hirst proposes further that the
'cognitive elements' we come to possess throughout our lives, act in
a determining fashion upon our educational growth (Felderhof, 1985,
p. 5). Education, Hirst continues, may be both deliberate and
unintentional. Indeed, even within the course of planned education,
unplanned outcomes may occur (Felderhof, 1985, p. 6). For the
purposes of his article, Hirst makes clear that he is concerned more
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with the former than the latter. In so doing, he identifies four
particular notions of education.
Each model, Hirst claims, rests upon its own specific theory for
the basis of knowledge and belief (Felderhof, 1985, p . 6). The first
model Hirst proposes might be termed the traditional concept of
education. This view proposes that there exists an objective and
specific body of skills, concepts and values, within a particular
tradition (Felderhof, 1985, pp. 6f.). Knowledge and belief
establishes its value because of its proven worth...across a long
period of time'. That which is thereby held to be true or good
becomes the content for instruction (Felderhof, 1985, pp. 7).
This discourse, based on the self-validity of belief, has its
strengths in its sense of timeless certainty. Its failings, however,
are all too clear. First it contains no self-critical mechanism;
plural world-views cannot be tolerated if they conflict with the
presupposed traditions of this model. In this case, no rational
judgements can be made of such plural views. The education
transmitted on this model's terms would be monolithic and singular.
Its appeal to the ghetto remains intense (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.).
Second, (and under criticism from the deconstructionists, who would
deny the legitimacy of an appeal to tradition), this view fails to
establish both the objective reality of the world, and the objective
validity of its own presupposed tradition. This model depends on
belief for its structural base. Belief, for postmodernism, is
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ultimately uncertainty. Therefore this educational concept fails the
critique of postmodern culture.
Hirst's second model comes close to the Durkheimian concept of
education discussed previously in this section. Hirst presents a
notion of education in which knowledge achieves its legitimation
through an acknowledged, voluntary social agreement. This is
achieved through the convergence of opinion on the meaning of the
evidence under consideration. It is by this social agreement that
the monolithic basis of Hirst's first educational model is avoided,
and whereby the legitimate expression of plural views may be open to
consideration (Felderhof, 1985, p. 9).
This concept of a convergence of opinion does have appear to have
a certain soundness to it. In one very real sense, it manages to
allow some postmodern concern to inhabit it: the question of the
existence of an objective form of knowledge does not arise.
Knowledge is based upon social agreement. This agreement is
concerned with belief, and is not intended to be a statement of
certitude about the objective existence of any such body of
knowledge. But, as Hirst notes, its failings lie in its treatment of
what he calls traditionally non-rational concepts; religion,
morality, culture. Because no basic convergence of opinion can be
reached with respect to these areas, this model must fail,
ultimately, in its universal coherence (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.).
I-Iirst's third model is very closely related to the first. This
model attempts...to legitimise autonomous beliefs by insisting that
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the accepted traditional belief system itself recognises the
existence of autonomous knowledge' (Felderhof, 1985, p. 10). Often
wholistic in concept, such a theor y relies on claims that all
attempts at the pursuit of knowledge rest upon beliefs that the
universe was created. In addition, any such theory must possesses a
primary focus from which all exploration of autonomous knowledge
extends, and to which all explanations of autonomous knowledge must
refer and agree (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.).
In the sense that this model requires a presupposed belief in the
foundational model of the tradition as its basic element in
generating empirical knowledge, it is no different from the first of
Hirst's models (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.). It would reject any
knowledge claims which conflict with the presupposed tradition,
since consistency with those presuppositions becomes a prior
requirement for the model's self validation. As a result, the same
criticisms which were levelled at the first model may be levelled at
this one.
Hirst finally presents a third model which he believes to be the
solution to the difficulties described in his previous three models.
This concept is comprised of four component parts. First, there can
be no exceptions to the belief that 'all areas of beliefs, values,
attitudes and so on are seen as areas in which rational critical
appraisal' can be made (Felderhof, 1985, p. 12). Second, there are
some beliefs which, whilst it may not be possible to assess them
rationally, nevertheless may still be held to be more, or less
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defensible. Third, there exist some beliefs, (Hirst gives here the
example of moral and religious beliefs), which are not only
contested, but which, in themselves, contest claims about 'what
counts as "rational criticism"' (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.). Fourth, no
society starts in a vacuum. Each society exists by virtue of its
critique of its own existence; it grows through rational self-
criticism. It is this ratio-critical element which is central for
Hirst. Thus, 'a rational society needs a body of generally agreed
principles[...]. How much diversity is acceptable in a society is
itself a disputable matter which must be decided by a rational
procedure' (Felderhof, 1985, ibid.).
As a result, Hirst suggests, this model provides a real strength
in that it is not affected by any presupposed tradition upon which a
society might base itself. Its aim is not to maintain that system,
but to develop the rational life of each person. It is not negative
in its aim, but seeks positively to enable individuals to show
'commitment in belief and practice in every area'; a commitment
which is determined through rational judgement, or critical review
(Felderhof, 1985, p. 13).
To this, however, postmodernisin would reply with a question mark.
Given the deconstructive nature of this cultural form, the
postmodern critic would contend that to claim that there is such a
thing as a rational pursuit is to express a certitude in method
which is deeply logocentric. The deconstructionist might assert that
this logocentrism relies at its base upon a belief in a systematic
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tradition - rational discourse - which is itself open to
deconstruction. The hermeneutical critic might in turn also wish to
criticise Hirst on precisely the same grounds: how can one be self-
critical, without applying the self-same critique to the method of
criticism. This circular dilemma continues to haunt postmodern and
critical thought. Education theory is as much affected by it as any
other epistemology.48
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iii. Discussion and Conclusions.
This chapter has considered some of the ways in which the
methodological presuppositions of the philosophy of education have
influenced thought in Catholic and secular traditions. What has been
presented above is not intended to show the whole range of such
conceptual thinking, rather, it seeks to show a range of some of the
major philosophical positions which are found in each tradition.
What follows is a brief consideration of the comparisons between
the methodological presuppositions of the two traditions, in the
light of the presentations made in this chapter. This thesis will
return again to compare details between the traditions later, and in
more depth. What follows should, therefore be considered as
preliminary.
Three particular areas of comparison present themselves. First,
issues concerning the datum for knowledge, second, issues related to
the concept of the individual, and third, issues relating to the
processes of education.
a. The datum for knowledge.
This chapter has presented one particular,	 (though not
exclusive), model of Catholic education, but one which, this thesis
contends, exists at least in part in all Catholic educational
thought. A threefold structure was developed in this model;
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revelation at the origin of the model, human dignity at the point of
reception, and wholism of knowledge at the moment of response.
The internalised logic of this structure is contained within its
own assumed tradition, namely that point of contact which
established the datum of revelation. It is in the datum of this
central focus of the self-communication of God, that the noetic
presuppositions of Catholic education are to be found.
This is to be contrasted with the datum for knowledge in secular
tradition. As it was described above, traditional idealism and
realism place their epistemic logic in a confidence in humanity's
rational capacities. Indeed, the very logic of each philosophical
approach rests upon the belief that rational argument makes each
model coherent. The rational processes become the presupposed datum
for knowledge. However, within the secular tradition, a second form
of philosophical approach was explored, that of the socio-cultural
and political models. At the heart of these ideological concepts was
found to exist a belief in the significance of society as an arbiter
of theory. For many of the overtly sociological approaches, the
presupposition that it was possible to reach societal agreement,
formed, to a large degree, the methodological base. This was
contrasted, however, by postmodernism. This claimed for itself the
irony of 'convention', or anti-convention as its base structure.
Both Catholic and secular traditions, then, use presupposed means
to establish their identities and subsequent structures. To that
end, it is legitimate to describe this as a convergence of
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methodology. However, it is also clear that the content of the
presupposed methodologies are, indeed at times wildl y opposed to
each other, and, indeed, often antithetical.
b. The concept of the individual.
In Catholic theology, as in its educational concepts, the human
individual is accorded a very important rle. The divine self-
communication is not merely an aspect of the economic Trinity, but
is also an aspect of the immanent Trinity: God communicates not
simply in himself, but to another. That other is held to be created
by God. Given the goodness of God, the creation of God is also held
to be good. Thus we may summarise the Catholic understanding of the
individual subject of revelation as the person who is grounded in
the creative goodness of God. God becomes the constant point of
reference.
Secular tradition contrasts with this theology by asserting the
identity of the individual in two ways. The traditional approaches
of idealism and realism present the individual as a rational being;
one capable of using logic coherently, with respect to the former,
and capable of deductive logic with respect to the latter. Thus in
idealist thought, the person is endowed with rational abilities. In
realist thought, the person is capable of thought, action and
judgement. The assumption which underlines each is that rational
discourse is possible.
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In its analysis of the human person, the socio-cultural approach
returns for its point of reference to the concept of society. Thus,
the person is endowed with social consciousness, with economic
conditions and relationships, with questions of autonomy and the
plurality of the person. Although each social approach differs in
its understanding of the person to the others, all share a basic
assumption that the individual relates not merely to himself or
herself, but to a greater whole; society. This may be seen, again,
in postmodernism's ironic (de)affirmation of social tradition, which
it sees existing as a form of metaphysical fascism, to be confirmed,
and in its confirmation, to be denied.
In summary, both Catholic and secular traditions affirm the need
to identify the individual. Both use presupposed structures to
inform their debate on this issue. But, as with the content of the
datum for knowledge, so too with the approaches to the concept of
the person: Catholic and secular traditions cannot agree with each
other on this point. Indeed, within secular tradition itself, a
great deal of ambiguity and difference exists between the various
approaches.
c. The processes of education.
This chapter has shown that Catholic education theory is wholist
in nature. It proceeds from a pre-determined structural methodology.
This methodology encompasses both the datum for knowledge, namely
revelation, and the point of reference for the intrinsic goodness of
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creation, namely God. As such, all educational processes in which
humans engage, originate from this presupposed structure. Knowledge
is unitive and coherent because all forms of knowledge share this
genesis in God's self-communication to creation.
Secular tradition considers the issues of educational process in
the light of its own presuppositions. Thus the traditional rational
approach of idealism and realism indicates that education is able to
occur by virtue of the rational or active capacities and
capabilities of the individual. Idealism develops its theory of
education from its conceptual presupposition that the individual has
a rational ability. That ability allows judgement about knowledge to
proceed on the level of informed and coherent opinion and moral
imperative. Realism works from a similar presupposition of the
rational capacities of the person. Knowledge is dependable, capable
of being known by those who are rational. The reality of the world
is asserted. Socio-cultural tradition, in contrast, returns once
more to the centrality of society. It is in society that education
takes place. Society is the arbiter and limit of the educational
enterprise. As a key educational concept, social agreement and
convergence determine the educational process. But, as it has been
shown above, the deconstructive culture of postmodernism has cast a
question over the certainties of social reality. Once again it
affirms, and by affirmation, denies the validity of an appeal to
social construct for an educational theory. In its place,
postmodernism leaves an ironic question mark.
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From this, it will be seen, again, that whereas both Catholic and
secular traditions share the need to presuppose conditions for their
models of education to occur, the content of those presupposed
conditions differs to some extent. Both Catholic and secular
traditions affirm the need for the existence of some form of society
in which education is expected to occur. Both traditions believe
that it is possible for education to occur. (These possibilities
are, of course denied by postmodern criticism).49
But it is equally clear that the disagreement in content of the
presuppositions of each tradition is marked. One bases itself upon a
theistic interpretation of reality. The other denies the legitimacy
of that reality, either as an actual presupposition, or as a
required presupposition.
This thesis will go on to examine the assumptions inherent in
Catholic and secular traditions, within one specific field of
education, that of religious education. In the light of the
discussions in the present chapter, this will concentrate
particularly on the stated aims for religious education, and on the
educational epistemologies which inform those aims.
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NOTES
1 Throughout this thesis the term tradition' will be employed to
denote Catholic and secular positions. Clearly argument exists both
amongst Catholics and secularists as to what each respective group
does and should intend in its understanding of both education theory
and religious education. Some of these arguments will be explored in
detail throughout this study.
2 On the surface, this narrative account would seem to ignore some
of the more accepted results of historical and scientific enquiry
into the origins of the human species. Just as it would be dangerous
to read into this theological exploration the assured' truths of
history and science (both in the rational and pejorative senses), so
too would it be dangerous to ignore here the power of symbolism. See
below.
The issue of the human rejection of God, and of the apparent non-
existence of a yearning for God amongst atheists is accounted for in
the Catechism by the notion of revolt against God. Indeed it could
be asserted that it is in the dialectic of a God-created desire for
God on the part of humanity and the equally God-created autonomy of
the will in humanity that an unavoidable tension exists (cf. CCC.
art. 29). Chirico makes the point that even in rejecting God, the
human remains the highest possible medium for God's self-
communication, on account of the created ontology of human yearning
which God brought about initially in creation itself (cf. Chirico,
1983, p.167).
' These terms correspond closely to Aquinas' Five Ways. The fifth
term pulchra is found in Aquinas, although his fifth Way relates to
the concept of there being a guidedness of nature to which all
creation tends. Cf. Summa Theologiae, Ta pars, 2, 3.
This in turn raises the question of the need for revelation for
humanity. If humanity possess a receptivity to know God, and that
receptivity allows for the rational human knowledge to achieve some
knowledge of God, to the extent that such knowledge might be held
with certainty, then it might also be suggested that revelation
loses its communicative significance in that process. Why should an
exterior revelation take place, if the capacity to know God is
already within human nature? Does this not make revelation
irrelevant? This is denied in various ways by the Church Councils,
most notably by the First Vatican Council which asserts that there
are certain 'good things of God' which lie beyond the sphere of
human knowledge, and which God alone can communicate in revelation
(DS 3005).
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6 The other four ways in which Christ is said to be present in a
particularly special way are; in the Church as it celebrates
liturgical celebrations, in the Church assembly, in the acts of the
ordained minister of the sacraments and lastly in the sacraments
themselves, most particularly the Eucharist (John Paul II, 1989, pp.
12-13).
On the relationship of Scripture to Tradition within the context
of the primacy of revelation See Kitng, 1964, pp. 105-106.
8 For a classical Catholic definition of biblical inspiration see
DS 1501, 3006; cf. 3288, 3292. See also O'Grady, 1969, pp. 217-222.
For this reason O'Grady speaks of revelation being 'not simply a
body of doctrine', but a reflection of a living faith brought about
by a living individual, namely, Christ (O'Grady, 1969, p. 214,
n. 1).
10 See for example references in Mondin, 1963.
11 On Tillich's concept of symbolic causality see Tillich, 1978, pp.
238ff.
12 For a purely secular presentation of this model of revelation see
Grimmitt, 1987; cf. Kalve, 1994, pp. 61-68.
13 See, for illustration DS 30, DS 125, DS 3021, DS 3024. Often
these teachings take the form of anathemata, (condemnations of
propositions contrary to Catholic doctrine). The doctrinal position
of the Church is often inferred, therefore, as the opposite of a
statement which is being denied.
14 Cf. also CCC. arts. 355ff.
15 Not of Origen himself, however, but of some monks in Jerusalem
who had been influenced by his teachings.
16 Waldensians and Lombards in France came to be heavily influenced
by Albigensian thought. In subscribing to dualist beliefs concerning
Scriptural tradition, they believed with the Albigensians that the
Old Testament had come under the influence of a demiurge or evil
spirit, holding also that New Testament tradition denied Jesus
Christ's human body, They also rejected the notion that the
sacraments could be used as a means of sanctification (cf., passim,
King, 1968, pp.250f).
17 As a fascinating further comment on the whole issue of creation,
set in the context of modern paleontology and the theories of
evolution, attention should be paid to the Pius Xli's encyclical
Humani Generis (1950), where the Pontiff permits the study of the
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evolution of human evolution, insofar as it follows the demands of
Catholic belief pertaining to the immediate creation of souls by God
(Ds 3896).
18 In a not entirely dissimilar sense Paul Tillich speaks of the
transcendence of existence as being crucial to an understanding of
human existence, but also as a means of overcoming the fear of non-
being. But whereas Balthasar speaks of mystery being integral to
understanding human nature, Tillich talks of taccepting acceptance'
of non-being (Tillich, 1977, pp. 152ff.).
19 It should be noted that this analysis will be concerned with the
concept of education. The concept of Catholic religious education
will be examined in Chapter Two below.
20 One might here see a connection between the Church's acceptance
of societal influence as an valid educational process and the
discussion in the previous section of the Church's demand that
creation be regarded as a morally good reality: if the created
realities are intrinsically good because they come from God, then
the educational process whereby society is capable of influencing
the person should, in itself, be seen as part of the created
realities, and therefore good. This of course is not to deny that
some social influences in themselves might not be morally good. The
distinction here is between the capacity to influence, and the
content of that influence.
It was in the context of his writings about the Catholic
university that Newman discussed his theory of education.
22 Italics in original.
23 Catechesis is discussed in more detail in the second chapter to
this thesis.
24 This is obviously not an exclusive definition of the term
'Catholic', which contains within it many more meanings and shades
of spirituality. The definition used here is merely intended to show
what tCatho1ic means for the purposes of this particular study.
25 The section on Plato and the post-Enlightenment thinkers
presented above is drawn from the present author's previous work,
Kalve, 1994, pp. 4-6. Due acknowledgement of this is hereby made.
26 This, of course is epitomised in the Kantian position of noumena
and phenomena. The noumena are the external sources of knowledge,
which remain unknowable. The phenomena are the mediated experiences
by which we infer reality. See, for example Kant, 1933, p. 20f.
27 Kohlberg, amongst others, criticises these Kantian categories of
knowledge as being dishonest to developmental psychology. He argues
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that experience does not fit a pre-given mould, but is an on-going
event which develops out of the interaction between human beings and
their environment (Kohlberg, 1968, p. 1023). However, Kohlberg's own
position has been criticised, in turn, by R. S. Peters, for not
taking personal habit into account within his psychological model
(Scheffler, 1966, pp. 245-262).
28 Because his idealism allows room for uncertainty, Kant's concept
of reality provides a particular significance to questions which are
valid in an educational context, such as how we come to know things,
and the extent to which we can know things. We might believe we know
the world of appearances, but if all we know is simply appearance as
opposed to concrete reality as it is, then there remains the
possibility for faith in metaphysics to operate in ways beyond the
realm of reason. Similarly, if the implications of Kant's view of
reality are correct, then the scientific account of there being a
determinism in the world must be considered as an explanation of
appearances, not facts in themselves. On this basis alone human
autonomy is permissible as a possible alternative.
29 This definition might be compared with the interpretations of the
anthropologist Yehudi Cohen, who suggests that socialisation
consists of activities that are devoted to the inculcation and
elicitation of basic motivational and cognitive patterns through
ongoing and spontaneous interaction with parents, siblings, kinsmen,
and other members of the community'. This socialisation, according
to Cohen, occurs within all cultures, as a constant, relational
activity (Wax, et al, 1971, p. 22).
30 This is not to say, of course, that modern idealists deny that
skills are unimportant, merely that curriculum content should always
defer both to idealist philosophical and educational principles. See
Power, 1982, p. 88.
31 This is an argument suggested also by H. W. Hepburn in Dearden,
Hirst and Peters, 1972, pp. 484-500. Hepburn, one should note,
analyses the relationship of aesthetics to education.
32 But note the comments of T. F. Daveney on moral education and
also on the dangers of too easily dismissing skills training from
intellectual education theory. See Langford and O'Connor, 1973,
pp . 79-95.
Thomas Groome notes that Aristotle is here stands in direct
opposition to Plato who saw the educative process as a way of
bringing out of ourselves what was already within. Aristotle stands
instead in the tradition of sense experience. See Groome, 1980, p.
6.
In the case of Descartes, it is particularly important to
recognise that he assumes in his definition of reality that our
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self-awareness, and our awareness of the world about us is
determined not through a construction of an imaginary reality, but
through our re-construction of reality as it is, evidentially and
experientially mediated to us through our self-interpretation of the
world. In his letter of March or April of 1648, writing probably to
the Marquis of Newcastle, Descartes suggests that such a reality
exists, our understanding of it being tour soul's capacity for
receiving from God an intuitive kind of knowledge' (Anscombe and
Geach, 1970, p. 301).
This simile holds good even if it is granted that mathematics is
a interpretational construction. What is at issue here is whether it
is feasible or not to claim that the logically impossible can exist.
36 Such an understanding of reality leaves it open to attack from
idealists, naturally enough, who may wish to argue that claims for
the existence of a reality which is beyond our material
comprehension, are nothing more than idealist metaphysics. As Power
notes, this has been countered by the suggestions of some realists,
that the tspiritual results of the organic actions of the brain,
are, in fact, highly refined parts of the evolutionary process, and
hence ultimately of material origin (Power, 1982, p. 94).
This is to assume, of course, that natural law, of its character,
lays down moral precepts which ought to be followed. Violations of
the natural law would, on this view, render the individual open to
the situational difficulties and disasters which would ensue. This
view could, however, be countered by those realists who wish to
stress social convention over natural law. They might argue that
moral action retains its obligatory character because conventional
wisdom and human experience have shown to us those moral actions
which bring about good, and those which do not. Strictly speaking,
such a view would be utilitarian, centering upon the usefulness of
each and every individual moral action (cf. Power, ibid. pp. 100-
101).
See also the comments of John Dewey on education as an exercise
in management for life, in Kilpatrick, 1933, p. 71.
To this end Paul Hirst speaks of education as 'the development of
the rational life for each of us, personally and socially' (Hirst,
1995). He goes on to suggest that the rational life 'requires that
in every area of thought and practice we persue truth and
justifiable action with no questions ruled out' [emphases in
original]. Rational processes are, naturally, open to fundamental
questioning, both philosophically and in praxis. This point is
acknowledged by Hirst.
40 We should, of course, be careful to distinguish between the terms
'community' and society'. In its secular sense community can have
two distinct, commonly held meanings. First, community can refer to
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a spatial concept, which is often geographic or demographic in
focus, indicating some cultural, economic or political area that
operates as a self-contained unit. Second, community can refer to a
conventional sense of face-to-face contacts between individuals, on
a personal basis. Clear rles are identified for individuals, and
through this process, normative behaviour comes to be regulated,
thereby providing order and security for those groups. To this
definition, society might be contrasted. Society might be understood
as a process of impersonal contact made throughout the modern,
industrialised world. People co-exist independently of each other,
and enter into relationships with each other, purely on the basis of
self-interest. In this way society acts as an epitome of
utilitarianism. However, we should be wary of placing too much
stress either on such a division of meaning between these terms, or,
indeed, on the definitions that have been given above. There are
many kinds of society, as, indeed, there are many kinds of
community. Amongst the many normative uses of the concept of
society, perhaps the most significant is its employment in
opposition to notions of 'the individual'. This is certainly a use
which was applied to the term by Durkheim.
41 This would, of course, beg the question as to whether there was
such a thing as 'morality' in a sociological setting.
42 Blackledge and also notes the comments of Durkheim's biographer,
Steven Lukes, that Durkheim's use of the concept of social
constraint is too wide to be of real value in understanding how
individuals come to internalise the values of society. Individuals,
Lukes suggests convincingly that when individuals internalise moral
rules from society, rather than being constrained by them, they show
a commitment to them. Commitment, as Blackledge notes, is a positive
term, whilst constraint has decidedly negative connotations about it
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 9, cf. Lukes, 1973).
43 Cf. Lefebvre, 1972, pp. 69-74 for a detailed account of Marx's
understanding of 'ideology'.
44 Hunt describes this as the 'theory of "relative autonomy"
(Blackledge and Hunt, 1985, p. 114).
1-low true this is to Marx's original intentions, is, however, open
to question.
46 But note the comments of Bertram, 1990, pp. 126f.
Meynell distinguishes deconstruction from postmodernism in that
the former is to do with certain approaches to literature, whilst
the latter is to do with an 'associated attitude to culture and to
the world as a whole' (Meynell, 1995, p. 128).
93
Even the anti-postmodern critic might inquire what it is that
Hirst means when he speaks of the trational processes. Hirst
himself seems aware of this problem of definition. In a private
communication to the author he writes 'I have in recent years
changed my view of how the rational life comes to be lived. I used
to think it was primarily through the persuits of theoretical reason
in the fundamental disciplines of thought[...J. I now think
practical reason fundamental in which rational practices develop not
from theoretical insights directly, but in practical experience
itself...' (Hirst, 1995, emphases in original).
It might be argued that Catholicism comes closest to those
secular philosophical approaches related to realism. Now whilst the
Thomist tradition has often been presented as realist, some secular
realists would wish to deny its place amongst them, claiming that no
metaphysical system (that is, a system with metaphysical
presuppositions) could legitimately call itself realist.
CHAPTER II
The Methodological Presuppositions of Religious Education in
Catholic and Secular Traditions
The central focus of this chapter is to do with the
methodological presuppositions which inform the theories of
religious education, as an educational process, in Catholic and
secular traditions.
Religious education as an educational concept raises issues of
philosophical complexity and controversy amongst both Catholic and
secular thinkers. Among Catholics, the recent development of new
programmes of study approved by the Bishops' Conference of England
and Wales and the subsequent disquiet about those programmes
expressed by some parents, priests and educationalists, mirrors the
controversies surrounding the development of
	
experiential'
approaches to religious education among secular educationalists (cf.
for example Burn and Malone, 1992; White, 1994; Hammond, et al,
1990; Thatcher, 1991).
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It may be admitted as an adjunct to the general thesis of this
study that this divergent controversy has developed because of
increasingly confused notions, among the members and educational
practitioners of the Catholic and secular traditions, of what the
actual aims and objectives of religious education are, when placed
within the context of education theory. Both traditions are at
present in a debate with themselves about what they are trying to
achieve in religious education, and about what religious education
can contribute, both to the education of children, and also to the
respective traditions themselves.
In comparing Catholic and secular methodological approaches to
religious education within the context of the general educational
theories of each tradition, this chapter will attempt to provide
evidence of the philosophical complexities which bedevil each
traditions' understanding and use of religious education. In the
following discussion and concluding remarks, this chapter will seek
not only to present these ambiguities in a critical light, but also
to indicate some surprising parallels and dissimilarities of
approach between each tradition.
This chapter, therefore, will first identify and analyse the
theological and educational presuppositions which underline Catholic
religious education theory, concentrating most particularly upon the
Conciliar and Post-conciliar documents of the Church. Having
established a structural base for religious education, (which arises
from the threefold structure for Catholic education, discussed in
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the	 Chapter One), this chapter will reflect on some secular
approaches to religious education. It will consider and compare the
work of a number of significant religious education theorists,
notably the work of theorists in the University of Birmingham's
Centre for Religious Education Development and Research, but also
the work of experiential theorists such as John Hay and David
Hammond. A third area of exploration in secular religious education
theory will be an analysis of the implications for secular religious
education in the light of some areas of postmodern theology and
theory, epitomised by the position of the Sea of Faith' school of
theologians.
A comparison of Catholic and secular presuppositions which
underpin religious education in each respective tradition under
examination will be attempted. Conclusions will be drawn from this
comparison, and contrasts analysed.
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1. Catholic Religious Education.
t Religious Education in our schools should have pride of place in
the curriculum. It must be evident in all our schools that it is the
foundation subject and has a natural priority for our work'
(Catholic Diocese of Northampton, 1994, P. 10). With these
resounding words, the Catholic Diocese of Northampton states its
commitment to see religious education placed at the forefront of
Catholic education in its diocese.
It is, perhaps unsurprising that a Catholic diocese would wish to
place such importance in the religious dimension of education. The
diocese, as the local church within the context of the universal
Church, seeks quite naturally to uphold the faith of the universal
Church in its local setting. This can be seen, for instance, in the
words of Bishop Daniel Mullins, the bishops of England and Wales
have always seen Catholic schools as central to the work and mission
of the Church' (Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, 1994,
p. 7). It is in this context that Catholic religious education must
be placed.' This is also the context from which any enquiry into the
specific methodological assumptions of Catholic religious education
must begin.
A number of specific issues arising from the words of Bishop
Mullins, quoted above, invite comment. First, the Bishop makes clear
that the school is a proper place for Catholic education. The
function of this place of education is linked intrinsically to the
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mission of the Church as a whole. 2 This is recognised as such, in a
recent and significant document produced by the Congregation for
Catholic Education. The Congregation states that, reflected in the
mission given it by Jesus Christ, the Church develops continually
new pastoral instruments to assist 'in proclaiming the Gospel and
promoting total human formation. The Catholic school is one of these
pastoral instruments...' 	 (Vatican Congregation for Catholic
Education, 1988, pp. 20-21). As an instrumental form of pastoral
witness to the Church's mission, the Catholic school is said to
assist the Church to evangelise, educate and provide formation of
both 'a healthy and morally sound life-style among its members'
(Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education, ibid., p. 22). As
such, the witness of the Catholic school - those distinctive
features which make it Catholic - are realised within its own
'particular vision of education'. This witness is one 'which is
concerned not only with the teaching and learning of subjects, but
also with forming its members in faith' (Bishops' Conference of
England and Wales, 1994, p. 7). The place in which one finds
education occurring as a whole, within a Catholic context is, then,
a place of formation. This is the place in which not only is the
world of knowledge encountered and taught, but also where a truly
theological process is undertaken; the human faith response to God's
self-communication.
But Bishop Mullins' comments lead also to a secondary, yet
significant point about the relationship of mission and Catholic
9schools, namely that Christian formation, as part of the mission of
the Church, is not limited to the educational processes of schools.
Catholic schools are said to be central to the Church's mission and
work, but not necessary and sufficient for that work to be achieved.
This is highlighted by a recent document of the National Board of
Religious Inspectors and Advisers, which stresses the need 'for
collaborative partnership between the home, the parish and the
school' (National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
p. 7). V. Alan McClelland suggests the same, when he reflects on the
sense children make of social and community interactions which they
discover and engage in as they mature. Thus, McClelland proposes
that a child's sense of community begins at home, is encountered in
the Church community and is further developed through schooling. The
work of faith formation can be said to occur in the same way, with
the same interdependence being relied upon in both cases (cf.
McClelland and Varma, 1989, pp. 25-29).
A school which undertakes this kind of pastoral and theological
work determines, as a result, its structure and ethos. In a recent
study of the effect of a Catholic school's ethos on post-l6 student
academic achievement, Andrew Morris found some evidence to suggest
that students who transferred from an environment in which a
Catholic school ethos predominated, to one where a secular ethos
predominated, suffered detrimentally in their subsequent academic
performance. Morris identified a number of areas in which the school
ethos of a Catholic school might be said to be distinctive. These
1O(
included the idea that in entering a Catholic school one enterec
into a faith-illumined environment which based itself upon God'
revelation, and in which any teaching activities were compatibl
with the actions and teaching of Christ (Morris, 1995, p. 68). Ii
his study, Morris included some comments by students about how the
perceived their school environments to be distinctively Catholic.
One clear observation made by a number of those he quoted was th
notion that the Catholic school was essentially a community in whici
the values of the Gospel were clearly communicated (Morris, 1995
pp. 68ff.). As a community, the Catholic school functions in a wa
which precludes the concept of competition as a priority. Rathei
than enforcing the self-seeking, self-valourising strictures ol
competition, criticised, for example, by McClelland, the sense oJ
community to be found in Catholic education finds its centrE
permeated thy the Gospel spirit of freedom and love' (McClelland anc
Varma, 1989, p. 27; cf. Gravissimuni Educationis, art. 8).	 This
necessarily has implications for all the curriculum. Just as th€
ethos of the Catholic school refers itself constantly to the Gospel,
so too the school curriculum must reflect the Church's belief ir
Christ, and God's revelation of Christ as the datum for all
knowledge, as the ground and framework for any educational process
in a Catholic school (cf. National Board of Religious Inspectors and
Advisers, 1994, p. 7).
Any exploration of Catholic religious education must be placed
within this context. If the immediate aim of religious education is
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t to promote knowledge and understanding of the Catholic faith', then
clearly its perspective must be both confessional and Christological
(cf. National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
ibid.). For this reason the Bishops' Conference of England and Wales
have given some clear and unambiguous directions indicating which
particular Church doctrines are to be considered as essential for
the teaching of religious education. Basing itself upon the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, the directions seek to enable
children and adults to grow in commitment to Christ and the Church
in such a way that the message of the Gospel becomes 'ever more
challenging and central to the lives of all our young people'
(Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, 1994, p. 8).
In asserting both a local and a universal dimension to Catholic
religious education, it seems clear that the Bishops' Conference
wishes to stress the relevance of the local setting in the delivery
of religious education, in ways which reflect those particular
cultural concerns which inform the educative processes in a given
place. But in asserting the universal nature of doctrine and belief,
the Bishops' Conference also wishes to stress that faith and
commitment are to be found in a community of shared values and
ideas: we believe as one Church, not as individuals (cf CCC arts.
26, 185). It is the formation and education of young children into a
deeper commitment to the community of the Church, which is seen as a
clear aim of religious education at the outset.
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Four particular themes related to the processes and aims of
religious education have been identified. 4
 These are; revelation,
community, the way of life and celebration. They correspond to the
four Constitutions of the Second Vatican Council. Thus, the theme of
revelation corresponds to Del Verbum; community corresponds with
Lumen Gentium; the way of life corresponds with Gaudium et Spes;
finally, celebration corresponds with Sacrosanctum Concilium. This
chapter will consider each of the themes in turn, in the light of
these four Constitutions. This chapter will also analyse how these
relate to Catholic religious education.
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1. Revelation and religious education.
The previous chapter has established that the concept of
revelation has had a profound effect on a satisfactory understanding
of Catholic principles of education. The datum of revelation at once
provides both a clear locus for theological exploration, and at the
same time gives itself to human understanding as the primary source
of all knowledge. As such, revelation is correctly identified in the
context of this chapter with the starting point of the exploration
of religious education within Catholic tradition. If the first aim
of religious education in Catholic schools is to learn 'about
religion according to the Catholic faith', and to reflect 'on the
ultimate questions of life' (National Board of Religious Inspectors
and Advisers, 1994, p. 10), and, in addition, if the structural
importance of revelation to education theory has been correctly
understood, then it becomes clear that the two concepts of
revelation and religious education are interlinked in a profound and
fruitful way.
(a) The Dogmatic Constitution Del Verbum.
The Dogmatic Constitution Del Verbum, which remains one of the
most significant documents of the Second Vatican Council, provides a
insightful indication of one way in which religious education might
usefully be understood. This document was introduced in the first
chapter of this thesis, in the theological discussion on revelation.
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What follows here is a short summary of some of the key issues in
the Dogmatic Constitution. The primary aims of religious education
will be analysed in the light of these issues. From this the first
structures of Catholic religious education will then begin to become
clearer.
The first chapter of this thesis discussed the importance of the
opening sentence of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation:
'Hearing the Word of God with reverence, and proclaiming it with
faith...' (Del Verbum, art. 1): at once revelation is linked to
faith and salvation. Why does the Church want to affirm this link?
The article goes on to explain that the Council wishes 'the whole
world to hear the summons to salvation, so that through hearing it
may believe, through belief it may hope, through hope it may come to
love' (Del Verburn, Ibid.).
The Constitution proceeds to give a structural outline for the
process of revelation. Thus, God reveals himself because he wishes
us to share in the divine life; to experience koinonia. This
revelation is in the form of evidence of himself in creation, and in
words and deeds. The Constitution proceeds to present and descent of
generations to whom revelation was made present; to the primordial
couple, to Abraham and the Patriarchal tradition, to Moses and the
Prophets, in the definitive revelation of Christ on earth, who, in
being revealed, reveals the Father, (cf. Mk 1: 9-11; Mt 3: 13-17; Lk
3: 21-22; Jn 1: 29-34). The Passion, death and resurrection of
Christ lead the way to the coming of the Spirit upon the Church, and
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point to a final consummation of the great dynamic of revelation in
the glorious return of Christ at the end of time (Dei Verbwn art.
3).
The transmission of revelation is the concern of the second
chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution. As Richard McBrien has noted
(McBrien, 1980, Vol. 1, p. 219), the Council is keen to place
revelation within the context of salvation. Thus the Constitution
states that God had revealed himself t for the salvation of all
peoples', and in such a way as to preserve in its entirety the full
content of that revelation, to be transmitted intact down through
all generations (Dei Verbum art. 7). Three particular periods may be
identified for this transmission: the Pre-Apostolic, the Apostolic
and the Post-Apostolic ages. The Pre-Apostolic age is seen by the
Council to be that time from the original moment of divine self-
disclosure to the definitive event of Christ's life, words and work.
The Gospel is proclaimed in these actions and activities, whether
that be the Gospel faith lived and proclaimed by the Patriarchs and
Prophets, or indeed most fully proclaimed in the words and life of
Christ. This age ends, and the Apostolic age begins, when the
Apostles are charged by Christ with the task of proclaiming the
Gospel at the Ascension and at Pentecost. From this point onwards,
revelation is transmitted through this second stage of contact with
the original event of the message. With the death of the last
Apostle, the Apostolic age draws to a close; the Gospels are then
committed to writing. The Post-Apostolic age now commences. The
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Bishops and their successors, to whom the apostolic mantle has
passed, maintain, uphold and develop a better understanding of the
tradition which has been committed to them. Two clear sources for
the transmission of revelation are now identified; Scripture and
Tradition (Dei Verbum art. 7).5
What is crucial for our understanding of the relationship of
religious education to the Dogmatic Constitution's presentation of
revelation, (and also, since religious education itself demands the
use of some interpretative skills when dealing with the notion of
revelation), is the question of how one understands divine
inspiration, and of how one interprets texts, whilst remaining
faithful to that concept of divine inspiration. It is this issue of
interpretation which the third chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution
addresses.
Retaining its faith-centred approach to the salvific realities of
revelation as presented in Scripture and Tradition, and retaining as
well the structure whereby revelation is made known, the Council
states that all that which is 'contained and presented in the text
of sacred Scripture, have been written down under the inspiration of
the Holy Spirit' (Dei Verbum, art. 11). It has already been
commented upon in the previous chapter that the Council is careful
not to equate revelation with Scripture. Scripture contains and
presents revelation, but it does so on its own terms: God may give
us God-in-Christ, but not our language with which to interpret God
in Christ. That is left to us to determine.6
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The following article of the Dogmatic Constitution presents what
might be termed the	 eeducational	 rationale'	 behind our
interpretation of revelation. Since it is in Scripture that God
speaks to humanity in a human manner, it is, therefore incumbent
upon the faithful listener to interpret Scripture in such a way as
to ascertain precisely what it is that God wishes to say. This quest
might be phrased in the following, interrogative way: what meaning
was intended by the Scripture writers, who, it is asserted by faith,
were inspired in the meaning they gave to their work? It is equally
asserted in faith that in some way God's meaning is represented
through the Scripture writer's meaning. The educational desire to
know' is placed, therefore, within this faith context. Practical
approaches to understanding this meaning are identified. Literary
forms as they appear in Scripture are to be respected, for t truth is
differently presented and expressed in the various types of
historical writing' (Dei Verbwn, art. 12). Accordingly the use of
contemporary literary criticism is required. But, crucially, it is
equally incumbent upon the exegete, (and, by extension, upon the
educator), to work from a position that takes into account the
t content and unity of the whole of Scripture', in the light of
Tradition and faith. Finally, all that is said in interpreting
Scripture is subject, ultimately, to the judgement and authority of
the Church (Del Verbuni, ibid.).
The Dogmatic Constitution goes on in its subsequent articles to
examine the ways that the Old and New Testaments are to be correctly
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understood as purveyors of the meaning of revelation. The Old
Testament, therefore, is placed firmly within the context of
salvation history. The communication of the divine is said to point
inevitably to the Christological focus of revelation attested to in
the New Testament. Thus, the Old Testament is said to prefigure the
New Testament (Dei Verbum, arts. 14-16). The New Testament too is
affirmed as salvific in content, inspired in origins, and touching
on historicity in origin and purpose (Del Verbum, arts. 17-20). The
Dogmatic Constitution ends with an analysis of the liturgical and
theological relationship that exists between Scripture and Tradition
in the life of the Church. Thus, the Church's veneration of the
divine in Scripture is explored. Scripture and Tradition are seen as
being rules of faith, because of their inspired nature. The Church's
preaching today, therefore should be 'nourished and ruled by sacred
Scripture' (Del Verbum, art. 21). There exists, moreover a universal
right of access to the Scriptures. Accordingly, 'suitable and
correct' translations of Scripture from the original languages are
demanded to this end. Such translating activity is to be more
welcomed still, if undertaken ecumenically with other the Christian
churches (Dei Verbum, art. 22). To achieve a more profound
understanding of the meanings invested in Scripture, theologians are
charged by the Church with the duty of undertaking patristic and
exegetical study, 'under the watchful eye of the Magisterium'. In
studying texts, 'appropriate techniques' of textual criticism are to
be encouraged (Del Verbwn, art. 23). All study nourishes holiness,
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if undertaken in the light of faith. Indeed, it is this very demand
for study, guided by faith, which, the Constitution concludes, will
bring about an increase in veneration of the Word of God, and will
lead ultimately to a renewed spiritual life in the Church (Dei
Verbum, arts. 24-26).
(b) Reflections on the presuppositions of Catholic religious
education in the light of the Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verbum.
The Dogmatic Constitution throws some light upon the
presuppositions which underpin Catholic religious education.
Revelation is treated as an objective action; an event. This event
not only explains, or justifies the contingencies and accidents of
history, but also it gives meaning and grounds for optimism to
enable us to begin to explain our origins in the first place. Not
only does it assume that reality is objective, or trea1, but also
it assumes that reality is created, finding its ontological genesis
in the event of revelation. Revelation, then, is a tangible concept,
held to be understandable within the reality of an equally tangible
universe. There is, in other words, a point of contact between our
own human physicality, and the inexpressible, otherriess of the
divine. This comes about in a purely kenotic manner; it is in the
very kenosis of condescension, that the divine enters into the human
world of perception, and so becomes known. It is in this act of God
becoming known in revelation, that religious education becomes
possible.
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Of its nature, religious education can be said, therefore, to
concern itself, initially at least, with the symbolism of language,
and especially, the language of narrative theology. Just as God
becomes recognisably active in human history as the Word, so, in
turn the Word becomes word, spoken and proclaimed throughout the
Church and the world. To begin the activity of religious education,
then, is to tell a story.
That story is to do with 'the human quest for meaning'. Within
the unfolding scope of the Dogmatic Constitution, it is clear that,
as an initial means of access into the story of salvation history,
the first aim of religious education is 'to explore the importance
of story' in this search for meaning (National Board of Religious
Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, p. 14).
This exploration leads in turn to the issue of understanding:
without understanding the meaning of that which has been explored,
nothing of human significance will have been achieved. Since, for
the Christian tradition, Scripture has such a central focus for
understanding the human-divine story of meaning, it is to Scripture
that religious education must turn, if it is to attempt to make
sense of the meaning vested in revelation. Accordingly, it is 'the
r1e of Christian Scriptures as expressions of the ways in which
humankind strives to understand God' which provides religious
education with its understanding of the event of God in human
history (National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
ibid.). It is the belief, similarly, that human history is the
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subject for the objective reality of God, (and the telos in which
that reality is presented within a Scriptural context), that allows
a correlated reflexion of understanding to occur. Human nature, and
the intrinsic goodness of the human person is revealed through an
analysis of the relationship of God with the world. This is attested
and recognized in Scripture.
This is understood, further, in the acknowledgement of the human
nature of the expression of God's reality within the Scriptural
text. If witness is given to the divine inspiration of Scripture,
and through this witness, understanding of the divine becomes
possible, then it is equally the case that those witnesses to the
human expression of that inspiration, allow those who study the
texts to begin to understand the human desires and faith of the
Scriptural authors. If the faith of the writers of Scripture, and
the faith of those who today witness to the reality of God are
correlative, then it becomes possible, at least in part, to come
today to a fuller understanding of Scripture, on account of that
shared witness. By extension, this ref lexion impinges upon how one
might understand the faith of the whole community of believers. This
is particularly the case if the opening article of the Dogmatic
Constitution is taken seriously. Not only does revelation entail
receiving, it also requires a response; a personal, faith-filled
ref lexion on God's invitation. This ref lexion becomes an intrinsic
part of the presupposed aims of Catholic religious education. It
means that, at the outset, religious education cannot remain an
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objective, dispassionate exercise. It must involve the individual in
his own self-communication and participation in community life. In
this way, the individual fulfils the injunction of the Dogmatic
Constitution to study the Scriptures, and to reflect upon them (Dei
Verbum, arts. 25-26).
This reflexion upon revelation as contained and presented in
Scriptural witness extends beyond the writings of Christianity as
such, and requires of religious education an exploration into the
sacred writings of other faith communities. Thus, it is implied,
(indeed the Catechism clearly states) that there exists in all
humanity a great commonality of purpose, at times frustrated, at
times hidden, but always present, comprising a continuous yearning
for the divine. This search for God is to be found among the
different faith communities, even among those faiths who do not
share a Trinitarian faith. These too are said to adumbrate Christ's
revelatory reality in their own, partial, incomplete ways. As such
they are to be respected for their integrity and sense of religious
purpose. it is, therefore, expected of Catholic religious education,
that an exploration of this search for God be undertaken among the
sacred writings of those faith communities (cf. CCC., arts. 841-
845).
In the ways described above, Catholic religious education is
found to be intimately linked to the outline of the Dogmatic
Constitution on Divine Revelation. God's sovereignty as the author
of reality is first acknowledged. The unfolding story of salvation
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is explored. The faith of the Church is examined by a reflexion upon
the faith of the Scriptural witness. The wholeness and integrity of
the human search is recognized and valued in the faith of all the
religions, but is pointed, Christologically, to the Trinity from
whom the story of salvation finds its source.
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2. Community and religious education.
The section above outlined the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine
Revelation, and related the presuppositions of Catholic religious
education to that document. There exists, however, a direct
connection between the event of revelation and the community who
experiences this event.
The locus of revelation is reality, or, to put it more correctly,
reality is called into being through the action of revelation. Yet,
as the previous section has shown, the ability to understand
revelation necessarily requires an interpretation of that event. It
is in this sense that theology, (in this context, the way of
expressing human understanding of the divine), becomes, in Stewart
Sutherland's memorable phrase, tthe articulation of the possible'
(Sutherland, 1984, p. 73).7 That articulation becomes possible
because of the mediate function of Scripture and Tradition, since
these are particular ways in which revelation is presented to us.
The presentation of revelation is, therefore, of its nature placed
firmly within the context of the Church. Accordingly, theology
becomes an ecclesial activity, precisely because it bases itself
upon the witness of Scripture and Tradition.
Finally, it should be added that any ecclesial activity finds its
origins in the Christ-event, and most particularly, in the
significance of the Passion and death of Christ, as the pivotal
moment of the history of salvation. This, Lumen Gentium makes very
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clear. Similarly, Michael Schmaus comments that tthere is no genuine
christology without ecciesiology, since Christ is ordained to
humanity, to gather it round himself as the ground and centre of its
salvation. There is no ecciesiology without christology, since
Christ is the source of the Church's life and its Lord' (Schmaus,
1972, P. 13).
This section will consider this in the light of the great
Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, and most particularly in
the deeply significant first chapter to this document. The
presuppositions of Catholic religious education will then be
examined in relation to this.
(a) The Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium.
The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, is a
deeply	 significant	 document	 for	 the	 Catholic	 Church's
self-understanding, for a number of reasons. First, it completed
what was left unfinished at the First Vatican Council, by moving
beyond that Council's juridical interpretation of the Church, and
presenting, as a development of that overtly institutional model,
the concept of the Church as mystery. Accordingly, after a number of
schemata had been discussed at the Council, and after the title of
an initial first chapter to the proposed Constitution had been
rejected, (a chapter entitled, significantly, The Nature of the
Church Militant'), a new schema was adopted by the Council, the
title of whose first chapter was 'The Mystery of the Church'
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(Dulles, 1989, P. 17). Read in the context of salvation, this
concept of mystery takes on a profound significance.
The Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium contains such a vast
amount of material, it would be impossible in the confines of this
study to give an adequate presentation of all of its nuances and
themes. Accordingly, much of the following exposition and discussion
will concern the first chapter of that Constitution. Less detail
will necessarily be paid to the remainder.
The first chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution is one of its most
important. It is manifestly programmatic, and provides the
structural foundations for the development of the whole document. As
has been mentioned above, the title of this chapter is significant.
The Church is mystery. How this is to be understood, is indicated
through the use of images and metaphors, which recur throughout the
whole Constitution. What becomes clear is that the intention behind
this concept, and the use of imagery points to the fact that the
Church's nature cannot be as readily understood as might a
mathematical formula. There exists in the nature of the Church a
transcendent otherness which defies definition. The reality is
greater than our understanding of it, and so must remain - and be
understood - as mystery.
This mystery takes on, from its outset a Christological focus and
perspective. Thus, when the opening words of the Constitution speak
of the light of humanity', they refer not to the Church, but to
Christ (Lumen Gentiuni, art. 1). The light of humanity is not the
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light of the Church, which, in this sense has no light at all, but
is, as the light of the Gospels must always remain, the light of
Christ. Christ illumines the Church, and Christ illuminates the
world from the Church. The Church might be visible to the world, but
that visibility comes solely from Christ's light 'which shines out
visibly from the Church' (Lumen Gentium, ibid.). In this sense, the
Church's existence is owed directly to the event of revelation,
Christ, who communicates to humanity from the Church.
At once it becomes clear that the Church is linked in some way to
the salvific plan of God for humanity. The Church becomes intimately
involved in the salvific actions of Christ on one level because of
its identification as a visible instrument for Christ's saving
light. This instrumental function of the Church is made more
explicitly salvific still, when it is expressed within a sacramental
context; the Church 'is in the nature of sacrament - a sign and
instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all
men' (Lumen Gentium, ibid.). The Church becomes a sign which both
signifies and effects a salvific grace.
The first chapter moves next to consider the ecclesial concept of
the 'People of God' (Lumen Gentium, art. 2). The Church is described
both as being predestined to exist by virtue of its instrumental
function in the plan of salvation, yet also as something which is
awaiting fulfilment, guided by the Spirit, to reach a definitive
completion at the fulness of time. The Church, then, is on
pilgrimage (Lumen Gentiurn, ibid.). This pilgrimage is placed within
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the plan of salvation, sited covenantally in the narrative theology
of the human-divine relationship, but seen as a journey with a final
goal; a return to communion with the Father (Lumen Gentium, ibid.).8
This theme is returned to in later parts of the Constitution.
The first chapter of the Constitution goes on to discuss the
sometimes ambiguous relationship of the Church with the Kingdom of
God. Thus, in article 5 of the Constitution, the Church's mission is
said to be found in the preaching of the Gospel by Jesus, (the
coming of the kingdom of God'), with the Church being required here
to proclaim and establish the kingdom of God on earth, and so
function as an instrument, distinct from that kingdom (Lumen
Gentium, art. 5). At the same time, however, article 3 speaks of the
Church being intimately connected in its origins, with that kingdom.
Christ's inauguration of the kingdom of heaven on earth may be seen
almost as parallel to the inauguration of the Church, which is
itself described as the kingdom of Christ already present in
mystery' (Lumen Gentium, art. 3). Quite clearly something of a
theological balancing act is being attempted here.9
The Trinitarian aspect of this chapter begins to come sharply
into focus when article 4 of the Constitution is seen in the light
of the previous two articles. In the words of McBrien, the Church
is the visible embodiment of the triune God' (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2,
p . 671). The Church is called by the Father (Lumen Gentium, art. 2),
to union in and with the Son (Lumen Gentium, art. 3), and, as
article 4 makes clear this is achieved through the power of the
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Spirit (Lumen Gentium, art. 4). The work of salvation, which is
described in a Trinitarian context at the start of article 4, is
mirrored in an equally trinitarian context for the existence of the
Church at the end of that article (Lumen Gentium, ibid.).
The Constitution goes on to describe the foundation of the
Church. This is seen as a two-fold process. First, the Church finds
its inauguration in the words and actions of Jesus on earth. But
this inauguration finds its completion only at Pentecost, when the
Spirit, received from the Risen Christ, empowers the Church to be,
fully in the world (Lumen Gentium, art. 5). As Jesus was compelled
to preach the kingdom, and to do good works, so now the Church,
too, is called to proclaim, embody and serve the coming Kingdom of
God' (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 671), as the body of Christ (Lumen
Gentium, art. 8).10
The subsequent chapters develop the important issues which have
been the subject of the observations made above. Chapter two of the
Constitution explores the image of the People of God, and the
significance of this theme being placed before the following chapter
on the hierarchical structure of the Church has been noted by
McBrien. 'The Church is presented in Lumen Gentium as the whole
People of God (chapter II), which happens to have a certain
hierarchical structure to help the people of God fulfill [sic] its
mission in history (chapter III)' (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 672).
The debate which led to these themes being placed in this way,
McBrien calls 'crucial' (McBrien, ibid., p. 671).
120
Yet, as McBrien notes, the third chapter of Lumen Gentium does
not find its significance in its place in the Constitution alone. It
remains important in its own right, presenting clearly for the first
time the truly collegial nature of the college of the Apostles,
found in the communion of Bishops (McBrien, ibid., p. 672). In this
sense, the Constitution finally completes what was left unfinished
at the First Vatican Council, which, in 1870, defined papal
infallibility. Authority belongs not only to the successor of Peter,
but to the whole episcopal order, which the Council declares to have
t supreme and full authority over the universal Church'. This, the
Council asserts, can only come about when the Pope is in agreement
with the College of Bishops (Lumen Gentium, art. 22). Collegiality
exists most especially in an ecumenical Council, but exists also in
the relationship of unity found between local bishops, and so
individual churches, and also with the Pope (cf Lumen Gentiurn,
ibid.). The Church is both local, and universal (McBrien, 1980, Vol.
2, p. 672).
At the same time, there exists a universality of function shared
by all the People of God, whether clerical, religious or lay. The
charge of Christ to preach the Gospel throughout the world applies
to all regardless of state (Lumen Gentium, art. 30). This universal
charge means that the lay are as much functional and active members
of the Church, as are those in orders; all have been commissioned to
the task of mission by Christ (Lumen Gentium, art. 33). Accordingly,
all are called to holiness, precisely because Christ calls the
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Church to be holy (Lumen Gentium, arts. 39f.). But the call to
holiness reminds the Church that it has not yet achieved perfect
holiness. This end remains the goal of pilgrimage for the Church
(Lumen Gentiurn, art. 48). Yet, in its final, moving chapter, the
Constitution reminds the Church that Mary, who has been assumed into
heaven, and who has reached that goal to which the whole Church
strives, serves as a model and sign of hope for an accomplishment
yet to be achieved. She remains 'the image and beginning of the
Church' and 'a sign of certain hope and comfort to the pilgrim
People of God' (Lumen Gentium, art. 68).
(b) Reflections on the presuppositions of Catholic religious
education in the light of the Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium.
The Dogmatic Constitution presents a number of legitimate areas
for consideration as fields relevant to religious education. A
proper consideration of the central issues of the Dogmatic
Constitution leads to the issue of community, touched on both above,
and in the previous chapter. By reflecting upon the vocation of each
human being, whether that call be implicit or explicit, to become a
Church, it is both possible and justifiable to reflect as well upon
'the human experience of belonging to community' in all its
manifestations and forms (National Board of Religious Inspectors and
Advisers, 1994, p. 15.). This provides grounds for the first
presupposed aim of Catholic religious education in this context,
namely that humanity are not individuals on self-centered quests for
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personal and individual fulfilment, but are beings, in each and
every case, graced with the dignity of the human person. 11 As such,
they possess the capacity to share with each other a recognition of
this dignity. Accordingly, it is through a reflection of this
principal dignity, that the human individual is able to identify
themselves within the context of a given community. They begin to
make sense of the world of relationships in which they find
themselves. In doing this they are able to become aware (that is,
they develop a capacity to recognise), that 'belonging' is a
profoundly human action. Recognition of this fact enables a sense of
community and society to develop, and provides also for a reflexive
identification to develop in the individual, whereby those positions
and philosophies which deny the legitimacy of the community or of
society may be rejected, on account of their claims which stand
against human dignity. At its core, then, Catholic religious
education, responding to the call of the Dogmatic Constitution Lumen
Gentium that humankind be a community, provides the grounds of faith
whereby human dignity - that which is found in human society and
community - may be recognised, reflected upon, shared, and lived.
But, as the Lumen Gentium makes clear, the call to humanity to be
a community comes from God, in revelation. It is according to
revelation, that humanity is not called simply to be a community,
but to be the community; the Church. In this way, so it is held,
humanity fulfils the demands laid upon it by God. In this way, the
plan of salvation is brought to its summit. Within religious
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education, then, this reflexive consideration of community must
lead,	 therefore,	 to this ecciesiological event. A deeper
contemplation into the experience of belonging to a community,
understood in the light of revelation, allows a more intimate
consideration of what it means to belong to the Church. Thus, not
only does Catholic religious education assist the individual to
place themselves in a community, and help them to reflect upon that
realisation, but it also enables the individual t to reflect on the
belief that, as people created in the image of a Triune God,
Christians are called to be that community which is the Church'
(National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, ibid.).
Catholic religious education necessarily must provide a sound
basis upon which knowledge of the structures which form the Church
may be given to the pupil. Naturally, some of this knowledge may be
found already within the Catholic child. This may have come about
through the social contexts in which the child may have encountered
the ethos of Catholicism, whether at home, or in a parish setting.
Nevertheless, it must not be assumed, of course, that every child
has been brought up in such a social setting.' 2 Similarly, it should
not be assumed that children are necessarily able to use the
metaphorical language which informs discussion on the ontology and
structure of the Church, and religious concepts, in any particularly
sophisticated manner. 13
Hence, Catholic religious education correctly presupposes that
pupils should be assisted in reaching both a knowledge and [an]
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understanding of people and rles in the Church' (National Board of
Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, ibid.). This assistance is
an educational aim, and cannot be assumed to exist in the mind of
the child without assistance from the religious educator. This
naturally raises the hermeneutical question of what understanding is
being developed in the child. Does the educator operate objectively,
or does he bring his own subjective experiences into the encounter?
Two elements may be addressed in this context. First, it is clear
that each person brings into the encounter with another their life
experiences, values and culture. These cannot, nor should they be
ignored. To this extent, the teacher is engaging in a form of
indoctrination; using and developing what he has already reflected
upon. But at the same time, within a Catholic context, religious
education must take its claims to community existence seriously.
What is taught is also part of the sensus fidelium of the People of
God, and is to be valued, as such, for what it is held to be; the
mature reflections of the community of believers upon the truths of
revelation. Seen in this light, Catholic religious education takes
on a developmental rle in which it assists in the continued
assertion of the Church's identity among its members. Moreover,
Catholic religious education demands that this assertion should
include the understanding that 'to be Church is to witness to the
Good News of Jesus Christ' (National Board of Religious Inspectors
and Advisers, 1994, ibid.). Catholic religious education not only
calls for an intellectual assertion of belief, but the lived
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reality; to engage in religious education in such a way as to
develop in pupils an understanding of what it is to be a Church,
requires a way of life on the part of the Catholic community as a
whole, and upon the religious educator in particular, which is open
to examination, and which can be seen to reflect the reality of
those beliefs.
Finally, Lumen Gentium points out that the human yearning for
God, which is to be found among many faiths, is a part of the desire
of all human beings to share in the divine life (cf. CCC. arts.
839-848). Accordingly, and in the light of the demands of the Church
that humanity recognises its communtarian existence, Catholic
religious education should enable pupils to examine in depth tthe
relationship between the Catholic Church and other denominations and
faiths' (National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
ibid.). Naturally enough, this requires tact and honesty on the part
of teachers. Traditions (including the Catholic tradition) must be
treated honestly and fairly. Where disagreements exist between
traditions, these cannot be ignored. Nor too, however, should the
positive and moving theology of revelation be ignored. It supports
most effectively the claims of Catholic theology that humanity is
one community which shares equally in the dignity of the human
person. In exploring the complex interrelationships between
Christian denominations, and between the Catholic Church and other
faiths, this unity of being can be effectively highlighted, and the
theology underlying it effectively maintained.
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3. The Christian way of life and religious education.
Having both considered revelation and the structure of the Church
in the light of the respective Dogmatic Constitutions of the Second
Vatican Council, and also having reflected upon these themes in
order to identify some of the major assumptions of Catholic
religious education which arise from them, this section now
considers the great Pastoral Constitution of the Council on the
Church in the modern world; Gaudium et Spes.
It is possible to see in Gaudium et Spes a development beyond
Lumen Gentium. Whereas Lumen Gentium analysed the mystery of the
Church, Gaudium et Spes moves on to look at the relationship that
exists between the Church and the world. It is, accordingly,
concerned above all with questions of lifestyle, morality, values
and attitudes, placing them all within a social picture, yet also
within a soteriological context.
This is mirrored, naturally enough, in the aims and assumptions
of Catholic religious education, as they arise as a consequence of
what was discussed above. Revelation is understood as the catalyst
that leads to the question of self identity as demonstrated in the
Church. But self identity cannot remain isolated within a community.
It must relate, and be a part of the greater whole. It must seek an
encounter with the other and recognise in that encounter that the
other shares in a common unity with the Church. It must, in the
words of the Constitution read the signs of the time' and interpret
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them in the light of the Gospel' (Gaudiurn et Spes, art. 4). The
Church is not something that exists alongside the world but within
the world' (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 674). Religious education must
take these concerns seriously, if its wholist educational basis is
to be recognised correctly.
This section will consider these issues in the light of some of
the key themes in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes. The
presuppositions of Catholic religious education will then be
examined in relation to these.
(a) The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.
Gaudium et Spes is an unusual document for a number of reasons.
First is its unique title; a Pastoral Constitution. This ascription,
suggested to the Council by the then Cardinal Wojtyla (cf. McBrien,
1980, Vol. 2, p. 673), later to become Pope John Paul II, gives this
Constitution its initial setting; the Church is not dominant in the
world, but is a servant of the world (Gaudium et Spes, art. 3).
As ever, the opening of the Constitution presents much of its
programme. At once the sense of community is stressed, only this
time, instead of simply speaking of the community of the Church as
did Lumen Gentium, Gaudium et Spes re-establishes a bond of unity
between all human beings, whether Christian or not: The joy and
hope, the grief and anguish of the men of our time...are the joy and
hope, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well'
(Gaudium et Spes, art. 1). It goes on to state that its message is
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addressed, accordingly, to all humanity, 'the whole human family
seen in the context of everything which envelopes it' (Gaudiurn et
Spes, art. 2).
Yet in saying this, the Constitution does not want to denigrate
or deny the validity of the distinctive message which the Church has
to give. There exists, on the part of the Church a religious
motivation, but one which is put at the service of the whole world:
'[there can be] no more eloquent expression of [the Church's]
solidarity and respectful affection for the whole human family, to
which it belongs, than to enter into dialogue with it [that is, with
the world] about all these different problems' (Gaudiun, et Spes,
art. 3).
Accordingly, and in response to this expression of solidarity on
the part of the Church for humanity, the Church is required to read
the signs of the times, to analyse the social and cultural forms of
transformation which modern society has engendered, transformations
which can so often lead both to hope and despair (Gaudiurn et Spes,
art. 4). It demands of the Church 'a new endeavour of analysis and
synthesis' (Gaudium et Spes, art. 5).
A great feature of these changes in society, especially within
industrial society, is the fact that they bring about a desire in
humanity for freedom. This freedom has some clear benefit for
humanity if properly used and understood. All too often, however,
social changes have led to detrimental changes in moral and
religious understanding. God, who was once rarely rejected has
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become the rejected one, displaced by a deified form of scientific
certainty (Gaudium et Spes, arts. 6, 7). These transformations have
also led to a number of imbalances, on the personal, the family and
the social levels. Thus, on the personal level, the practical,
modern and postmodern outlook stands in opposition to the wholist,
synthetic outlook; the demands for practicality oppose the demands
of moral conscience; the desire for specialisation contends against
an integrated and complete perception of reality. On the family
level, demographic pressures compete against economic and social
premises; one generation is opposed by its succeeding generation;
old social and gender relations are contrasted against new social
and gender relations. Lastly, on the social level, the affluent
oppose the underdeveloped; international organisations for peace are
opposed by nationalism; humanity, the author of distrust and hatred,
is opposed by humanity the victim. (Gaudiurn et Spes, art. 8).
These are seen by the Constitution as ways in which human society
has become unbalanced. By implication, the Church contends that they
can be rectified, that they do not need to stand in opposition, but
that they can be put back in balance with each other. The dilemma
for humanity is, however, to achieve this return to balance, to
re-establish a recognition of the collective and individual worth of
each human being, in the light of humanity's capacity for
self-destruction (Gaudium et Spes, art. 9).
At the core of these difficulties, says the Constitution, lies a
question of meaning; for what purpose is life? Does life have an
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ultimate meaning? To this quest, the Church brings its legitimate
voice, and thereby engages in the debate: Christ is the meaning. In
Christ, humanity achieves its ultimate perfection. In Christ,
humanity finds its completion: And that is why the Council, relying
on the inspiration of Christ, the image of the invisible
God...proposes to speak to all men in order to unfold the mystery
that is man and cooperate in tackling the main problems facing the
world today' (Gaudiurn et Spes, art. 10).
As the Constitution develops these themes, it works towards
establishing more clearly the Church's soteriological function as a
servant, both in and of the world. There, Church claims, there
exists a dignity, given by God, which is to be found in the human
person. That dignity, which is built up in the community of all
humanity requires us to recognise that, as a result, human actions
and activities necessarily take on the most profound significance.
They are undertaken, after all, by those who share in the image of
God. Through sin, through a seeking after freedom from God, as
opposed to freedom in God, that dignity has become sullied, and
those who undertake human actions are in need of redemption. At the
same time, it is precisely these activities which form the basis of
the Church's dialogue with the world, for the Church is always to be
found in the world. But the Church, which must always be understood
under its soteriological category of mystery, has not yet fully
achieved that salvific function. Its completion will only come about
at the end of time. As an earthly institution, the Church is made up
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of human beings, who share the same dignity, and bear the same
marred image of God, as those who are found outside the Church.
Provided and nourished by God, however, the Church is at once a
heavenly community, and also a human institution. It journeys
towards the same human goal as does all humanity, yet it is also
enriched spiritually through a constant renewal in Christ.
Recognition of this duality, of the fact that 'the earthly and the
heavenly city penetrate one another is a fact open only to the eyes
of faith' (Gaudiura et Spes, art. 40). Yet, at the same time, this
visible union of two functions is both visible and effective. The
Church is given as a means of bringing God's message of salvation
into the world. At the same time the Church seeks that salvation for
itself and for all humanity. But, as mystery, the Church is itself a
means of salvific grace. It is, in essence, a sacrament; that which
both signifies grace, and makes effective what it signifies.
The Church remains, and must remain impartial. It cannot be
allied to one political system, or ideological outlook. The Church
is called instead to a religious function, namely that of passing on
the good news of Christ (Gaudium et Spera, art. 42). Yet this is not
to deny the fact that a prime expectation on the part of human
beings is that they do not neglect their temporal duties. To do so
is to put into danger the very salvation which human beings seek
(Gaudium et Spes, art. 43). Human activity is, after all, linked
inextricably to the dignity of the human person, made in the image
of God. Denial of social responsibility is a denial of God. But the
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Church, as the Constitution makes clear, is deeply concerned that
the temporal and the religious should be seen as being complimentary
to each other. A failure to see it in this way presents a very
serious difficulty for the Church, and indeed is understood to be
one of the most dangerous threats to a properly religious
understanding of the world (Gaudium et Spes, ibid.). This
complimentarity is caught up in the very aim of the Church: that
the kingdom of God may come and the salvation of the human race may
be accomplished' (Gaudium et Spes, art. 45).
It is in the light of this effort by the Church on behalf of all
humanity, which, the Constitution suggests, is the reason, and
indeed, the justification for dialogue with humanity, that the
Church believes it has a valid voice in the world. This, the
Constitution sees as the proper expression of the missionary
function of the Church (Gaudium et Spes, art. 92).
(b) Reflections on the presuppositions of Catholic religious
education in the light of the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.
The Pastoral Constitution presents some very significant
implications for religious, education. For the first time, the clear
indication is given that, within its educational context, the life
of and values of a Christian are things which not only can be taught
in a factual, content based manner, but which, being taught, can be
experienced, appropriated and given formation within the individual.
Secondly, these values derive necessarily from the Church's concept
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of community. Educationally, it is from within the community of the
Church and of humanity, that the teaching about values and questions
of meaning must come.
This necessarily raises the question: from where, from a Catholic
perspective, does a sense of values arise, both in religious
education, and in the individual? One suggestion is to be found in a
recent document on Catholic education prepared by the Congregation
for Catholic Education. The Congregation seeks to provide some
educational goals for the Catholic school. As it does so, it
suggests that a useful frame of reference with which a Catholic
school's identity can be correlated is one in which the Gospel
values which are its inspiration, must be explicitly mentioned'
(Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education, 1988, art. 100). For
Catholic religious education, the sense of values which must
underpin the life of all humanity is found first and foremost in the
values of the Gospel. Those Gospel values derive from the life and
person of Christ. Since all humanity is called to share in these
values, it follows that humanity is called into communion with
Christ who brings these values into the human sphere of activity.
But it also follows, given Christ's injunction to the Church to
baptize all nations, 14
 that the particular community of Christ, the
Church, is called to bring the world into communion with Christ and
with itself. Communion, therefore, becomes mission (cf. John Paul
II, 1988b, art. 32).
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Educationally, this issue raises a more basic enquiry into the
issue of self-experience as a pedagogically sound guide for any
exploration of values. If, as has been suggested, a core purpose for
religious education as it touches on values and morality is the
exploration of those values which underpin beliefs and actions in
the human family' (National Board of Religious Inspectors and
Advisers, 1994, p. 16), then it must be established that (a) it is
possible to identify core human values, and (b) that those values
lend themselves to exploration. For Catholic religious education, as
for any systematic educational process, the first question must be
presupposed, if the second question is to follow. Thus, not only do
the values espoused in the Gospel require an assent of faith if they
are to be recognised as values, but also, so too do any set of
social norms. Faith in values and morality requires us to have faith
in the commonality of the human family: to accept common values, one
must also believe in a common basis to those values.15
But the Church seeks also to affirm a reality which addresses the
commonality of the human condition, with a distinctive voice. For
this reason, (though clearly not for this reason alone, given the
Church's concept of revelation), the Church proclaims its belief in
the Christological dimension to life. Religious education, insofar
A.
as it has a role in broadcasting the voice of the Church
educationally, functions in such a way that it assists children to
understand the following of Christ as a call to holiness/wholeness
of life' (National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
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ibid.). As the Church proclaims its belief in its central giver-of-
values, Jesus Christ, so Catholic religious education parallels that
action through its own attempt at proclaiming Christ, by teaching an
understanding of the nature of Christ's call to humanity. This, in
turn, invites reflection upon the very nature of mission and
discipleship. Not only is holiness, wholeness of life in God, to be
taught as a valid educational concept, but also it is to be taught
as a valid focus for personal reflection and development. This is to
do no less than to proclaim 'the living God who is close to us, who
calls us to profound communion with himself...It is the proclamation
that Jesus has a unique relationship with every person, which
enables us to see in every human face the face of Christ' (John Paul
II, 1995, p. 145). It is both religious education's Christological
praxis, and its rationale.16
Finally, it will be clear from what has been said both earlier in
this chapter, and also previously in this section, that the Pastoral
Constitution is concerned with all human traditions, including
especially the faith commitments of religious traditions other than
Christianity. Religious education must also accord a special regard
for those tradition. Thus, pupils might be expected 'to explore the
values and way of life of other world faiths', and so to come to
respect those traditions for what they are (National Board of
Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, ibid.).
Of course, it might be argued, perhaps justifiably, that respect
does not amount to very much. In one sense this is correct. Respect,
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understood in a formalistic sense, might give rise to a deliberate
coldness of attitude on the part of the student. The tradition being
studied might be an interesting, and indeed, a significant one,
amongst the myriad of world-views and religious beliefs. But despite
this, the student might remain so detached from the living tradition
which he or she studies, that the fact that this tradition might
indeed be a living, vibrant expression of the human search for
meaning, has been lost by the student. If this is what is meant by
t respect, then it does not stand for what the Pastoral
Constitution, or religious education understands by the term.
Respect, as a concept in Catholic religious education, understood
correctly in the light of the Pastoral Constitution, means something
far more significant and active. Not only does it involve an
absolute recognition in esteem of the individual dignity of each and
every person, including the self, but also it includes as a
necessary condition for this absolute recognition to take place, the
further identification of the religious commitment found in
traditions other than Christianity, with the human desire to respond
to God's initial call to salvation. Respect involves a recognition
of the vocation of all individuals, (both those of students and
those being studied), according to their conscience, to respond to
the revelation of God, as it is understood within the categories,
concepts, language and cultural expression of those individuals and
traditions. Bound up with this recognition is the belief that God
has spoken most completely in Christ. For the Catholic student,
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then, right judgement must therefore be understood to have a place
within the educational concept of respect. That judgement, however,
first and foremost must be inclusive, before it can begin to
function at the level at which such respect is engendered. But that
decision on the part of the student must be made ultimately from a
position of faith, which, for the Christian, arises as a gift from
God. As with all theological expressions, respect, correctly
understood, owes its meaning and relevance to revelation.17
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4. The Church's celebration and religious education.
As it has been shown in the preceding sections, the Church's
perception of reality, of itself and of the world, begins with its
presupposed premise of revelation, which is communicated by, and
mediated from Christ, who is present in the Church, and who is
proclaimed to the world by a Church which recognises that it is
itself in the world, and, therefore, insofar as it is a human
institution, also of the world.
But it should also be recognised that the Church understands
itself to be intimately connected to what it perceives to be the
divine origins of reality. Thus Christ is proclaimed the head of the
Church (cf. Colossians 1: 12-20). He is second Adam, who makes right
what first went wrong with the human Adam.' 8 He ends the banishment
of man from the Garden, when, as the Gardener, he - the Risen Christ
- announces the completion of God's plan of salvation by revealing
himself to Mary Magdalene (cf. John 20: 11-18). As the Ascended
Christ, he prepares the way for all humanity to return to God. But
he remains present in the Church, expressing that reality
especially, in graces mediated sacramentally by the Church, in its
life of celebration and festival.
This celebrating and festive life of the Church is considered and
presented in the context of the Second Vatican Council in the
Constitution Sacrosanctuni Concilium, promulgated on 4 December 1963.
This section will analyse how celebration and festival is to be
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understood in the light of this Constitution, most especially
through a consideration of elements in its first chapter. The
implications of this for religious education will then be discussed.
In particular, issues will be considered which deal with the
relationship of celebration with human development, and with the
symbolic nature of the Church's sacramental life in relation to the
inner growth and spirituality of individuals in a learning
environment.
(a) The Constitution Sacrosancturn Conciliurii.
To understand the Constitution Sacrosanct urn Conciliurn, it is
necessary to be aware of the presupposed conditions under which that
Constitution is intended to be seen. As Richard McBrien notes, the
Constitution develops from the premise that the liturgy must be
understood as being the most significant means by which the mystery
of the Church can be shown to the faithful and others, in the lives
of believers (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 676; cf. Sacrosancturn
Conciliurn, art. 2). For this reason, the Constitution sees in the
Christian life, in its institutions and its call, the possibility of
renewal and reform in the light of changes brought about through the
beneficial development of human knowledge. This renewal and these
reforms are to be understood as ways of up-building the ecclesial
body of Christ, to which all humanity is called to be a part. In
particular, this involves a reform of the liturgy (Sacrosanctuw
Conciliurn, art. 1).19
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The importance of the liturgy derives from its soteriological
function: 'for it is the liturgy through which, especially in the
divine sacrifice of the Eucharist, "the work of our redemption is
accomplished"' (Sacrosanctum Conciliuni, art. 2). In these liturgical
actions, the Church becomes a sign of the graces mediated through
them. The Church, which possesses, so the Constitution asserts,
visible and invisible realities, tends to direct itself and those
who are members of it from the human elements of its structure
towards the divine. In building up the human body of Christ, the
liturgy underlines the principle that, through the sign of the
Church in the world - a sign of grace made effective through its
event - the Church is a sacrament to the world. In its sacramental
existence, God and Christ are made present in the world (cf.
Sacrosanctwn Conciliuni, ibid.).
How does the Church celebrate, in the light of this
soteriological presupposition? Principally, this is achieved through
the Church's celebration, in word and rite, of the re-enactment of
the Paschal Mystery (that is, the passion, death, resurrection and
ascension of Jesus Christ). Finding its origin in the saving actions
of Christ, and communicated through the Spirit filled actions of the
apostles, this 'work of salvation' is continued, according to the
Constitution, through the sacrificial and sacramental activities of
the Church. Most especially this is to be recognised in the Church's
sacramental life of Baptism and Eucharist: 'by Baptism men are
grafted into the paschal mystery of Christ; they die with him, are
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buried with him, and rise with him...In like manner as often as they
eat the Supper of the Lord they proclaim the death of the Lord until
he comes' (Sacrosanctum Conciliuni, art. 6).20
Given that the activities of the Church are to be seen as
sacramental actions which effect and mediate salvation to the world,
it follows that they are in some way related to the saving actions
of Christ in human history. Given the universal vastness of God's
plan of salvation, 21 the Constitution makes clear that the Church
takes up and re-enacts that which was accomplished by Christ in the
Paschal Mystery (Sacrosanctum Conciliurn, arts. 5, 7).22 The Church,
continues the Constitution, has been commissioned to continue this
perpetual celebration of the Paschal Mystery, through its
empowerment in the Spirit (Sacrosanctum Conciliurn, art. 6, passim),
and in its close relationship with Christ in effecting and mediating
salvation to the world. 'Christ, indeed, always associates the
Church with himself in this great work.' Accordingly, 'the liturgy,
then, is rightly seen as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus
Christ' (Sacrosanctum Concilium, art. 7). As a result, every
liturgical action becomes an action of Christ, the Head, and his
Body, the Church (Sacrosanctum Conciliurn, ibid.).
Since Christ is the Head of the Church, and the one who, in the
language of Hebrews has 'passed through the heavens', 23
 and given
also that the Church understands itself as a people on pilgrimage to
this same destiny of glory, then it follows that the salvific
actions of Christ, who is made present in the sacraments of the
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Church, provides a foretaste of the future destiny of all humanity
(Sacrosanctum Concilium, art. 8.).24 The earthly liturgy becomes a
paradigm of the heavenly liturgy. Indeed, the liturgy enacted by the
Church is provided here with a clear theological context, in which
the hidden realities of the divine are made present for humanity in
the world of visible realities. The divine subordinates the human,
and so provides an image of the in-breaking of God into the
creaturely realm, much as do images of revelation and the
Incarnation.25
A very important point must be made, however, with regard to the
activities of the Church. The liturgy does not exhaust all that the
Church can accomplish. The Church is able to continue to preach
faith and penance, to prepare the faithful for the sacraments, to
proclaim the Gospel; to be, in other words, the human partner to a
divine imperative (Sacrosanctum Concilium, art.	 9). Yet, at the
same time, the liturgy remains tthe summit towards which the
activity of the Church is directed; it is also the fount from which
all her power flows' (Sacrosanctum Concilium, art.	 10). The
Church's mission is overtly proselytic. It seeks to draw all
humanity, not simply to itself, but to Christ who shines forth from
the Church (cf. Lumen Gentium, art. 1). Grace is mediated from that
perspective. God's actions are made tangible, and the accompanying
grace flows from this divine originator. Given the significance of
pilgrimage of the people of God to their destiny of heavenly
fulfilment, as an expression of the Church's self-understanding, the
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liturgical work of salvation acts as a means of directing the
people of God to that ultimate goal (Sacrosanctuni Concilium, art
10).
The Church, then, as the people of God, must encourage all its
members to become effectively involved in full participation in the
liturgy, and most especially the Eucharist (Sacrosanctum Concilium,
arts. 26, 28, 29, 31, 47-55). To achieve this most effectively, it
is necessary for there to be an accessible language of signs and
symbols, readily understood by the faithful, in order that the
sacramental actions of the Church might be properly understood.
Indeed, it might correctly be asserted that the liturgy is of itself
a world of signs and symbols (Sacrosanctum Concilium, art. 21). Any
renewal or reform of the liturgy must reflect this fact. As Richard
McBrien has commented, 'If the sign is to cause the grace it
signifies (as the Council of Trent declared), then the sign must be
understandable' (McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 676). To this extent, the
Constitution allows for legitimate variations and adaptations' of
ritual, provided that those changes do not touch on the faith or
good of the community as a whole.26
(b) Reflections on the presuppositions of Catholic religious
education in the light of the Constitution Sacrosancturn Concilium.
One particular thread seems to flow as a constant throughout the
Constitution Sacrosanct urn Conciliurn, as with all four of the
Constitutions discussed in this chapter. That thread is community.
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In each case it is the community of believers, who, by virtue of
their calling by God to be leaven in the world, are seen as the
intrinsic example of unity and communion to which all humanity in
turn are called to aspire. The wholism of Catholic theology, seen as
the basis of Catholic education in the first chapter of this thesis,
is reflected in this Constitution as the community united in prayer
and celebration. In a New Testament image, it might be apposite to
suggest that Sacrosanct urn Conciliurn envisages the community of
believers, the Church, to be a tupos for the disciples and Mary,
awaiting their fulfilment by the Holy Spirit, in prayerful, yet
celebratory expectation. 27 If liturgical celebration is to mean
anything, it must involve the community of the Church, faithfully
awaiting their Master.
At the same time, however, it should be recognised that Catholic
religious education, in using this wholistic theology, should never
ignore the fact that the community is made up of individuals, who
share in the experience of being part of this celebrating and
expectant community, but who also experience their own individual
moments of celebration and joy, both within and without the
liturgical setting in which the community of believers is to be
found. Educationally, then, Catholic religious education must
recognise that individuals find meaning and value in many events in
their lives, which are personal, and indeed intrinsic to that
individual's social and religious development. These experiences may
include self-interpretations of the numinous or the transcendent,
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but will just as readily involve questions of sexual and emotional
experience, aesthetic or artistic appreciation, as well as awe and
wonder. Many of these events and experiences will have been
celebrated by individuals, families, or indeed wider communities,
and need to be explored as a significant example of the celebratory
nature of human development. Thus, Catholic religious education
should initially help pupils to explore the meaning of celebration
which marks the growth and development of every human being'
(National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, p.
17) •28
At the same time as recognising the significance of human
experience in the realm of the social, emotional and physical world,
pupils, along with all individuals, might undergo spiritual
experiences which give deeper meaning and value to their lives.
Catholic theology, and especially the theology of Sacrosanct urn
Conciliurn, suggests that these experiences are to be found in their
highest and purest form in the graces given in the sacramental life
of the Church, and in particular, in the Eucharistic celebration
(Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education, 1988, pp. 58f., cf.
Sacrosancturn Concil.iurn, art. 2).
This spiritual growth is recognised by the Constitution
Sacrosanctum Conciliurn, as essential to furthering human growth and
maturation, and is to be seen as an equally significant part of
Catholic religious education. Thus, teaching on the sacramental
journey which each individual undertakes, becomes a way that pupils
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'become aware that being a member of the Church is something
dynamic, responding to every person's need to continue growing all
through life' (Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education, 1988,
pp. 59). This educational process must necessarily involve teaching
about signs and symbols, if it is to make sense to the child. The
sacraments are symbolic signifiers, which represent, as well as
effect the grace of divine realities (National Board of Religious
Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, p. 17). Understanding of this
principle can only come about if those symbols and signs are
recognised for what they are.
The stress on the ecclesial nature in which these signs and
symbols are employed, and the concomitant way in which an
understanding of these signs and symbols is intended to bring about
in the pupil an appreciation and desire for active membership of the
Church, indicates here the catechetical nature of religious
education. By reflecting upon the nature of sacraments, and by
experiencing the grace mediated by them, Catholic religious
education becomes the instrumental facilitator by which pupils might
reflect upon those experiences and so come to a mature decision on
whether they should respond positively or not to a deeper
relationship with that Church which has mediated those graces to
them. Religious education acts, therefore, as a missiological and
catechetical branch of the Church, and moves religious education
from being simply an academic subject, to one with a mission of
spiritual development.29
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This in turn leads to the question of prayer and the
identification of the aims of religious education with the prayer of
the Church. If religious education asks pupils to reflect upon the
nature of sacraments and their actions, it will equally expect
pupils to make a considered response to prayer. Pupils are thus
asked to reflect on the place of prayer in the life of the Catholic
community and of individual Christians' (National Board of Religious
Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, p. 17). This requires pupils to be
critically open to the variety and possibilities of prayer in both
the Christian and non-Christian traditions (cf. CCC. 1049; 2559f.,
passirn). As with the issue of understanding the sacramental nature
of the Church's celebration, in gaining knowledge of Catholic and
non-Catholic prayer systems and processes, pupils will face
questions touching on their personal involvement in that sacramental
life, and in those prayers. Reflection on the place of prayer in
Catholic and non-Catholic traditions can only lead to a deeper
development both of a knowledge and understanding of prayer in
other faiths', and in Catholic spiritual traditions (National Board
of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, p. 17). Given the
wholism of Catholic theology and educational theory, this
universalising of prayer tradition and experience is one further
reflection upon this wholism, of which Catholic religious education
is but a part.
In the light of the Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium, then,
Catholic religious education invites the pupil to engage with the
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prayer tradition of the Church. He is encouraged to recognise within
his own experiences moments of celebration, which are reflected in
the life of the Church. He is asked to reflect upon the mystery of
the sacramental life of the Church, to experience that which the
Church mediates, and to recognise that human dignity, united in a
common desire and yearning for God, is to be found in the
non-Catholic traditions as well as Catholic ones. Throughout this
whole process, the unity of Catholic theology is asserted, mirrored
in the ecciesial nature of the religious education which is
undertaken, to achieve this aim.
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The first part of this chapter has analysed Catholic religious
education in the light of the four Constitutions of the Second
Vatican Council. In each case, the significant parts of the
Constitution were first examined, before a reflection on the
implications for religious education in the light of these
Constitutions was attempted. By using this particular method (that
is, of exposition followed by reflection), the implication should
not be drawn that this provides the sole, nor indeed, the most
complete way of approaching the question of what constitutes the
methodological aims and presuppositions of Catholic religious
education. The author of this thesis does contend, however, that in
using this particular mode of approach, significant parallels can be
found between Catholic theology, as expounded in the conciliar and
documents, and one particular interpretation of Catholic religious
education which arises as a reflection of that theology.
The subsequent section will analyse some specific themes relating
to the aims and presuppositions of secular religious education.
Three particular strands will be explored; phenomenological
approaches, experiential approaches, and postmodern possibilities
for religious education.
A final section will compare the Catholic and secular
presuppositions identified in the previous two sections.
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ii. Secular Religious Education.
The aims and presuppositions of secular religious education are
very varied, and take many particular forms and structures. By way
of an introduction to this question, a brief - and by no means
complete - survey of opinions will serve to show just how diverse
some of these aims might be. The views of the educationalists which
follow should not be taken as exhaustive or absolute descriptions of
what religious education should aim to be. They are merely
illustrative of the problems the scholar faces in attempting to
assess these vast issues.
Raymond Holley, for example, has suggested four specific aims for
religious education, which he terms, the general aim, the stage aim,
the scheme aim, and the lesson aim. Each feeds down to the next aim,
in the form of a base and accompanying inverted pyramidal structure,
which he demonstrates diagrammatically in his book Religious
Education and Religious Understanding (Holley, 1978, p. 17). General
aims touch on the	 forma1, general statement covering all
religiously educational activities indulged in throughout the
child's career in school...more a statement of policy than a
detailed directive' (Holley, 1978, p. 10). Stage aims relate to the
various stages or levels of thinking in which children engage. As
children develop, the aims for religious education should reflect
these changes (Holley, 1978, ibid.). Holley's third type of aims are
scheme aims. These relate to particular aims of schemes or units of
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work within a programme of study. They are designed to provide a
coherent direction in which each particular unit might proceed, and
give a unified structure to the overall scheme of study (Holley,
1978, p. 11). Holley's final aim for religious education he terms
the lesson aim. This last aim is very specific to the individual
task, and is limited to the scope of the individual lesson and its
learning objective (Holley, 1978, ibid.).
These four elements, Holley argues, might be applied to all forms
of religious education (Holley, 1978, p. 9). Indeed, as they stand,
they could easily be applied to every curriculum subject. Holley
therefore attempts to justify these aims in relation to religious
education in particular, by referring to the dimensional,
educational and social criteria which, according to Holley, are
necessary for providing a basis for a sufficient aim for religious
education to be formulated (Holley, 1978, pp. 18-21).°
Dimensional criteria relate to those dimensions of religion which
allow reflection and meaning to take place: what it might mean when
we speak of religion, for instance (Holley, 1978, p. 18). For
Holley, this must include reference to the existence of a spiritual
life. Religious education, he suggests, should always aim to tgive
practicable direction to the provocation of spiritual insights'
(Holley, 1978, p. 19).'
Of educational criteria, Holley stipulates the importance of
creating a	 sufficient	 depth	 and breadth	 of	 religious
understanding', as an aim for religious education. This, then,
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involves what he understands to be the specifically educational
scope of religious education: the development of understanding,
knowledge, attitudes and sensibilities for religion. This, Holley
adds, is not to suggest that the pupil should actually come to the
lesson with a requirement to have a religious faith. Nor, however,
does it preclude this possibility (Holley, 1978, ibid.).
Finally, Holley advocates a social criteria in which the aims of
religious education might be socially contextualised. This relates
to Holley's view that secular religious education belongs to a
democratic system of education, and must be recognised as such.
Accordingly, secular religious education must reflect in its aims,
the desires and opinions of the informed majority. In addition,
religious education must aim to be moral. Religious education might
be used to convert pupils, or to influence them into religious
belief. This should be avaoided in the aims of religious education.
To fail to guard against this would allow religious education to
become an immoral and anti-educational process. The right of the
pupil to choose on this issue freely, and thereby to preserve his
integral	 autonomy,	 (an	 autonomy	 which,	 without	 further
justification, Holley asserts to be a philosophical commonplace),
must be retained in any aim for religious education (Holley, 1978,
pp. 19f.).32
Another educationalist, Edwin Cox, identifies four possible areas
in which religious education might have an educational role, which
he suggests might be possible positions from which the aims of
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religious education might arise, in the light of the 1988 Education
Reform Act. 33 Religious education might attempt to promote religious
belief, to teach morality, to promote a social conscience and to
provide for an experience of the transcendent (Cox and Cairns, 1989,
pp. 76ff.).
Thus, supporters of a catechetical approach to secular religious
education might argue that the aims of religious education should be
solely to bring about religious belief in the pupil, to promote
religion as a means of underpinning the culture and fabric of
British society, much along the lines advocated by the CATS Trust
(Hart, 1991, passim).
Cox identifies a second possible aim for religious education
which arises from the Act; that of teaching morality. Here,
religious education is not so much concerned with the transmission
of religious knowledge, let alone belief, but, rather, with the
inculcation in children of a morality, which, in the context of
understanding and reflection, will teach children to be good (Cox
and Cairns, 1989, pp. 77f.).
Cox's third possible aim for religious education, that of
promoting the social consensus, is a contentious one. As Cox points
out (Cox and Cairns, 1989, p. 79), the 1944 Education Act certainly
envisaged that religious education should aim at uniting a society
which had been on the verge of losing its sense of values and
direction. Placed within the context of the Second World War, which,
at the time of the Act, was at a particularly significant point for
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the Allies, this desire for social unity seems all the more
stronger. The fact that religion is identified as the unifying
strand for this cohesion is particularly interesting. Cox suggests
that this view of religion might still prevale in some
educationalist's eyes, as a valid aim for religious education, and
one which, it is implied by Cox, is still considered possible in the
approach taken by the 1988 Education Reform Act (Cox and Cairns,
1989, ibid.).
The last of Cox's suggestions of possible aims for religious
education is one which provides a setting for transcendental
experience to occur. There exists good evidence, suggests Cox, that
many people have had spiritual experiences. If this is the case, he
continues, then some planning for this eventuality must be made in
the educational curriculum. This would not imply, as Cox correctly
points out, that the educational context of the spiritual is limited
to religious education alone, nor that any one particular religion
should be studied as a principle example of a vehicle for the
transcendent. Other curriculum areas could have equally strong
claims to assist pupils to experience the transcendent. Religious
education would, therefore, be one curriculum subject among many,
engaged in this particular form of education. The debate, as Cox
concludes, has only just begun (Cox and Cairns, 1989, pp. 80-83).
Alan Brown presents yet another series of aims for religious
education. Brown recognises that it will be impossible to propose a
consensus view of the principle aim of religious education. Within
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the context of study of religious education and pupils with learning
difficulties, Brown proposes his own particular aim for the process:
to help the pupil to understand religion' (Brown, 1987, p. 12). In
doing so, Brown asserts that religious education can claim its place
within the curriculum solely on the grounds that it is an
educational process, and not a proselytic subject, protected by law
from the educational demands placed on the other curriculum subjects
by teachers, parents, pupils and educationalists (Brown, 1987,
ibid.). This, Brown goes on to suggest, is reinforced by the
suggestion that most religious education teachers today believe that
pupils construct their own form of social reality. This would
include the construction of their own sets of values and beliefs. In
Brown's view, then, religious education is concerned with helping
pupils to understand religion, to make them aware of its basic
beliefs and to see how these beliefs have been, and are being
expressed...' (Brown, 1987, p. 13). In saying this, Brown argues
that religious education must be understood to function in a
separate realm from nurture. ttNurture, he comments, thas outlived
its usefulness' (Brown, 1987, p. 14).
Similarly, John Rankin suggests that religious education's chief
aim should be concerned with helping pupils understand religions.
His key term in this process is that such an understanding must be
'sympathetic' to those religions found both within society, and
within the individual pupils. These religions might have had an
influence in forming the lives of those individuals, and indeed,
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affecting the worldwide community (Erricker et al, 1993, P. 2). This
aim, Rankin suggests, follows from his contention that religious
education should perceive itself in the same way as it perceives any
other curriculum subject: 'it must be a part of a teacher's function
to help equip students to meet the circumstances of living in
society...' (Erricker et a], 1993, ibid.). Religious education
contributes to this by aiming to teach world religions
sympathetically, without passing on the prejudices with which we all
grow as individuals.
It will be clear from this short and by no means complete survey
of some of the aims, which a number of educationalists have found
possible for religious education to appropriate, that no consensus
exists between theorists' and teachers' views about what it is that
religious education should be concerned. Three particular approaches
have, or are gaining importance in religious education, however.
They might loosely be termed the phenomenological, the experiential
and the postmodern schools of religious education theory. This
chapter will now go on to examine some of the chief proponents of
these schools of thought.
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1. The Phenoinenological School: Michael Grimmitt's theory of
religious education.
One of the major educational theorists working in the field of
religious education today is Dr Michael Grimmitt. Currently Director
of the Centre for Religious Education Development and Research at
the University of Birmingham, much of his work has centered around
the construction of a theory of education which seeks to balance a
phenomenological methodology with an applied use of the memories,
concepts and values of those engaging in religious education
(Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 249-256; cf Grimmitt, 1991, p. 77).
Grimmitt posits two kinds of knowledge, skills and attitudes
present in religious education, and informed by differing and yet
not completely divergent concerns,	 resulting	 in somewhat
contradictory outcomes in the learning process.
On the one hand Grimmitt speaks of knowledge, skills and
attitudes which are necessary to understand the social significance
of religion in present-day society, and on the other hand he speaks
of the knowledge, skills and attitudes which are promoted through
the study of religion and which give rise to a development of the
pupils' own sense of questioning, introspection and sense of self-
identity. The former Grimmitt calls cabilities in pure religion' and
the latter he calls t abilities in applied religion' (Grimmitt, 1991,
ibid. ).
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Grimmitt suggests that it is not only possible, but also
educationally	 desirable	 to	 establish	 links	 between	 the
phenomenological and interactive methodologies. They provide
opportunities for developing a whole range of t coinpetencies' in the
pupil, and provide a common ground between the usually dialectically
polarised worlds of the adolescent and the religious believer
(Grimmitt, 1991, ibid.).
To understand Grimmitt more fully, we will now look at the
concept of phenomenology, and analyse how Grimmitt uses this notion
in the context of religious education. As will be seen readily
below, the concept will play a crucial role in determining for
Grimmitt the nature and articulation of social constructs, and of
religious and spiritual consciousness.
Phenonienol ogy.
In the study of religions the methodological practice known as
phenomenology has attracted great attention from many significant
scholars, including Joachim Wach (Wach, 1922, passim), E 0 James
(James, 1950, passim), Friedrich Heiler (Heiler, 1961/1979, passijn),
W L Brennemann (Brennemann, 1982, passirn) and Peter McKenzie
(McKenzie, 1988, passim). As a working definition, phenomenology of
religion may be described as a methodological principle which
utilizes data from the history, theology, social and political
contexts and psychology of religion, as well as from direct
observation of the field of study. 35 As such, some scholars have
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asserted that the proper field for phenomenology of religion covers
all phenomena that are claimed to be religious (Bleeker, 1971,
p. 16).
Phenomenology can therefore be said to concern itself above all
with the identification and description of religious behaviour and
beliefs. Attempts at demonstrating or debating the existence of the
reality of the religious focus of any of these phenomena must be
discounted as being both pointless and irrelevant. The sole concern
of phenomenology remains the personal narratives, experiences and
actions of devotees.
An important point needs to be raised here about the relationship
of phenomenology to tradition, and of the relationship of tradition
to the actual actions and beliefs of devotees. In its descriptive
function, phenonienology is required to address historical concerns
of a religion as well as its narrative ones. Thus when the
phenomenologist is engaged in the study of a religious phenomenon
account must be paid both to its history and also to its subsequent
development. But fieldworkers have often noted that the beliefs and
practices of devotees often differ in emphasis, and sometimes in
substance, from the historical tradition of the religion. They have
argued that the phenomenological method enables a coherent whole to
be made of the religious tradition by recognising both the
historical (official) practices and beliefs, as well as the
unofficial folk-religious expressions and experiences of devotees
(see, for example, Bowman, 1992, pp. 6-8, 13f.).
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It is in part as a response to meeting the challenge of producing
a coherent theory of phenomenology that some scholars today prefer
to advocate an open-ended phenomenology over and above the
descriptive (and rather restricted) phenomenology described above.
Thus John Shepherd, for example, points out quite correctly, that
whereas the phenomenology evolved by Ninian Smart in the late
sixties has been used erroneously by some as a closed descriptive
system, the fact has been overlooked by them that it constitutes not
a closed system for the study of religion, but simply presents the
necessary conditions for the study of religion to take place.
Smart's phenomenology is not, and was never intended to be a
prescriptive approach which denies a combination of both empathy and
critical reflection on the part of the interpreter (Shepherd, 1994,
pp . 11-16).
Hand in hand with the re-evaluation of phenomenology, is the
relationship of phenoinenology to anthropology. As early as 1971 the
American scholar John Saliba suggested that not only were history of
religions and phenomenology intimately linked, with phenomenology
providing the tool whereby penetration "into the significance of any
religious fact" is achieved, 36 but that anthropology, in providing a
means of placing the field of study into an analysis of societal
life in general, enables an interest in the folk-religious elements
of a religious tradition to be studied alongside the official
tradition (Saliba, 1971, pp. 46ff.). This last point is one which
Saliba notes had been largely ignored by religious historians, and,
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by implication, also by phenomenologists (Saliba, 1971, ibid.).
Marion Bowman's recent confirmation of the significance of folk-
religion to phenomenologists serves to show Saliba's prescience on
this point (Bowman, 1992, pp. 20-21).
How, then, does Michael Grimmitt understand phenomenology, and
what is its significance to his theory of religious education?
Michael Grimniitt and Phenomenology.
Grimmitt acknowledges that a phenomenological approach to
religion, whilst undeniably useful as an instrumental tool with
which to study religious traditions, beliefs and practices, retains
in its system some inherent difficulties. Phenomenology in the field
of religious education (as a process which describes and comments
upon the expressions and experiences of religious faith) is a valid
method for educational achievement, but needs to be treated
circumspectly (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 46).
For whilst phenomenology is often said to be an objective value-
free attempt to dispassionately relate concepts and beliefs in
concrete terms, 37 Grimmitt notes there are two large objections to
the implications of this process being fully realised (Grimmitt,
1987, p. 40f.).
First is the objection often given by faith communities
themselves. Phenomenology implies that - as objects of study - the
religions may be treated with equality, whilst recognising that each
tradition possesses distinct and unique features. Phenomenology is a
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process which results in what Grimmitt calls an inevitable
'relativisation of religious values and beliefs' (Grimmitt, 1987,
p . 40; see also Grimmitt, 1991, P. 78). But members of the religions
themselves often raise the objection, especially if they belong to a
revelatory faith, that their religious tradition is not only unique,
but is also the only true religious faith. For such critics, the
study of religion means a further exploration into the Truth. To
religious adherents such as these, the ideals of phenomenology
remain alien and invalid (Grimmitt, 1991, p. 79).
The second pertinent criticism of phenomenology noted by
Griinmitt, questions the basis of that methodology's claim to be
impartial and neutral-valued in its study of religious phenomena
(Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 41f.). This criticism states that just as
religious traditions are made up of their own ideologies and
presuppositions, so too the phenomenological method is burdened by a
secular outlook which operates in just as absolute a way as do the
truth-claims of the religious traditions themselves. Indeed it could
be said that phenomenology, because of its secular burden, is as
much an ideology as a method. If this is so, then any effective
study of a religious tradition becomes influenced by that
ideological concern. 38
Griinmitt recognises that these different criticisms are
important, but believes that phenomenology still has a place in
education as a methodological instrument placed within the context
of the setting in which those being educated find themselves. He
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believes, nevertheless, that as a necessary and sufficient
structural base for religious education, phenomenology has failed
(Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 209f.).
Firstly it is insufficient as a pure method of teaching religious
education because it becomes an unrealistic exercise if conducted
with pupils without due regard to their own experiences, needs and
sense of value. Any study of religious culture or belief must take
into account the sitz im leben of those who study it. If this is
ignored, and the study of religion fails to make a point of contact,
and thus falls short of meeting the needs and catching the interest
of pupils, then no educational achievement will result at the end of
the process. But, as Grimmitt points out, to provide for the needs
and desires of learners through an interaction with the study of a
religious tradition is to go against the very principles on which
phenomenology is built (Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 209f).
Similarly, phenomenology attempts to discourage the introduction
of the values and judgements of the practitioner as a means of
understanding religious belief (Saliba, 1971, p. 51). Laudable as
this may be, Grimmitt notes that successful child-centered learning
requires that 'children's immediate existential situations and
experiences provide a basis for all aspects of learning' (Grimmitt,
1987, p. 209). To ensure this happens it is necessary that the
child's own values and judgements are employed in dialogue with the
traditions which are to be explored. Those values will need to be
used both to understand and to evaluate those traditions. If a child
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cannot be taught to be constructively critical and open, Grimmitt
argues, then that child has not developed educationally, 39 nor in
terms of their human existence (Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 210-211).
In other words, Grimmitt suggests that a balance has to be
achieved, whereby it is both recognised and accepted by religious
adherents and phenomenologists alike that neither group can claim to
have an ideological monopoly on the way pupils within a learning
context begin both to experience and to respond to the religious
beliefs, rituals and practices of believers. The way pupils come to
learn about and 'understand' those beliefs will be qualitatively
different from the way believers will 'understand' them (Grimmitt,
1987, p. 46). The context for pupil learning will be decidedly
secular. That is a given, which delineates and limits the
educational use of religious traditions in schools. It also raises
the question of how the religions which are studied do indeed relate
to the educational context in which they are found.
A disjuncture exists, therefore between the experiences of
children who are being educated in a secular and systematic process,
and the experiences of the religious adherents of the tradition
being studied. One point of contention lies in the concept of
understanding. A child who is learning phenomenologically may come
to an understanding of the significance of a certain action or
belief on the part of a devotee to the religious tradition, but at
no point does that phenomenological method of itself allow the child
to understand the religious experience of the devotee from within
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the religious tradition. To do so would mean phenomenology would
have to cross the barrier of value-judgements and ontological truth
- something which phenomenology by definition cannot allow. The
child must remain an outsider to the religious tradition.
Griminitt next draws a distinction between what phenomenology
achieves, that is, 'learning about religion', and what religious
education achieves, that is, 'learning from religion' (Jackson,
1982, P. 143). What does Grimmitt mean by the latter term?
First, Grimmitt suggests that by learning from religion,
individuals are able to gain insights into their own life-story,
their situation, values and beliefs. They are able to evaluate,
prioritize and make significant the commitments and ideologies
within which they exist and interact. This inevitably involves a
judgement and appraisal of what they have been studying (Jackson,
1982, p. 143).
Second, Grimmitt notes that secular religious education is of its
nature humanist, even if some of its practitioners (both teachers
and learners) may not be humanists themselves. As a result, the
governing principles behind any educational activity that is
undertaken by these groups will necessarily be ones which lead first
and foremost to some of the achievable goals of secular education.
Religion relates to this educational process in an instrumental way.
This clearly differs from the theologian's principal task of
witnessing to the 'Truth' by an enquiring, self-critical awareness
of the presence of the Divine, and a reflection in faith of that
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presence for themselves and for their community (Grimmitt, 1987, pp.
257-261).
Social constructs and human givens'.
It will be clear from the above that much disagreement will be
found between the secular educationalist and the theologian. Each
begins with assumptions which are at variance with each other's
starting point, and each seems to travel along a different road.
Yet there still remain points of contact between the theologian
and the secular educationalist. Both groups make use of experiential
models in their approach to religion (for example, the interactive
involvement of pupils with materials demonstrated in the tReligion
in the Service of the Child Project' in the University of Birmingham
(Grimmitt, 1991, p. 79; Grimmitt, Grove et al, 1991, passim) or the
experience of the Divine in the life of the believer). Both groups
also make use of contextually determined norms. For the secular
educationalist, these norms will be mediated through the social
constructs in which individuals live, such as the family and local,
plural and world-wide communities, and will determine to a large
degree the kinds of learning outcomes one would anticipate as a
result (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 256). For the theologian, however, these
norms will be mediated through a revelation of the Divine, and
through the faith community to which the theologian belongs (Dulles,
1992, pp. 19-35).
Grimmitt works from the notion that there are certain social
constructs which are unchanging, but which provide norms through
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which his concept of realit y is worked out. Grimmitt calls these
constructs 'human givens', and goes on to describe them as
'universal or necessary truths of an anthropological kind contingent
upon the human condition being as it happens to be, or...facts about
human life which are constant, irrespective of culture and ideology'
(Grimmitt, 1987, p. 69, his emphasis). Included in this human given
is the holding of beliefs through acts of faith.
Grimmitt recognises	 that many	 sociologists and	 social
anthropologists would criticise the inclusion of the capacity to
hold beliefs in faith as a human given, choosing instead to uphold
the rigorous principle that no perception of reality can be value-
free, since all forms of society have ideological and environmental
factors playing upon them, thereby reducing the human autonomy of
choice.
In response Grimmitt suggests that this is radically to fail to
appreciate the dualism inherent in the meanings applied to the word
'human' (Grinimitt, 1987, p. 74). For just as one is born human (that
is, as part of a species), so also one can become human through the
emotional and spiritual growth one encounters in one's life.
Grimmitt goes on to stress that he is not saying here that it is
a necessary human given that all human beings should be capable of
'holding religious beliefs by an act of religious faith', but a
faith commitment that could be either religious or humanistic. Its
basis would be found in the human freedom which enables us to make
conscious choices leading to evaluations and subsequent commitments
168
for or against the chosen reality. For Grimmitt, the religious
faith response' is influenced through the cultura1 form' which
religion takes (Grimmitt, 1987, pp. 90-91, 92).°
Grimmitt's constructs are derived from secularist ideologies and
principles. His refusal to engage with the specific truth claims of
a religious tradition on the level of epistemological enquiry, and
his insistence that his approach to religious traditions should be
informed solely in instrumental terms, suggests that, despite his
criticisms of phenomenology, Grimmitt remains firmly wedded to that
methodology. Religious traditions are not to be treated as bearers
of truth, but as systems of thought which reflect what Grimmitt
believes to be the human capacity to believe: twhatever intrinsic
worth may be claimed for religion by religious adherents, religious
educators are concerned with religion's instrumental worth'
(Grimmitt, 1987, P. 259).
But in conjunction with the ideological values which Grimmitt
sees in the culture and theology of religious belief, he finds also
an educational context for religion. To approach religion as an
instrumental system, helps the inquirer to begin to understand the
human condition (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 260).' The study of religion
provides grounds for understanding the human capacity to be
religious. If, as Grimmitt suggests, the theology and belief of each
tradition is not to be regarded by the educationalist as a noetic
source of truth, but is to be seen, rather, as a further example of
that tradition's capacity to demonstrate the human given' of
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belief, then that theology itself can contribute to this
phenomenology, yet cannot be used as the sole rationale for
education. This is because in his model the principal setting for
this development of understanding remains the educational learning
process. This process relates to the human capacity to interpret and
rationalise the human condition; a capacity which is as much a
tgiven as the others tgivens Grimmitt mentions (Grimmitt, 1987, p.
260).
Grimmitt uses his constructs, therefore, as a means of engaging
in the educational process above all other activities. His rationale
remains humanistic in outlook and secular in aim. His statement that
t all religions provide a view of the human and a vision of the goal
to which human beings should aspire' is used to assert an
educational legitimation for his humanist rationale for religious
education (Grimmitt, 1987, P. 261).
A critical reflection of Grimmitt's theories.
Grjmmjtt acknowledges that his own ideological standpoint is
influenced by the cultural and educational milieu in which he finds
himself. Given the secularist base from which his approach develops,
he limits his conceptual theory to the narrative structures of
description, and to the auto-psychological response of those who
undergo the learning process. Phenomenological methodology, albeit
adapted by Grimmitt, is applied to religion, but is used in the
context of human development: we live through our experiences, which
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inform our personal development. 	 Similarly,	 the religious
development of adherents of those reli gions is also influenced by
these human experiences. Educationally, these experiences, which
Grimmitt refers to as 'further examples of human "givens" can
provide a way of meeting both the needs of pupils in understanding
their own experiences of meaning and value, whilst retaining the
essential integrity of the religious tradition in its own experience
of being studied and 'understood' in the process of religious
education (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 231).
Grijnmitt claims that the secular category of the 'human given' is
capable of transcending the norms of a person's capacity to perceive
reality, and is thereby able to change that person by means of self-
adjustment, by enabling the person to think rationally about
morality and then act upon it, 42 and by allowing the person to go
beyond 'self' to a higher and more humanised concept of being.
However, Grimmitt has failed to show adequately why a 'human
given' should act in the way he claims it does. Nor has he shown why
that action should be a worthwhile pursuit in itself. Now whilst it
might be shown that some acquisition of knowledge by the learner
might be achievable through a careful use of the categories which he
advocates, Grimmitt fails to demonstrate the logic of his further
claim, that the acquisition of knowledge is beneficial or morally
good. In other words, Grimmitt fails to tell us why in secular terms
his conceptual system of coming to know is indeed worth pursuing
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over any other; why are his set of conceptual norms either 'good' in
themselves, or good within a universe of possible goods?
In effect, this means that whereas Grimmitt works from the
assumption that 'human givens' are non-metaphysical, the value
invested in those 'givens', and an absence of a real justification
for those values, do indeed imply a metaphysical context for them
(Grimmitt, 1987, pp.74-77).43 Without an objective explanation of
them, and a moral justification for them, however, the ontological
basis for these 'givens' remains unclear and open to speculation.44
It is the contention of this paper that Michael Grimmitt's work
rests upon the mistaken conviction that 'human givens' are not of
the same order as metaphysical statements. The present author
believes that Grimmitt's systematic presentation of an instrumental
form of religious education may be disputed, however, because it
might be shown that metaphysics does indeed lie at the heart of his
theoretical structure. This is a serious challenge to Grimmitt's
conceptual work, and is one which secular religious education as a
whole needs to address.
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2. The Experiential School: David Hay, John Hammond and the
developmental experientialists.
The experiential approach to religious education is closely
related to the kind of phenomenology suggested by the theories of
Michael Grimmitt, discussed above (cf. Hammond, Hay et a), 1990, pp.
6-7, passim). In 1990, one of the leading exponents of the school of
experientialism, Dr David Hay, reflecting on society's attitudes
towards religious awareness wrote,
t Once people are convinced there are sound theoretical reasons
to dismiss it as illusory, religion tends to be pushed out of
consciousness or, if it does manifest itself, it has to be
interpreted away as an aberration.
Thus a majority of children, when they arrive in school for the
first time, will already have assimilated many of the concepts
that underpin this dismissal' (Hay, 1990, p. 96).
This, according to Hay, is the reason why it is essential, if
religious education is to be a meaningful exercise, for it to seek
to retrieve the tinner space' of individual religious awareness.
This, Hay continues, is something tchildren in our culture need to
be taught' (Hay, 1990, pp. 96, 106). To this extent, Hay is setting
out the religious education agenda for the 1990's. Moreover, this
agenda does not apply merely to experiential religious education
alone, but also, given the increasing popularity of the experiential
approach among religious education practitioners, to the larger
constituency of religious education research and practice, as a
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whole. Religious awareness - the inner space which is to be found in
each individual, if looked for deeply enough - becomes a crucial,
and sometimes self-assumed presupposition for experientialists. It
is a key concept for them, which they are required to establish both
as evidently 'real' within the human sphere of life, and also as a
valid methodological presupposition for educational practice. For
from this concept flows the entire superstructure of experiential
religious education theory. Put conversely, if inner space or
religious awareness, as defined by the experientialists is a
demonstrably false concept, then the entire edifice of experiential
religious education falls. How that concept is defended by
experientialists, and how their theoretical superstructure builds up
from its presupposed reality, is the subject of this section of the
chapter.
The background: the initial work of the Religious Experience
Research Unit, and its bearing on experiential approaches to
religious education.
One of the major difficulties for phenomenologists, psychologists
and sociologists alike is the question of how to define 'religious
experience'. Even before it becomes possible to examine whether
religious experiences actually exist, it becomes necessary for the
educationalist to define the terms which will be used in studying
them. Hay has indicated the significance of the work of Alister
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Hardy and Edward Robinson, in suggesting answers to these questions
(Hay, 1990, PP. 29-39).
Hardy, erstwhile Professor of Zoology at the University of Hull,
and subsequently holder of the Linacre Chair of Zoology at the
University of Oxford, became particularly interested in studying
what he termed a spiritual reality', which was, to his mind, a
harmony of experience'. This reality, he believed, was a valid
element in human nature itself. In a lecture delivered in 1948,
after Hardy had been elected to his Oxford Chair, he suggested that
there existed a dichotomy between the materialism of scientific
theory, valourised to the point of deification, and the inherent
desire in human beings for a meaning or synthesis to life which
included the notion of the spiritual: an intangible sense of
awareness of the unity of the individual and the world (cited in
Hay, 1990, p. 21).
Later, after retiring from Oxford, Hardy developed his ideas more
fully in his Gifford Lectures of 1966. Human beings, he suggested,
possessed an inherently religious nature. Acceptance of the reality
of this experience was being denied, however, because of the
prevailing scientific secularism of the world in which human beings
grew up. At the heart of the issue, for Hardy, lay the question of
religious awareness. If, Hardy reasoned, he was correct in ascribing
religious experience as a reality in human life, then it must be
possible to observe that experience universally among human beings.
Accordingly, Hardy began to devise a natural religious history' of
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human beings (Hay, 1990, pp. 22ff.). In effect, Hardy was setting
out his ground plan to map out the human experience of the sacred.
What did Hardy mean by this term?
Hardy had become interested particularly, in the work of a number
of anthropologists. The ways in which he understood the term
sacred' hinged on the ways he understood the work of these social
scientists. Of specific importance to him was the work of Emile
Durkheim. In 1912 Durkheim had published a significant sociological
study of religion called The Elementary Forms of Religious
Experience. In it Durkheim looked especially at the concept of
totemism; tribal religious structures which employed the use of
symbolic sacred objects to unite the clan or group. Durkheim's
general thesis was that the origins of all religions arose from some
form of totemism. Religion was to be understood ultimately, as a
projection of social experience. That experience was itself totemic.
But Durkheim adds that this is not to say that religious
experiences are simply psycho-social manifestations of materialist
phenomena. They retain, according to Durkheim a fundamental
otherness about them, which make them unique. Individuals do not
find pseudo scientific answers to the meaning and function of the
world in which they find themselves, through a religious experience.
Rather, they are directed through these experiences to act in a
certain way, to live in a particular manner, to be a specific
person. Religious experience, for Durkheim, is not simply a response
176
to a material cause, rather, it is more than the phenomena
encountered (cf. Hay, 1990, p. 24; Durkheim, 1961, passira).45
According to Hay, Hardy used Durkheim's approach to define what
he understood by the 'sacred'. Thus, for Hardy, the 'sacred' did not
necessarily denote 'God', but was understood instead to point to 'a
reality beyond the self...', something which was 'as biologically
real as, for example, the experience of being in love' (Hay, 1990,
p. 26). To further his research on this concept, in 1969 Hardy set
up the Religious Experience Research Unit (now known as the Alister
Hardy Research Centre), to explore and classify the varieties of
religious experience.
The Unit collected together large amounts of data on religious
experience, and Hardy's interest in both adolescent and childhood
accounts of such experience has led Hay to suggest that the
information which was gathered indicated that children were just as
capable of having religious experiences as more mature people. This
leads Hay to suggest that those theorists who define religious
experience within the confines of the social construction of
reality, (such as, for example, Berger and Luckmann), fail to
recognise the significance of Hardy's evidence. There may be serious
grounds for doubt, therefore, over the validity of their theories.
Social construction theorists, Hay suggests, would argue that the
prevalence of religious experiences among more mature subjects
indicates that a cultural and linguistic learning exercise has gone
on: the subjects 'learn' or appropriate the 'right' social language
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and conventions, in order then to interpret certain experiences that
they might have, as being religious ones. If, as Hardy's evidence
seems to contra-indicate, very young children are capable of having
religious experiences before they have appropriated to themselves
the relevant cultural and social conventions that allow a religious
interpretation of the phenomena to be made by them, then the theory
of the social construction of religious experience would seem to be
in jeopardy (Hay, 1990, p. 32).
This possibility led, in turn to the work of the educationalist
Edward Robinson. For Hay, as for all the experientialists,
Robinson's efforts were of great significance. His achievement lay
in the fact that he began to question the received wisdom of
psychologists such as Piaget and Goldman, that religious intuition,
understanding and experience occurred in young adults from about the
age of twelve or thirteen, and that before that time, children
possessed neither sufficient maturity nor the necessary stages of
intellectual development to have treligious experiences' (Hay, 1990,
p . 33). To this extent, Robinson follows Hardy in seeing in children
an innate ability to have religious experiences.46
These	 experiences	 Robinson	 sought	 to	 classify	 as
tt'self-authenticating" (Hay, 1990, ibid.). By this, Robinson meant
a number of things. First the experience was unique to the
individual, to the extent that it made a profound and original
impact upon the child. Second, they bring to the child a self-
awareness; a recognition of both who one is, and what unity exists
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between oneself and the world (Hay, 1990, ibid.). At its heart, Hay
contends, lies the issue of encounter: in some way, often beyond the
ability of language to describe this event, the individual
encounters an experience which is so real to them, and with which
they enter into such a profound relationship, that they are able to
validate both the experience and themselves. For Robinson, then,
religious experience is a reality (Hay, 1990, P. 34).
It is from this background, that experiential religious education
draws its initial structural base. For, as Hay has noted, if both
Hardy and Robinson were correct in interpreting the data which they
had collected, as indicating the existence of a self-validating or
self-authenticating series of religious experiences in children,
then this has profound and serious implications for the nature of
religious	 education.	 The	 investigations	 made	 by	 Edward
Robinson...suggest that religious education has seriously fallen
short in the task of helping pupils to apprehend this very basic
experiential dimension of religion' (Hay, 1990, p. 39). How
experiential religious education approaches the challenge, follows
below.
An experiential theory of religious education.
In the influential handbook New Methods in RE Teaching: an
experiential approach, the aims of experiential religious education
are presented unambiguously as a two-fold task. The first task is to
recognize the validity of the religious experiences of individuals,
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such as, for example, those reported in the data discussed above.
The second task points out that action is required to achieve this
recognition;
Religious education must perform two tasks if it is to face
the question of the religious believer's intention squarely.
First, it must honestly present religion for what it claims to
be - the response of human beings to what they experience as
sacred. Secondly, religious educators must help pupils to open
their personal awareness to these aspects of ordinary human
experience which religious people take particularly seriously'
(Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, p. 11).
Both propositions in this statement of aims derive from the
implications which arise for religious education from both the early
and the more recent work of the Alister Hardy Research Centre,
discussed above.
Thus, in 1978 and 1985, two survey polls indicated that roughly
one third of the sample population had stated that they had
encountered a religious experience in their lives. In 1987, a
follow-up poll indicated that as many as one half of the British
population had at one time or another had a religious experience,
which they had interpreted as such (evidence cited in Hay, 1990,
p. 79; see also Hay, 1987, passim, for a fuller interpretation of
the survey data).
The first task of experiential religious education, then, is to
present religion as honestly as it can, for what it purports to be -
a human response to experiences which are interpreted as being
sacred. Evidence from the survey data seems to indicate the presence
of a prevalent number of common themes through which individuals
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express their interpretation of this esacred experience (Hammond,
Hay, et al, 1990, p. 202). In a descending order of frequency
amongst positive replies in the survey data, these include a sense
of;
a patterning of events
an awareness of the presence of God
an awareness of receiving help in answer to prayer
an awareness of a guiding presence (not usually called God')
an awareness of the presence of the dead
an awareness of a sacred presence in nature
an awareness of an evil presence
an awareness that all things are one (Hammond, Hay, et al.,
ibid.).
Similarly, there seems to exist specific common areas of
religious experience among those who are specifically religious:
ritual, in which moments of sacred history are relived so that they
take on a renewed sacred significance; sacred literatures, where
interpretations of sacred time are made which speak as a direct
experience of the divine to the individual; reality itself, which
becomes for the individual a direct experience of the sacred, and,
prayer and meditation, in which the individual believes himself to
be entering more deeply into the sacred reality (Hammond, Hay, et
a], 1990, p. 12).
It is argued by the experientialists that all these experiences
need to be recognized by religious education, if it is to engage
meaningfully with the issue of religious experience: tTo concentrate
on externals such as discussions of doctrine, moral stances,
pilgrimage, rituals and so on, is to ignore the most central issue
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in religion - its spirituality' (Hammond, Hay, et a], 1990, p. 13).
Elsewhere, Hay and Hammond write that experiential religious
education 'is about using, and so valuing and exploring, one's own
experience as a way of knowing better other's experiences of
religion' (Hay and Hammond, 1992, P. 145). To do this, they argue,
requires the teacher and student to engage with the 'inner'. Using a
Tillichian metaphor, they comment: 'Inner is about depth. It is to
be contrasted with surface knowledge, the facile and the
superficial' (Hay and Hammond, 1992, ibid.).
To understand this concept, it is necessary first to understand
why a purely objective appraisal of reality will not do for
experientialists, when they define religious education in the light
of their beliefs about religious experience. This dissatisfaction
stems most substantially from a mistrust, on the part of
experientialists, of the ways in which modern science has created
the cultural secularism with which most people now understand or
explain reality. The problem with this outlook is that so often it
seems to forget that it uses metaphysical language to express it own
interpretation of reality. The world is not merely interpreted as if
it is constructed from atomic and sub-atomic particles, but also,
the assumption seems to be made by science that these ways of
explaining reality - metaphors for an objective reality beyond
complete comprehension - are no longer to be understood merely as
metaphors, but as part of the material reality itself (cf. Hammond,
Hay et a], 1990, p. 13). Similarly, experientialists note that
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consciousness too seems to be understood by secular-science as if it
also resulted from this material interpretation of reality. This
attitude to the material basis to reality, however, is not simply
treated by scientists as theory, but, suggest the experientialists,
is used by them as a presupposed assumption to explain all of
reality in its every phenomena (Hammond, Hay et a], 1990, ibid.).
This presupposition,	 experientialists argue, has affected
society's perception of reality. So much concentration is paid to
the outward objective world, that the inner, subjective world of
experience is subordinated, or even ignored, in its own right. If
the survey data discussed above is correct, this would suggest that
a whole area of human reality, a lost inner core, is becoming
alienated from society's understanding of it (Hammond, Hay et a],
1990, ibid.). This process of alienation clearly has implications
for religious education.
To this extent, and insofar as experiential religious education
understands itself as something which seeks to retrieve this lost
inner dimension in students, the religious educator is asked to act
as a deindoctrinator', working to change the material-metaphorical
approach of secular science (Hammond, Hay et a], 1990, p. 15). Given
that the findings of the poll surveys, as well as the work of the
Alister Hardy Research Centre, indicate that a large number of the
population may have had, from puberty onwards, and possibly earlier,
what they interpret to be religious experiences, it is very likely
that a significant number of young adolescents will also have had
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these kinds of experiences. Because of the prevailing secular bias
of society's materialist understanding of reality, these experiences
will tend to be discounted by those children, or interpreted
materially. However, experientialists assert that such a view is in
itself doctrinaire. In reply to it, experiential religious education
seeks, therefore, to present a wider vision of reality: tWhat it
does is to demonstrate that there is more than one perspective on
reality' (Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, p. 15).
Two particular aims for experiential religious education may
therefore be identified. First, religious education seeks to enable
pupils to become aware of their own inner experiences, to respect
and value them for what those experiences are, and so to learn and
respect the experiences of others. Second, (and crucially, in the
light of the experientialists' critique of the breakdown of metaphor
in scientific discourse), religious education must enable the rle
of metaphor to be understood correctly, in its application to the
interpretation which people give to the experiences they have had.
This enables religious education to remain firmly non-confessional;
the child does not enter into religious practice, but becomes aware
both of the power of experience in peoples' lives, and of the
significance of metaphorical language which is used to explain these
experiences (Hammond, Hay et a], 1990, p. 17).
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A critical reflection of experientialist theories.
A number of major questions arise, however, with regard to how
far the experiential approach might be justified in the name of
religious education. At issue is the question of inwardness. In a
major article which presents a critique of the experiential
methodology, Adrian Thatcher argues that experientialist religious
education suffers from seriously defective philosophical assumptions
and presuppositions about inwardness, which render the methodology
unsafe as a means of doing religious education (Thatcher, 1991, pp.
22-27). If experiential religious education asserts the tautology
that all human experience is experienced by humans, then, Thatcher
argues, the methodology requires an inner world to exist, where some
series of internal events act as a parallel to a series of events in
the outside, objective world. This latter suggestion, says Thatcher,
smacks of a philosophical dualism which has been dispensed with
since the time of Wittgenstein, and, latterly, Derrida (Thatcher,
1991, pp. 22-23).
Thatcher's critique is based,	 therefore,	 upon the key
philosophical issue of the way in which experiential religious
education understands experience and inwardness. In essence,
Thatcher finds the experientialist approach to this problem to be
grounded in the uncritical epistemology of the Enlightenment
(Thatcher, 1991, p. 22).
Thus, Thatcher argues, experiential theory presupposes, in the
same way as Descartes, that there must exist an inner world or
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dimension to which the reality of the outer world is communicated.
For Descartes, the existence of this inner world becomes a necessity
in order for humans to make sense of an external world. When the
first doubts arose regarding the certainty of our knowledge of the
external world as it actually is, Descartes began to Question in a
fundamental way the relationship that was said to exist between a
sentient being and the world in which that being comes to attain
knowledge (Anscombe and Geach, 1970, p. 265). Descartes suggested,
accordingly, that there must exist an inner, private world where
knowledge of the outer external world takes place. The immaterial,
inner world thus becomes the subject for knowledge of the object,
which, for Descartes, was the external world. The inner world
becomes the place where knowledge of the outer world - as it
actually is - takes place (Anscombe and Geach, 1970, pp . 109ff.; cf.
Thatcher, 1991, p. 22).
However, this Cartesian dualism, which Thatcher finds prevalent
in the approach to knowledge of the world by experientialist
theorists,	 (Thatcher,	 1991,	 ibid.),	 is an area in which
postinodernism has undoubtedly been of great value43 as a debunker of
old, and in this case falsifiable views. Not only do we need to
deconstruct our world, but also, we need to deconstruct ourselves.49
No absolute knowledge of the world as it is, is made available to
us. Indeed, some have argued that there is no self' available to
apprehend the world in the first place (e.g. Solomon, 1988, passim,
cited also in Thatcher, 1991, p. 27).
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A particular criticism of the experientialists' key concept of
inner awareness, relates to the question of how we come to
understand meaning. Thatcher offers the example of Wittgenstein's
theory of language games to show where experiential theory might
fall down. Wittgenstein would argue that it is impossible for me to
express my sensations publicly, until, or unless there existed a
shared common language and concomitant shared conceptual
understanding of that language, to which each individual had equal
access. Any description of a sensation must, therefore depend upon
social training and gamesmanship. The result of this, then, would be
to suggest that meaning is publicly learned, not communicated
through sense-experience (Wittgenstein, 1986, $$ 243, 290-291; cf.
Thatcher, 1991, p. 23). Given that one of the first aims of
experientialist religious education is to suggest that the meaning
of religious functions and attitudes of believers can be understood
by pupils through a heightening of those pupils' self-awareness of
the t inner', that is, the suggested statement that religious
education should open their personal awareness to those aspects of
ordinary human experience which religious people take especially
seriously' (Hammond, Hay et a], 1990, p. 11), then this clearly
stands in opposition to Wittgenstein's theory of language games -
and with most late twentieth century philosophical enquiry. If
Wittgenstein is right, then experiential religious education has
aims which are impossible to achieve.
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In a reply to Thatcher's critique, Hay and Hammond argue that
experiential religious education does not operate with the dualist
assumptions of which Thatcher accuses them. Rather, they assert,
they are concerned the significance of depth for religious
education: t The key to the process is taking seriously one's own
experience' (Hay and Hammond, 1992, p. 145). Talk about depth, they
continue, is not talk about a hidden inner world which is in some
way independent of reality. It is instead a metaphor for a deeper
attentiveness and mindfulness. It is through the intellectual
journey, moving in greater depths, they suggest that it becomes
possible to understand the meanings of expressions and experiences
other than one's own. These experiences, they argue, must include
religious ones (Hay and Hammond, 1992, p. 146).
The question remains, however, as to how one can reach an
understanding of the meanings of experiences which happen to a
variety of individuals, without reducing that understanding to mere
subjectivity. 50 Any possibility of achieving a shared, common
understanding of meaning would be immediately lost to a subjective
interpretation. If, as Hay and Hammond assert, religious education
seeks 'to demonstrate that there are many possible ways of
interpreting the reality in which we find ourselves' (Hay and
Hammond, 1992, p. 146), then it becomes theoretically impossible to
know whether what one asserts to be the religious meaning of another
individual, is, in fact the case. Truth and falsity must necessarily
become subjective in the experiential method. To what extent value
can	 therefore	 be	 ascribed	 to	 it,	 is	 a moot	 point.
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3. Postmodernism and religious education: the 'Sea of Faith' school
of theologians.
At first sight, it might seem paradoxical and, indeed,
incongruous to include the work of a theological school within a
section devoted to secular, postmodern religious education. It is
the case, however, that the 'Sea of Faith' group of theologians
represents in terms of traditional theism a decidedly secular and
atheistic position, which arises directly as a result of their
postmodern reflections. Accordingly, their place is firmly to be
found on the secular side of the debate. In addition, although the
work of the 'Sea of Faith' theologians has generally been strictly
theological, some recent studies, debates and conferences organised
by them have begun to be concerned with areas other than theology.5'
This section will outline the postmodern secular theology of the
'Sea of Faith' movement, and will give some indications of the
possibilities such a theology presents for secular religious
education.
The growth of the eSea of Faith' movement.
In 1984 the then Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, Dr Don
Cupitt was invited by the British Broadcasting Corporation to write
and present a documentary series on the changes in Christian belief
which had occurred during the past one hundred years. Choosing for
his motif a line from a poem from the nineteenth-century poet
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Matthew Arnold, Cupitt called his series of programmes The Sea of
Faith. The documentary was to prove to be a high water-mark for
religious broadcasting, and catapulted Cupitt into the public arena
of religious debate. However, Cupitt's views were already familiar
to those who had read his seminal work Taking Leave of God (Cupitt,
1980). The series and accompanying book (Cupitt, 1985a) both
extended the scope of his earlier study, and simplified its language
to suit a wider audience.
At the end of 1984 a group of this audience, led by Ronald Pearse
and members of the Anglican Diocese of Leicester met with Cupitt in
Cambridge, to suggesting the setting up, first, of a conference, and
then, of a movement or network of like-minded individuals, which
could act as a forum for theological debate and reflection (Hart,
1994, pp. 24-25). The first conference took place in 1988.
Subsequent conferences, newsletters and publications followed. A
network was quickly set up, and by the end of 1995, a number of
theologians were beginning to write under a tSea of Faith' label
(see, for example, Shaw, 1987; Dawes, 1992; Freeman, 1993; MacDonald
Smith, 1993; Hart, 1993; Geering, 1994; Hart, 1995).
The theology of the eSea of Faith' movement.
The theology of the t Sea of Faith' movement arises out of the
postmodern complexities of late twentieth-century intellectual and
spiritual enquiry. At its centre lies the question of the status of
reality in the context of the social, sexual, political, moral and
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spiritual relationships of individuals as they try to make sense of
themselves and the world in which they live. In the section above,
it will have been seen how Wittgenstein's linguistic theories were
employed by critics of the experiential methodology, to show how it
becomes impossible to speak of a meaning for reality outside of the
linguistic conventions which are commonly shared by individuals in
order that sense may be made of reality. The theology of the 'Sea of
Faith' movement also uses Wittgenstein's theory, to construct a
philosophical approach to this question, which is called by them
'non-realism' (Hart, 1993, pp. 1-27).
David Hart argues that the ideological failures of the post-War
(and, post-Cold War) orders has led to an accelerated feeling of
disillusionment with the claims of those who assert their authority
or capability to guide or save humanity from disaster and despair.
The world of calm assurance which might have existed in the past has
long since gone: 'No one group has the right to believe itself
absolutely correct in its beliefs or to be the only community in
existence with a God-given identity' (Hart, 1993, p. 6).
This loss of belief extends itself into language too. If the
cultural relativity which Hart advocates is accepted, then this has
profound effects on the ways in which we interpret value and meaning
through language. The philosopher D Z Phillips, whom Don Cupitt
refers to approvingly, has developed Wittgenstein's concept of the
language game, by arguing that religious expressions are themselves
self-contained units which operate under their own presuppositions.
191
Religious language is autonomous; questions of veracity or
truthfulness are strictly limited to its internal and limited
meaning. Cupitt asserts that
'We can show how it works, but there is no sense in the idea
that one might be able to step outside the limits of religious
language and check its accuracy by comparing the religious
representation of God with the original' (Cupitt, 1982, p. 18;
cf. also, Cupitt, 1985b, p. 172f.).
There is, in other words, no 'original' with which to be
compared. No meaning lies outside the religious language which is
used by the various religious traditions. There is no ontic reality
beyond human expression. Outsidelessness becomes, therefore, a key
concept in non-realist theology and philosophy.52
What, then of the religious language game? How does this
non-realist view of religious language affect talk about God?
Non-realism and religious language.
In his study of the human quest for religious meaning, the New
Zealand theologian Lloyd Geering describes religion as 'the creation
of meaning' (cf. Geering, 1994, pp. 101-118). This anthropologically
charged image underlines much of the non-realist philosophy of
religion. 'We live', Geering continues, 'in a time of cultural and
religious change' (Geering, 1994, p. 100). Accordingly, it is no
longer possible to assume one single definition for religion, and
thereby say what it should be. To do any other would be the height
of arrogance; there would always remain the risk of alienating one
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individual or groups's self-perception of their religious life,
through misrepresenting what they believed their religion to be
(Geering, 1994, ibid.).
To support his argument, Geering gives the example of Wilfred
Cantwell Smith's theory of religion. For Smith, religion is less to
do with reference to specific doctrines or beliefs, which can be
made up into identifiable lists, and more to do with the fact that
people can be passionately committed to ideals and causes.53
To this notion, Geering suggests, Smith brings the question of
the beliefs and attitudes of individuals. These, accrue to human
commitments as a form of "cumulative tradition" (Geering, 1994,
p. 102f.). Geering comments that here Smith is close to suggesting
that beliefs and attitudes are nothing else than cultures Indeed, as
Geering notes, religion and culture are indeed inseparable concepts,
which may, however, be distinguished from each other. Following
Tillich, Geering argues that religion should be understood as the
inexhaustible creative element within any culture. It should be
understood as providing the ultimacy of culture, without which,
culture would have no depth: 'Thus culture manifests in visible or
concrete forms the products of the religious quest, namely, the
quest for meaning' (Geering, 1994, p. 1O3).
The implication in all this is, of course, that as the demands of
culture changes, so too does religion change. The traditional image
of an unchanging, objective theism, containing revealed and certain
truths is equally subject to these changes.
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Don Cupitt has indicated what this might mean for traditional
religious realism, and in particular, with one aspect of religious
realism, namely what Cupitt calls 'supernaturalism'. This, Cupitt
suggests
'was a combination of the ancient religious distinction between
flesh and spirit with Plato's distinction between the world of
sense experience, the world around us, and the higher,
unchanging world of ideas' (Cupitt, 1992, p. 12).
For Cupitt then, realism implies a fixed, real, objective world
'out there'; an objective order against which human life and action
may be judged (Cupitt, 1992, ibid.). This, Cupitt suggests, broke
down largely not as a result of the rise of scientism (as opposed to
the views of experientialists such as David Hay, discussed in the
section above), but instead, because of the rapid growth from the
beginning of the nineteenth century of an awareness of change in
society and nature. From 1800, Cupitt asserts, individuals found
themselves becoming profoundly more aware than before of dialectical
ways of thinking, of the gradual development and alteration of
social relationships, of shifts in culture and perceptions of the
world (Cupitt, 1992, p. 13). Religion also, then, becomes part of
this changing scenery.55
If language, as understood by the non-realist 'Sea of Faith'
theologians, is correct, then the idea of 'an objective,
ready-ordered cosmos out there and independent of our minds, has
come to an end' (Cupitt, 1985b, p. 177). Language, human self-
perception and the apprehension of the world all become relativized.
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Our world exists only as our world, not as some reality independent
of our perception of it.
Similarly, talk of God, creation and an interaction between an
objective God and an objective world must also collapse. 56 God can
no longer be understood as an independent focus for reality.
Instead, God becomes interiorized, or subjectivized into the self;
'Just as the oniy world there can be for us now is our world, so the
only god there can be for us now is our god' (Cupitt, 1985b, p.
181). Religious meaning itself thereby becomes relativized, and
human.
It will be seen from this analysis of non-realist, secular
theology that language and meaning lies at the heart of the process.
Wittgenstein figures prominently in that linguistic model, but, as
Cupitt himself has noted, non-realism's greatest debt is to Kant
(Cupitt, 1985b, pp. 209-210). For Kant, no direct knowledge of God
is possible. We are forced, therefore, to posit an "Ideal of
Reason" in its place. God becomes the ethical content to that
ideal, a pole star, a guide, but not a reality independent of our
knowing it. 'God, then, is a unifying symbol of the goals of our
intellectual and moral life' (Cupitt, 1985b, p. 210). Lloyd Geering
goes further, eQuating God with a symbol for Gaia-earth:
'If we choose to speak of God, we shall be using this term to
focus on all that we supremely value and on the goals which
make human existence meaningful and worthwhile...
This God is in the physical earth of which we are a tiny part.
Even more, this God is to be found in all living creatures.
Most of all, however, this God is rising to self-awareness in
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the (as yet) confused collective consciousness of the global
human community. This is tomorrow's God...' (Geering, 1994, pp.
235, 236).
The non-realism of the tSea of Faith' theology, and secular
religious education.
Given the secular, humanist basis for non-realism, and given also
the strictly cultural and anthropological foundation for religious
language and its concepts, any particular aims for non-realist
religious education must follow those same postmodern concerns. The
non-realist contention that there is no objective reality of which
it is possible to have certain knowledge, has a profound
significance for the aims of religious education.
In order that those implications might be explored in the light
of secular non-realist theology, this study will turn now to a
consideration of the question of meaning and value for religious
education in the light of this form of postmodernism. From a
non-realist perspective, then, is religious education a good thing?
Can it achieve anything worthwhile?
These may seem at first to be curious and odd questions to be
asking. They highlight, however, a profoundly serious issue which
arises as a result of non-realism. Indeed, this problem haunts
nearly all postmodern thought (cf. Soper, 1991, pp. 122-124). In
religious education, the question of value takes on a new
significance. If religious education can said to have an aim, (which
this thesis presumes to be the case), then it must imply that a
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certain amount of value or purpose exists in the actions of doing
religious education. Non-realism, however, is unable to assert that
religious education can have an objective value other than that
found in an interiorised, subjective sense. The aims of religious
education are not good in themselves, because there can no longer be
any objective sense of 'good' or 'bad'. All is subjective.
The aims of religious education, as they arise from this
perspective, are equally subjective. They are aims only insofar as
they become our aims. Religious education itself is an actual
process only insofar as it becomes our process. In non-realist
terms, it cannot exist or function in any way other than as a
subjective, interiorised action. I do not learn about something
other than myself. I interiorise. I learn about myself. I learn
about the cultural means of expression in which we all engage: 'the
postmodern reality is a collection of petites histoires of the
tribal deities that tell us little of the deities themselves, [but]
rather more of the cultures that formed them' (Hart, 1995, P. 1). To
this extent, postmodern, non-realist religious education is
concerned with 'story', whose patterns and meanings are to be
understood as ways of approaching the forms of human construction;
creations by human beings in ritual and myth, of the meanings for
their actions, in which we ourselves are the 'fictions' (cf. Cupitt,
1991, p. ix).
The meanings of those stories are not to be found outside the
'text', but are vested in the 'texts' themselves. Whilst it remains
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impossible, in the light of the postmodern critique, to isolate a
deeper objective reality behind the story, 'we can at least gather
together stories from different traditions which highlight the
common features in the human adventure and endeavour' (Hart, 1995,
p. 2). Features share a commonality, solely in an anthropocentric
perspective. The human story has a commonality because it is a story
about our human commonality, not because there are identified,
objective realities beyond us, in which we share (Hart, 1995,
ibid.).
The aim of postmodern, non-realist religious education, then, is
to understand the religious traditions as one element of this human
story. To use another metaphor, religious education looks into a
mirror of reflected images of humanly constructed meanings. Those
traditions reveal, claims Hart, (quoting Peter Berger) "signals of
transcendence"' (Hart, 1995, p. 4); moments in the religious
language game where humans have created sacred meanings for their
actions and interactions. This sacral character is not to be
understood, however, in an objective sense. It is not an external
reality to the humans who create meaning. Rather, it is part of the
human sense of the holy; that ultimacy which, according to non-
realists, provides the depth and passion in each human culture.
What, then, would the aims of a non-realist religious education
actually achieve? Moving from the acceptance of the existence of a
fixed reality, to belief in a world of human construction,
non-realism would include religious education as a part of that
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world. To the extent that non-realism claims to point towards human
creativity and cultural expression as the only power which
constructs its own sense of values and ethics, non-realist religious
education attempts to enable students to understand the significance
of this human creativity, for the human spirit. As David Hart
comments: tthe freedom to be spiritually creative...could be argued
to be the highest and most pertinent form of creativity that human
beings can produce' (Hart, 1995, p. 153).
Non-realism implies that religious education should act as a
humanising process. It should enable the cultural accretions of
traditions to be appreciated for what, to the non-realist mind, they
are; human constructions, examples of the holy, human spirit. 57 In
the context of non-realism, then, the aims of religious education
point to the introversion of perspectives. Meaning becomes
subjective. As an educational process, religious education must
remove objectivity, discard the real, and relativise all moral
judgements and actions. To non-realists, this becomes the ultimate
freedom.
A critical reflection of non-realism.
On the face of it, non-realism appears to present some very
attractive features for secular religious education. A postmodern
world view would certainly seem to make the fraught difficulties of
inter-church and inter-faith dialogue less contentious. If, as the
non-realists assert, there is no objective reality, then there can
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be no truth-claims by traditions on behalf of themselves. No one
would have access to an absolute answer.
However, it is precisely in the fact that postmodernism is itself
declared by its exponents to be the answer to the - admittedly
considerable - difficulties of traditional objectivism and realism,
that a paradox lies. As Victoria La'porte rightly observes in her
review of David Hart's study of non-realism and the world faiths,
t post modernism can itself be an intolerant creed, especially
towards realist ideologies - with its own dogmas and saviours'
(La'porte, 1995, p. 43).
Paradox is clearly apparent in postmodernist certainty. How can a
philosophical system which denies the legitimacy of tradition, not
itself be condemned as a harbinger of a new tradition of certainty:
the certainty of uncertainty itself? This is the lasting legacy of
postmodernism, whose ironic simultaneous statement-yet-denial leads
inevitably to an insoluble paradox.
This insolubility is also present, when postmodernism is applied
to religious education. If, as the non-realists seem to imply,
religious education is part of the human quest for meaning, but that
the meaning which is searched for is, in fact, nothing other than
pure subjectivity, then what is actually undertaken and accomplished
in religious education, or, for that matter, in any form of
educational practice, to warrant calling it education? Non-realism
denies the legitimacy of any recourse to objective sources upon
which knowledge might depend. Religious education becomes a purely
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interior practice, in which the human spirit of creative power is
contemplated. But the postmodern paradox here lies supremely in the
assertion by non-realists, of the ultimacy of the commonality of the
human creative will.
Yet, on what grounds can it be claimed to be a will or
commonality, to which reference might be made? If, as some
non-realists might wish to assert, commonality is, in fact, the
shared experience of being human, then this too needs to be
deconstructed. Human nature itself cannot lie beyond the postmodern
gaze.
Finally, what use would a postmodern programme of religious
education be to inter-religious discussions? Even if Cupitt is
granted his deconstructive mission, it would be difficult to see how
that mission might contribute to any inter-religious dialogue, as
opposed to disputation, particularly with those traditions which
claim a revealed nature. It might then be questionable to assert
that non-realist religious education would do anything to contribute
to religious understanding and appreciation. Given the almost
revolutionary character of non-realism, it would seem, rather, that
what the 'Sea of Faith' school of theologians is suggesting, is a
radical	 departure	 from	 the	 established	 approaches	 of
self-understanding of the religious traditions themselves. To enter
into dialogue with these traditions from the perspective of this
theological radicalism, would seem to be an impossible task.
Instead, one ideology would necessarily be left to confront another.
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In conclusion, it must be said from the perspective of the author
of this thesis, that postmodernism provides some serious challenges
to traditional objective theism. This stems as a result of the
deconstruction of reality, which postmodernism undertakes. However,
as a method of religious education, its appeal must remain limited
and partisan. After all, postmodernism itself is an ideology, and as
such is burdened with its own prejudices and presuppositions.
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iii. Discussion and Conclusions.
This chapter has considered some of the ways in which Catholic
and secular forms of religious education might express their aims
and presuppositions.
The model employed in this thesis to outline the aims of Catholic
religious education, was derived from an analysis of the
implications for Catholic religious education of the four main
Conciliar Constitutions of the Second Vatican Council. This is not
to suggest that this approach, designed to identify the aims of
Catholic religious education, is the oniy way in which this might be
achieved. Other methods of arriving at answers to this particular
problem might be equally valid. It is the contention of this thesis,
however, that the particular methodology employed in this study to
identify those aims is a proper one, and that the particular aims of
Catholic religious education have been correctly identified.
Much the same can be said about the three particular approaches
to secular religious education, analysed in the second half of this
chapter. It will be the case, certainly, that other secular
methodologies of religious education might have been explored, to a
profitable end. What the second part to the chapter has done,
therefore, is to present just a few of the possible ways in which
secular religious education might function. Despite the admittedly
diverse character of the selection of approaches to secular
religious education made in that part of the chapter, it remains the
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contention of this thesis, however, that what is presented there
does represent fairly the broad spectrum of secular thought about
religious education. Thus, the author suggests that each of the
models studied says something of value about the aims of religious
education, and says it on behalf of a wide constituency of secular
opinion and theory. What follows is a brief comparison between the
approaches of both Catholic and secular tradition, in their efforts
to outline the aims of religious education. Three areas present
themselves. First the engagement of religious education with
religious tradition, second, the aims of religious education, and
third the structural presuppositions of religious education.
a. The engagement with religious traditions.
Catholic religious education begins with, and functions from its
self-perception of the events of revelation. In particular, the
approach of the cyclical theology described in the Chapter One, with
which Catholic religious education is imbibed, is itself revelatory.
The educational theory that begins from the belief that God calls
fallen man to return to life in God, stems from this revelatory
point of commencement. From this starting point, the engagement with
religious traditions proceeds from the belief that God vests
goodness in them through revelation (that is, revelation to the
whole world), insofar as those religious traditions enable human
beings to strive for God in the ways which are open to them.
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However, an underlying tension must always exist in Catholic
religious education as it engages with religious traditions. This
tension is derived from the faith and understanding Catholic
religious understanding has, both about itself and its relationship
to the Church, and also in its relationship to the world of faiths.
As a result, Catholic religious education is seen to operate on
two levels when it engages with the religious traditions:
(1) Catholic religious education operates as an educational
process which claims access to a religious tradition which it holds
to be as equally vested in the desire to seek after truth, as are
the religious traditions other than Christianity (and other than
Catholicism in particular). There exists, in other words, a common,
shared dignity, which is recognised in Catholic religious education
to exist in all faiths;
(2) Catholic religious education exists as a process which claims
access to a religious tradition that itself claims possession of a
higher level of fulfilment in that search for God. This claim is
held to be higher than that of any other tradition, namely the
guardianship of maintenance of the deposit of faith, and the message
of revelation. This constitutes Catholicism's claim to uniqueness,
authority and catholicity.
This might be compared with the approach of the traditions of
secular religious education to the engagement with religious
traditions. Secular religious education operates with its own
presuppositions and prejudices. Religious education does not, on the
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whole, treat the religious traditions as equal partners in a quest
for a deeper understanding of truth. This might be contrasted with
Catholic religious education which clearly does go some way to
recognise this possibility. In all of the models of secular
religious education discussed in this chapter, the religious
education process is treated as a system which generally perceives
itself to be distinct from the traditions it studies, both in its
aims, and in its epistemic neutrality. There is no general
perception that secular religious education could, or should share
in the claims of the traditions which it studies.
Accordingly, it can be added that secular religious education
generally functions as a process which obtains data from the
religious traditions, but which does not see in its function the
duty or ability to contribute to those traditions in their quest for
truth. This may be asserted, despite the claims of all three secular
traditions under study in this chapter, to contribute to a dialogue
between the religions and secular opinion. Phenomenology works from
a clear principle of observation, not participation. Experientialism
assumes that the subject, (the pupil), is the focus of religious
education, not the religious tradition itself, which is regarded as
an ancillary to the process. Non-realism denies the claim of any
tradition to have authority.
As such, a tension underlies the approaches of secular religious
education in its engagement with the religious traditions. This in
part mirrors the tensions found in Catholic religious education.
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Both Catholic and secular religious education claim a sense of
absolute identity. With that identity, each goes forward to engage
the religious tradition. Each claims to be distinct from the
tradition which is studied. Yet Catholicism recognises itself to be
part of the religious milieu in which it finds itself. Secular
religious education makes no such distinction, or, in the case of
non-realism, denies there is an objective milieu in the first place.
b. The aims of religious education.
To this extent, then, it is possible to isolate what the general
purpose of Catholic and secular religious education might be. It is
the contention of this thesis that the general aims of Catholic
religious education fall into four particular areas. These areas
correspond to the four Constitutions of the Second Vatican Council.
First, in the light of revelation, Catholic religious education aims
to reflect upon the fact, and event of revelation. Second, as a
response to the ecciesial nature of Catholicism, Catholic religious
education aims to reflect on the fact and event of being the Church.
Third, in recognition of the existence and action of the Church in
the world, Catholic religious education seeks to explore ways of
making that existence and action more meaningful, both to the
Church, and to the world. Fourth, in celebration of God's event of
revelation, Catholic religious education seeks to call those who
undergo the process to live the life of grace, in all that this
implies, both negatively and positively.
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In a similar way, this thesis contends that the aims of the
secular traditions of religious education under review may be
summarised in three particular ways. Phenomenological religious
education seeks to allow pupils to empathize, to develop themselves
personally by developing an understanding of religious tradition,
and to reflect on the nature of humanity through a recognition of
human givens'. Experiential religious education aims to enable us
to understand ourselves better, by reflecting on the commonality of
experience, and especially religious experience. Non-realism asks us
to recognize the human commonality of the search for meaning. It
seeks also to limit knowledge to the linguistic concepts that are
employed, and to remove what is sees as the burden of objectivity
from epistemic enquiry.
c. The structural presuppositions of religious education.
From this reflection of the aims of Catholic and secular
religious tradition, and from the overall analysis of data in this
chapter it will be seen that both traditions operate from
preconceived structural presuppositions.
Catholic religious education assumes the reality of revelation.
It functions primarily with regard to its ecclesial claims; it is
part of the function of the Church, first and foremost in its
mission to the Church and to the world. From this base, Catholic
religious education engages with the religious traditions, and uses
pedagogical methods to achieve its aims.
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Secular religious education also operates with presupposed
assumptions. Phenomenology assumes the existence of human tgivens,
the capacity to be religious, and the possibility of there being an
objective phenomenology. Experientialism presupposes the validity of
human experience. It asserts the commonality of the human capacity
to have religious experiences, and asserts that these abilities
enable individuals to understand themselves better. Non-realism
presupposes that objectivity has failed, and that it is impossible
to think coherently in realist terms. It also presumes that the only
way for religious traditions to engage with postmodern secularity is
to embrace an anti-objective non-realist stance.
In conclusion it can be said that Catholic and secular religious
education are similar in the sense that they share the need to hold
presupposed theoretical positions, in order to enable their aims to
be achieved. However, because those aims differ so widely, it is
difficult to identify areas where any real basis for agreement might
lie in a comparison of those aims themselves.
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NOTES
1 The Law of the Church, and the Civil Law of the state both have a
relevance when discussing Catholic religious education. Thus,
according to Canon Law, religious education is to be placed firmly
within the principles of Catholic doctrine. Oversight of this is
left, ultimately, to the 'competent ecclesiastical authority', This,
in effect, means the Bishop of the diocese (CCL., Cann. 803.$2 and
$3). Civil law requires that all Catholic schools, either voluntary
or state aided, should conform to education legislation. Thus,
religious education must be provided for all registered pupils, the
syllabus content for religious education must accord with the Trust
Deed relating to the school and controlled by the governors, and
religious education must be inspected under the provisions of
Section 13 of the Education (Schools) Act of 1992. For a summary of
this legislation see National Board of Religious Inspectors and
Advisers, 1994, p. 9.
2 This is evinced, for example by the Second National Conference of
the Catholic Education Service, held at Newman College, Birmingham
on 9-11 April 1995. The Conference theme was 'The Church's Mission
in Education'.
See also Hastings, 1991, P. 173. McClelland sees a weakness in
internal Catholic school policy in its attempts to overcome the
stress which secular society and education often places upon the
need to conform to an individualistic and materialist goal in
education. He regards two documents issued by the Sacred
Congregation for Catholic Education in the last decade as attempts
to redress the balance. Thus he identifies the 1982 document Lay
Catholics in Schools: Witnesses to Faith as reflections on the need
to emphasize the personal and Christian dedication of the teacher.
The second document, The Religious Dimension of Education in a
Catholic School, (1988), McClelland sees as stressing the
particularly communitarian nature of Catholic religious education.
Taken together both documents stand in clear opposition to the
demands of secular materialism.
National Board of Religious Inspectors and Advisers, 1994,
pp . 12-17. See also Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, 1996.
A detailed analysis of the relationship between Scripture and
Tradition is presented in the previous chapter of this thesis.
6 J am grateful to Cohn Gunton for suggesting this phrase to me,
which I here paraphrase somewhat. It is precisely this separation of
revelation from tradition which enables Catholic theology to avoid
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the dangers of literal fundamentalism, and which allows
interpretation its proper and significant function in assisting our
understanding of things (Gunton, 1994).
7 It should be noted, however, that Sutherland does not share in
theism's concept of God as an objective supernatural reality.
Accordingly, whilst Sutherland's phraseology has been borrowed, his
theological understanding of that phrase has not here been assumed.
For a detailed examination of what Sutherland means by the term, see
Sutherland, 1984, pp. 76-86).
8 See also John Paul II, 1988b, pp. 18-20. The Pope here explicitly
links the journeying of the People of God with communion, which he
understands to mean the union with God brought about by Jesus
Christ, in the Holy Spirit' (John Paul II, l988b, pp. 18). It is
because of the combination of an instrumental function and effectual
action of the Church, (effectual, that is, in terms of salvific
grace), and a concept of the Church as the People of God on a
journey (that is, a communion of saints at once on pilgrimage to God
and also intimately linked to God through Christ), that the Church
is properly understood as a sacrament of unity (John Paul II, 1988b,
pp. 19).
Schinaus presents a useful summary of the key issues in this
debate. He places the origin of the Church definitively at
Pentecost, indicating here a supporting pneumatological structure
for the Church, which arises as a culmination of Jesus' life, death
and resurrection (Schmaus, 1972, pp. 13-42). This pneumatological
aspect is supported also by Congar, who points out that an overtly
Christological, incarnational model of the Church fails to guard
against an institutionalisation of the Church, which would deny the
value of the prophetic inspirational life of the Church which is to
be found in its ecciesial reality. The Spirit, understood to act in
union with Christ, provides for a more coherent unity of structure
(Congar, 1983, pp. 5-12).
10 See also Lumen Gentium, art. 8.; cf. Schmaus, 1972, pp. 63-64
Schmaus here considers the meaning of this term for the Council. He
fails to note, however, that there is a danger of confusing the
divine and human natures of the one person of Christ, with the human
nature of the Christian individual, in the analogy he comments upon,
in article 8 of the Constitution. This is the reason why, when
comparing the Church to both that which is endowed with the
spiritual graces of the divine Christ in an already achieved
completion, and also a pilgrim Church labouring on earth, yet to
reach its home, the Council brackets its incarnational analogy with
the words 'in a somewhat similar way' (Lumen Gentium, art. 8).
11 For a brief presentation of the Catholic authorities who support
this view, see Chapter One, above.
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12 See, for example, Jackson and Nesbitt, 1992, PP. 19-28. Even in a
study of avowedly Christian children, (Jackson and Nesbitt define
this to mean children who regularly attend worship or youth
activities related to a church', p. 19), differences in the
religious experiences of these children are very varied, albeit with
a number of existing experientially overlapping similarities.
13 Cf., for example, Erricker and Erricker, 1994, pp. 174-184;
McGrady, 1994a, Pp. 148-163; McGrady, 1994b, pp. 56-62. Erricker and
Erricker comment upon the need to develop a methodology for
religious education, which takes into account the ability of
children to use their abilities of imagination and self-expression.
McGrady, writing in an Irish context, develops the view, backed up
by empirical research, that children find it difficult to use
metaphorical language fluently in a religious context.
Educationalists, he suggests, should seek ways which facilitate a
linguistic approach to the teaching of religious metaphor.
14 Cf. Mt. 28: 18-20.
15 This form of fideism avoids, of course, any particular epistemic
theory which attempts to establish common human values through
logical or deductive means. What is at issue here is not whether any
values can be proven to exist, but rather whether values and
humanity can be shown to share in a commonality with each other.
This thesis contends that one possible way in which values and
humanity may be said to share in a commonality might be through a
presupposed belief in that commonality.
16 See, passim, Kalve, 1995, pp. 5-7.
17 This concept of respect may be extended into a way of life which
is to be identified within the whole school ethos. Thus, whilst
pupils might be encouraged to develop lifestyles which will
contribute to a school environment, and enhance its mission
statement, it should be recognised that this does not finish in the
religious education lesson. To the extent that religious education
is not merely classwork or academic study, the relationship of
personal development with an identifiable Catholic ethos remains
vital for transforming the way of life of the individual child into
one of twisdom; understanding; knowledge; right judgement; courage;
reverence; and awe and wonder' (National Board of Religious
Inspectors and Advisers, 1994, ibid.).
' Cf. the second reading from the Office of Readings of the Divine
Office for Holy Saturday.
19 As Dalmais correctly points out, liturgy should not be understood
first and foremost as discourse (logos), but as an operation or
action (ergon). This should not, of course preclude the theological
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fact that liturgy does contain within itself data, upon which the
theologian can reflect (Martimort, 1987, PP. 229-231).
20 Exegetically, this liturgical structure may be seen, for instance
in the description of blood and water pouring from the side of Jesus
on the Cross. The key sacraments of the Church may here be
identified; blood with the Eucharist, water with Baptism. Indeed,
the Church itself can be said to originate symbolically from this
pericope, especially since the two sacraments mentioned above are
the key sacraments of the Christian life (cf. Jn 19: 34).
21 E.g. 1 Tim 2: 4.
22 On the concept of the Paschal Mystery, see Martimort, 1987,
pp . 262-266.
23 Heb 4: 14.
24 In an Apostolic Letter celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary
of the Constitution Sacrosancturn Conciliwn, Pope John Paul II
presents five particular ways in which Christ can be said to be
present in the Paschal Mystery. These are (i) within each and every
liturgical celebration; (ii) in the assembly of the Church at
prayer; (iii) in the acts and person of the celebrating ordained
minister ( t in persona Christi'); (iv) in the word of Christ,
proclaimed; (v) in the sacraments, most especially in the Eucharist,
both in its celebration and in its species as consecrated bread and
wine. See John Paul II, 1988a, pp. 12-13.
25 A link between revelation, Incarnation and the Paschal Mystery is
made, forcefully by Hans Urs von Baithasar, 1990, pp. 12-14.
26 This latter point is also noted by McBrien, in McBrien, 1980,
Vol. 2, p. 676.
27 See, for example Acts 1: 12-14.
28 In some comments to teachers, educators and theologians at the
Maryvale Institute of Religious Education 1
 on 9 January 1993,
Francis Clark spoke of the danger, in his mind, of minimising the
unique significance and efficacy of the Eucharistic sacrifice by
first inviting the pupil to consider moments of celebratory and
sacrificial significance in their own lives, before making
comparison of these with the Catholic theology of Eucharistic
sacrifice. This process, which he termed 'thysiology', reduced the
divine realities of the Eucharistic sacrifice into categories open
to phenomenological enquiry. This, Clark argued, would blunt the
pupils' understanding of the prevenient nature of the divine action
brought about in the Eucharist, and so had to be avoided. This
thesis would disagree with Clark's view on this matter, arguing
instead that it is an essential educational activity to begin with a
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pupil's self-understanding and self-experience, before introducing
new ideas and theological concepts to the child. Human development
and understanding does not occur in a vacuum, but through a
continual upbuiiding of the individual, through experience and
reflection.
29 From this interpretation, profound questions arise as to the
relationship of lapsed, non-Catholics and those of other faiths to
the Catholic religious education process. If religious education is
catechetical, does this not alienate those who, through conscience
or circumstance, cannot belong to the Catholic faith, yet who find
value and inspiration in Catholic education? In reply, it must be
asserted openly and honestly, yet with friendship and charity, that
Catholic religious education is precisely that; catholic. As a
branch of the Church, (and indeed a form of theological reflection),
it calls all humanity into union with Christ. That union is to be
found - albeit imperfectly - in the Christian churches in general,
but most completely, in the Catholic communion. This is not to
denigrate those religious traditions other than Christianity, in
which great good, and the truth of God is to be found. It is a
question, nevertheless, of the honest faith response of the Catholic
Church to its calling that Catholic religious education must owe its
origin and rationale. See also the Declaration Nostra Aetate, art.
2.
30 Holley fails to demonstrate, however, why these criteria should
have any more significance than any other that might be posited in
their place.
31 This would be supported by, among others, Robert Coles, who in
his remarkable study of the spiritual life of children, movingly
describes many instances which indicate to him the depth of
religious beliefs held by children. See especially Coles, 1992, pp.
129-147.
32 Interestingly, Holley does not suggest the converse: that it
might be equally immoral of religious education to take away a
particular religious belief from a child, without replacing it with
another.
This is an important contextual point, which should be remembered
when considering Cox's four particular aims. Cox is concerned to
show what the 1988 Education Reform Act might imply for the aims of
religious education.
An earlier, and shorter version of this section on Michael
Grimmitt's theory of religious education first appeared in Kalve,
1994, pp. 61-68. Due acknowledgement is hereby made to that fact.
On the fraught question of what is a religion, I assume the
theoretical model proposed in Stone, 1991, pp.337-351. Stone
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suggests that religion may be defined as a system of practices and
rituals rationalised by belief.
36 Saliba speaks of phenomenology's concern with the objective and
subjective elements of a person's experiences.
Grimmitt's concept of phenomenology seems closer to what Saliba
calls the 'history of religion'. Cf. Saliba, 1971, p.42ff.
38 Although it should be noted that Grimmitt prefers to speak of one
ideology being 'criticised from the standpoint of another'
(Grimmitt, 1987, p.41).
I.e. the development of such skills as self-knowledge, critical
openness and the capacity for personal decision-making. See
Grimmitt's article, 'World religions and personal development', in R
Jackson, (1982), pp.142-143. Of course such a list would not be
exhaustive.
40 For Grimmitt, the 'cultural form' of religion comprises the
symbolic language and actions which form a systematic structure
whereby the meanings of a transcendent objectivity placed outside
human categories are communicated to the human. In a loose sense
this could also be termed Grimmitt's concept of revelation.
41 In speaking of the enquirer beginning 'to understand the human
condition', Grimmitt is of course using the term quite correctly as
an experiential expression. Thus through education we come to terms
with what we are and what we experience. Education, then, provides
the means whereby we enter more intimately into an engagement with
our humanity.
42 But see Smith, 1986, p.80.
43 Grimmitt attempts to demonstrate here the factual basis for
'human givens'.
" By this I do not suggest that notions such as human freedom are
unverifiable on their own terms. What I am arguing here is that it
is wrong of Grimmitt to suggest, as he does, that when such concepts
are applied in support of the idea of 'human givens', that those
'human givens' can therefore be understood as non-metaphysical
terms. Social constructs do not provide cast-iron defences against
metaphysical thought.
This idea of there being 'more' than just the objective world is
mirrored in William James' seminal study of religious experience. In
a curiously Kantian conclusion, James asserts that our apprehension
of an objective world is but a part of a fuller process, a unity, of
the objective reality which is 'incalculably more extensive' than
the subjective interpretation of it (James, 1985, p. 476). Religious
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experience for James becomes a union with this reality which is more
than the interpretation. For James, as a Christian, that reality he
finally calls 'God' (James, 1985, pp. 486f., 491).
46 It should be noted that reports of childhood religious
experiences are given usually by adults who remember their
experiences over often a lengthy period of time.
47 For a examination of the issues surrounding metaphor and
experiential awareness, see Erricker and Erricker, 1994, pp. 174-
184.
48 This in itself may well be a contradiction in terms for
postmodernism!
For an example of this from a feminist perspective, especially in
relation to Derrida's key term difference, see Soper, 1990,
pp . 11-17.
50 This point is recognised by Hay and Hammond (Hay and Hammond,
1992, p. 146).
51 Thus, for example, at the 8th Annual Conference of the Sea of
Faith Network, held at Leicester University on 27-29 July 1995,
three stranded activities were available to participants; a
political strand, a creative strand and a theological strand.
52 For a critical analysis of 'outsidelessness' from a theistic
stance, see Brinkinan, 1994, pp. 53-58.
To the extent that Geering describes this as 'the capacity of
people to be religious' (Geering, 1994, p. 102), his understanding
of Smith's view of human nature is virtually indistinguishable from
Michael Grimmitt's theory of human givens.
Here links may be seen between the approach of experientialists
to questions of significance and value, and the non-realist
position. See also Tillich, 1984, p. lOif; cf. Tillich, 1957, pp. 5-
11.
For examples of this changing scenery, see Cupitt, 1985b, pp.
154ff. Cupitt concludes, 'If religion has a history, then it is a
human one' (Cupitt, 1985b, p. 159).
56 For a detailed account of how, in Cupitt's view, objective theism
has been forced to decline, see Cupitt, 1980, pp. 15-33.
This, for example, Anthony Freeman gives as a title for one of
his chapters in God In Us. See Freeman, 1993, especially pp. 48-51.
CHAPTER III
The Spiritual Dimensions of Religious Education in Catholic and
Secular Traditions
The first two chapters of this thesis analysed the educational
and philosophical presuppositions which lie behind Catholic and
secular religious education. In those chapters, (particularly in the
second), reference was made to the spiritual dimensions of religious
education which exist in both Catholic and secular contexts. The
present chapter seeks to identify some of those contexts in which
those dimensions operate, and to analyse the place of spirituality
within religious education, from Catholic and secular perspectives.
To do this, the first part of this chapter will explore some of
the aspects of Catholic theological and educational thought which
centre around the issues of spirituality and catechesis. After
attempting to define spirituality and catechesis, these concepts
will be placed within an educational context. An analysis will be
made of the interrelationship of these concepts to religious
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education, and bridges between these concepts and Catholic religious
education will be explored.
The second part of this chapter will consider what it might mean
to speak about the spiritual within the context of secular religious
education. First, secular definitions of the spiritual will be
explored. Then, in parallel with the first part of this chapter,
these themes will be placed within an educational context, this time
applying them to the secular context established in the first two
chapters of the thesis.
The chapter will conclude with a comparison and contrast of the
two positions explored. Similarities between the assumptions and
presuppositions of the two traditions will be examined, and
differences highlighted.
The chapter will end with some final conclusions drawn from the
discussions and exploration outlined above.
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i. Catholic Religious Education and the Spiritual.
1. Defining t the spiritual' in Catholic theology and thought.
Spirituality is both a lived experience and an area suitable for
academic study. It is a lived experience in that it is found in the
beliefs and life experiences of the individual (Hume, 1988, p. 97).
It is to be experienced in the light of faith, but it is also an
experience which is practical, being seen by many interpreters as a
way of living out that faith in concrete terms.1
Spirituality implies a life lived in and filled with the Spirit.
It becomes a study of experience, and is grounded in the
experiential realities of the life of each individual. It is not to
be understood simply as an exercising of the intellect, but as a
Christologically focussed engaging of the entire self; t it is the
lived experience and praxis of my life as uniquely called by Christ'
(Kaam, 1975, p. 293).
Neither, however, is spirituality simply a life lived, or an
experience experienced. Spirituality does engage the intellect,
especially through faith. As Pope John Paul II has put it when
speaking about faith and human freedom, 'the essential usefulness of
faith consists in the fact that, through faith, man achieves the
good of his rational nature' (John Paul II, 1994, p. 192, original
italics removed). Catholic spirituality, indeed, spirituality
extended to include all experiences of faith combines just this
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element of belief and intellectual enquiry. A Christological
activity, its dependency upon Christ as the source and focus for
those experiences, makes it above all a reflective action.
Van Kaam has noted that this action is one part of a two-fold
stream which flows from a reflection on sacred scripture, the other
stream being that of systematic theology (Kaam, ibid., p. 8).
Accordingly, any attempt to define the meaning of spirituality will
have to include in its survey the significance of scripture to its
enquiry. It is to the scriptural witness to spirituality that this
chapter now turns.2
(i) Scriptural origins.
The earliest Christian references to spirituality as the
experience of life lived out in the Spirit are to be found in the
Pauline letters (Komonchak, 1990, p. 972). This form of experience
should be seen as one which has been touched by the reality of the
divine. John Ziesler notes that the Pauline use of the term spirit'
should ordinarily be understood to refer to the Holy Spirit: t[it]
was the divine especially in its communication with and action upon
the human' (Ziesler, 1983, p. 95). J. D. G. Dunn comments also that
central to the themes of Pauline theology is the notion of the
experience of divine grace, expressed most definitely in Paul's use
of terms such as in Christ' and in the Lord'. This language, and
the language of the Spirit bound up with it, is according to Dunn
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part of Paul's experiential concept of a divine power which
transforms a man from the inside out' (Dunn, 1975, pp. 200ff.).
Paul speaks of those who are in Christ as being set free from the
law of sin through the law of the Spirit, which is life in Christ
(Romans 8: 1-2). Accordingly for Paul, the Spirit has a functional
role to play in the events of human salvation. Christ, who brings
about salvation, brings about the possibility of new life, a life
lived according to the Spirit' (Romans 8: 4; NJBC. 82: 63). So, for
Paul, life itself becomes filled with the Spirit of power (1 Cor.
2:4), who dwells in us (Romans 8: 9). Faith in God's action of
raising Jesus in a transformed and gloriously new way of being,
incorporates us into Christ, who pours out the Spirit upon us. This
enables us to recognise God in faith, and call Him Abba (Romans
8: 9-17).
Within this context it becomes legitimate to speak of the
religious experience to which Paul attests in his writings. He does
not testify simply to the resurrection as an event which occurs
beyond his own life-experience, but affirms that life is now lived
not merely through Christ but in Christ (Gal. 2: 20). Spirituality
exists for Paul inasmuch as the new life of the risen Christ fills
his (i.e. Paul's) very being. As Joann Woiski comments of later
Pauline spirituality, this mature experience was one of ever deeper
participation in the paschal mystery, of loving trust even unto
death...' (Komonchak, 1990, p. 973),3
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When the Gospels are considered, it becomes clear that it is the
concerns of the different communities for whom and by whom the
Gospels were written that guide and influence the spirituality of
each of them. Mark's Gospel, which probably originated from Rome,4
has as its central theme the kingdom of God. From the outset, two
elements play a continuous rle in this theme as it develops: Mark's
Christological concerns (who is Jesus), and the communities concerns
about discipleship (what is the appropriate response to Jesus). It
is through this that the Marcan narrative employs the multi-faceted
structures of Messiahship, the Suffering Servant motif, Son of God,
the Lord, et cetera. Structurally, the Passion narrative seems to
have a climactic function, showing that Jesus is only properly
understood in the light of his suffering, death and resurrection.
Indications	 about	 the	 Christological	 and	 discipleship
spirituality of the Marcan community for whom the Gospel was written
are found throughout the text. Jesus is understood not only as the
one who inaugurates the kingdom of God, (a kingdom which for now
remains hidden in part), but is also the Lord who calls the people
to repentance and faith (Mk 1: 1-15). Through a process of being
portrayed as healer, teacher, crucified and risen one, the Gospel
shows a dynamic movement towards a final understanding and
experience of who Jesus is, and of what our response to him should
be. This development seems initially to be hidden from our
perception: the so called tmessianic secret' in which Jesus is
presented as actively seeking to hide the claims to messiahship made
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of him predominates the Gospel up to the death and resurrection
narratives (Mk 1: 34, 44; 3: 12; 5: 43; 7: 36; 8: 26, 30; 9:9. Cf.
Mk 14: 62; 15: 39; 16: 1-8).
The response to Jesus, that of discipleship follows a positive
line of progress in the first half of the Gospel, but becomes
increasingly negative and bleak in the second half. Thus, in the
first half of the Gospel, the disciples are held up to be the ones
to imitate (Mk 1: 16-20; 2: 13-14; 3: 13-19; 6: 6b-13). But the
exemplary behaviour of the disciples rapidly vanishes as Jerusalem
and the Passion approach. Increasingly a negative light is thrown on
them. Ultimately they run away, abandoning Jesus to his fate (Mk
6: 52; 8: 14-21; 8: 32-33; 9: 32-37; 10: 35-45; 14: 17-21, 26-31,
43-52, 54, 66-72). The focus shifts. Marcan spirituality moves its
attention from the example of those in the Gospel who so
dramatically failed to follow Jesus, to Jesus himself, who now
becomes the only one who deserves imitation. To be a true disciple
in the light of Mark's Gospel is to be an imitator of Christ, who
faithful to God, followed along the path of love to his own death
and ultimate triumph. This spirituality only becomes clear in the
light of that resurrection.
The spirituality of Matthew's Gospel seems almost certainly
grounded in a Jewish-Christian perspective. 5 Two strands seem to
inhabit Matthean theology; the portrayal in the Gospel of Jesus as
the Christ, and the notion of the closeness of the kingdom of God as
Jesus preaches it. Both of these themes seem to be set out most
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clearly at the beginning and end of the Gospel. At the start of the
Gospel, Jesus is seen as the royal Son of God, as Immanuel,
God-with-us, as the Christ (Mt. 1: 18-25). At the end, all authority
and power over the kingdom of God, over heaven and earth, and over
all time is given to Jesus. Having proclaimed the kingdom to Israel,
the community must now go out and preach to the gentiles in that
same power (Mt. 28: 18-20).
The kingdom of God becomes an object of hope (Mt. 6: 10) and
proclamation (Mt. 3: 2; 4: 17). Its proclaimer, the Christ, makes
its nearness felt in such a way that it becomes an eschatological
symbol of God's promise of salvation (e.g. Jesus appearing to eQuate
the future destruction of Jerusalem with the end of the world, and
his accompanying parables in Mt. 24: 1-51).
Matthew's Gospel attempts to establish Jesus's relationship with
Judaism in the light of this sense of impending finality of the old
order and the establishment of the kingdom. Thus, Jesus is shown not
merely to be one who affirms the Mosaic Torah, but who brings it to
complete fulfilment (Mt. 5: 17). A yearning seems to exist for the
renewal of the bonds of Israel's laws and traditions, and it is to
the end of achieving this, and of establishing the new covenant of
the people with God that the ecciesial community is instituted. This
relationship exists, according to Matthew's Gospel through Jesus
Christ (1: 23; 28: 18-20).
Matthean spirituality, then, is to live according to Jesus's
teaching in this new covenant. It is in experiencing this
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cooperation with God that we enter into a new covenant, a new
Church.
When Luke's Gospel is considered, it is seen that the Lucan text
appears to rely upon Mark's Gospel. The Greek of the prologue is
masterly (Lk 1: 1-4), and the there exist also indications of the
author's familiarity with Septuagintal Greek in the following
passage. Other internal evidence suggest sources were used which
derived from Q, as well as a source original to the Gospel, normally
designated L. But it is also evident that Luke refashions and
redacts material to suit his own theology. From this we can
understand something of Luke's spirituality and his understanding of
religious experience throughout the Gospel (NJBC. 43: 4).6
Two particular strands of Luke's theology might here be
highlighted. First is that of his sItz Ira leben. Given the focus of
Luke-Acts, it seems right to suggest that Luke is addressing a well-
to-do Gentile audience who are facing the prospect of living in an
increasingly hostile environment. Questions of theodicy seem to
arise quite naturally as a result of this throughout the Lucan
texts: if God has not kept his promise to his chosen Jewish elect,
allowing Jerusalem instead to be destroyed, then why should Gentile
Christians believe in this same God's promise of faithfulness to
themselves? Luke's reply to this is to provide his audience with the
overtly kerygmatic structure and story of Luke-Acts. Through Jesus
God was faithful to his people Israel. But this 'Israel' is no
longer the Jewish nation alone, but includes the Gentiles, the
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unclean and the outcast. Israel is thus reconstituted, as a
continuity of the new with the old (NJBC. 43: 5). Its universal
character is typified by the utterance of the non-Jewish Centurian
at the Crucifixion (Lk 23: 47), by the events surrounding the
conversion of Cornelius (Acts 10), and the general direction of
Luke-Acts which reaches its conclusion in Paul's open-ended mission
to Rome - by implication indicating the whole world - (Acts 28:
30-31).
In this context, the spirituality of the community in Luke-Acts
is the experience of a missionary Church learning to expand in a
world of all peoples. In this experience the community learns to
widen its horizons in its sharing and caring. It finds itself called
to spread the Good News wider than before, just as Jesus was
impelled by the Spirit to proclaim the freedom of God's power to a
larger generation than his own Jewish people.
Turning to the question of the spirituality found in the Gospel
of John, it will be seen that the Gospel differs from the synoptic
gospels both in form and style. Rather than use apothegms and short
parables to present the message of Jesus, Jesus is portrayed through
the use of long and highly symbolic discourses. At the same time,
Jesus is shown to engage in a much wider mission, both in Galilee
and Judea, focussing in particular upon the latter. This might be
seen as a contrast to the predominant preoccupations of the
synoptics with a ministry of Jesus set largely in Galilee.7
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The theology, and hence the spirituality of the Gospel
concentrates on the hour of Jesus' glorification (NJBC. 61: 14).
Jesus' mission, that of bringing about grace and truth into
Creation, finds its genesis from the Father (Jn 1: 11-12; 18: 37).
In order to fully achieve this goal, which for John is finally
accomplished in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, the
Gospel narrative moves through various cycles of acceptance and of
rejection (NJBC. 61: 14). A pattern is established for the Gospel: a
positive beginning (Jn 1-4) gives way to a progressive and
cumulative rejection of Jesus. Conflicts arise over his identity.
These remain unresolved and by being ambiguous, they can be seen as
a necessary component of faith seeking understanding in John's
theology. Resolution of the conflict is only possible when Jesus has
completed his mission and has returned to the Father (Jn 5-12). The
mood darkens again, but with the impending departure of Jesus from
life looming larger, the promise is made to the disciples of a
future joy which will be given to them. Jesus will be seen to dwell
in them when the Paraclete is given as a guide (Jn 13-17). Finally
Jesus'	 glorification is	 achieved in the	 crucifixion and
resurrection. In this context the episode with Thomas leads to a
statement by the narrator that the Gospel itself is intended to lead
the hearer to faith in Jesus (Jn 18ff.; 20: 30-31).
The spirituality of John's Gospel stems directly from this
pattern. In the Gospel narrative John describes how the community
itself experienced both union and alienation. This arose primarily
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because of the experience of who Jesus was: his intrinsic unity with
God. An understanding of this fundamental concept of unity might be
extended to the whole community, so that each person is able to
experience unity with each other in Christ. Similarly, the question
of the identity of Jesus, which brought about rejection of him by
the Jewish community might be extended to the Christian community's
own experience of alienation and rejection by the world. The Gospel
presents a challenge to the community to respond to this alienation.
Finally, just as Jesus was sent by God, so the community is sent by
Jesus into the world to give light to the world, and to bring the
world to glory in God. The spirituality of the Gospel of John might
thus be summarised as follows: to experience the Christian life is
to experience the same relationship as Jesus had with the Father. It
is to be Christ in the world, and so to do the Father's will
(Koinonchak, 1990, pp. 973f.).
The general forms of spirituality in the New Testament described
above are to be found also within Catholic theology, and must be
seen to be as much a part of Catholic theological thought on
spirituality as they are for New Testament thought in this area. The
next sections of this enquiry into the meaning of spirituality will
look at the theological reasoning of twentieth century Catholic
spirituality in the light of the scriptural witness.
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(ii) Theological enquiries into spirituality: up to Vatican 11.8
There was a certain ambivalence present within the character of
Catholic theology in the twentieth century which is reflected also
in the spiritual writings which developed during that time. On the
one hand, there was a scholastic tradition which seemed to derive
both from the t rediscovery' of Thomism at the beginning of the
century, and also sought its roots in the questions of authority
which dominated ecclesial history in the nineteenth century.
However, this form of tradition could find its origins much further
back than the 1800's. Its most significant proponents could
justifiably claim an inheritance from the seventeenth century, and a
concomitant growth in ascetical theology pointed back even further
to the desert Fathers themselves. In contrast to this, however,
there existed also a more liturgical and Christocentric spirituality
which was guided by the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, but
which also claimed an ancient antecedence through its claim to have
returned to its sources in the studies in biblical and liturgical
history which came to dominate conciliar thinking. 9 This section
will consider a representative sample of spiritual thought from each
of these traditions, highlighting the differences as well as the
similarities found between each of them and showing how both can
claim to share in the spirituality of the scriptural traditions
discussed above. The spirituality of twentieth century scholasticism
will be represented by Tanquerey and Garrigou-Lagrange, that of pre-
conciliar reform and renewal by Marmion and de Foucauld.
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a. Adoiphe Tanquerey.
Tanquerey was a member of the Sulpician order, one which found
its spirituality in that of the French school of seventeenth century
spirituality. In the light of this, it might seem surprising to find
that Tanquerey's understanding of spirituality resembles to a
remarkable degree the kind that came to be developed by the Second
Vatican Council. Thus Tanquerey's spirituality is found to be
grounded in scripture and doctrine, and to find as its beginning the
question of human existence. Its primary theological focus is
Trinitarian, and it depends heavily upon the concept of the mystical
body of Christ and the Church: Christ is seen to be central, in whom
we find our union through union with the Church. Finally,
Tanquerey's spirituality involves the call of the whole Church,
ordained and laity together, to the life of Christian perfection
(cf. Tanquerey, 1930, passim).'°
b. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.
Garrigou-Lagrange was a doyen Dominican professor of dogmatic
theology at the Angelicum in Rome, and was theological mentor of
Pope John Paul II. His theology of spirituality depends even more
than does Tanquerey's upon the concept of the individual. The
spiritual life involves intimate conversations with God. This is
achieved through a threefold process in the which the individual
passes through a purgative, illuminative and unitive stage to reach
the perfection of Christian existence in God. The first stage, the
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purgative, is one in which sins are effaced by punishment. The
senses are purged, passions quieted and desires softened. The second
stage, the illuminative, is pneumatological. The individual receives
illumination by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, so that contemplation
of the mystery of God is made easier for him. The third stage is the
unitive one. Here the individual enters into a state of perfect
mystical union with God, in which the passions are burned away, and
in which the individual practices the moral and theological virtues
to the highest degree possible.
Exemplified by his concept of detachment, Garrigou-Lagrange's
theology is as much concerned with the individual's struggle to free
himself from the lower appetites that drag him down and impede his
efforts from achieving the fullest union with God, as is the
spirituality of Tanquerey. It is the concept of union with God as
the one thing necessary for salvation that drives Garrigou-Lagrange
to espouse a spirituality bereft of sensuality and worldliness. All
are called equally to holiness. That holiness is the holiness of the
desert, ascetical and demanding in its requirements in the extreme
(see Garrigou-Lagrange, 1947, 1948, passirn).
c. Abbot Columba Marmion.
Abbot Marmi.on's theology of spirituality differs from that of the
previous two theologians described in this section because of its
greatly positive anthropocentrism and liturgical bias. Whilst both
Tanquerey, Garrigou-Lagrange and Marmion all assert the fundamental
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importance of the redemptive work of God in Jesus Christ, Tanquerey
and Garrigou-Lagrange speak of God acting virtually in an
exclusively juridical sense. God declares the sinner just. There is
no real transformation or renewal of that individual. God remains a
somewhat distant judge: the individual has no particular function to
fulfil in his spirituality other than to be justified by God's
declaration.
Marmion's theology of spirituality functions within a rather
differently presupposed structure. God is no longer the distant
judge who imposes His law, rather he becomes understood correctly
only when He is seen to be the source of love. This love is made
most particularly manifest in the incarnation of God in Jesus
Christ. The truly divine, out of love for humankind becomes truly
human. But Marmion does not leave his theology standing at the
incarnation. He develops the theme of loving sacrifice more fully by
presenting the Eucharist as the source from which, and in which the
true depth of Christ's action in the soul becomes properly
effective. In so doing he prefigures the use by the Second Vatican
Council of the theme of the liturgy in general (and the Eucharist in
particular) as the source and summit of the Christian life, to be
found	 in the	 Sacred Constitution 	 Sacrosanct urn Conciliwn
(Sacrosancturn Conciliurn, art. 10). The Eucharistic theme is
continued through extension: to give oneself to Jesus Christ is to
give oneself to others for love of Him, or rather to give oneself to
Him in the person of our neighbour' (Marmion, 1934, pp. 164-165).
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This stems directly from Marmion's understanding of the Eucharist.
Since it is in the Eucharist that we have become one body in Christ,
so we are compelled to love one another, regardless of the cost. The
political and social implications of this theology are clear. To be
a human being is to be in communion with each other.
d. Charles de Foucauld.
Charles de Foucauld was the founder of the Little Brothers of the
Sacred Heart of Jesus. In a similar way to Adoiphe Tanquerey,
Charles de Foucauld followed in the traditions of French
spirituality. His own spirituality differed from that of the
Benedictine Abbot Marmion, and as a result, one commentator has
noted that his approach, particularly his focus on Jesus was thus
less liturgically and less socially oriented than Marmion's'
(McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, pp. 1073).
Poverty and simplicity became the guiding principles of his
theology. To be fully realized, to be a Christian, to follow Jesus
demands that the individual should follow the way of poverty and
humility. To work this out in reality, Charles de Foucauld set up a
religious community. Its own principles involved communal sharing, a
lack of personal possessions, the giving of gifts, food and help
freely to all who asked, and an attempt to live the life of the
gospel in evangelical simplicity (see Foucauld, 1964, passim).
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(iii) Theological enquiries into spirituality: Vatican II.
Before considering the specific theology of spirituality of the
Second Vatican Council, this section will discuss briefly the work
of two significant theologians whose contributions might be seen to
prefigure what eventually developed at the Council. Those
theologians are the Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin and the Cistercian
Thomas Merton. This section will then go on to consider spirituality
as it evolved out of the Second Vatican Council.
a. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.
Teilhard de Chardin's major contribution to the debate about
spirituality was his attempt to re-assess spirituality in the light
of humanity's concrete existence here and now. His work as a
palaeontologist enabled him to seek ways of linking together the
scientific wonder and awe he felt about the world with the sense of
mystery he felt to be imbued in the world about him. God was not to
be experienced in the way of purgation, nor through a striving after
mystical union. Instead, God was to be found fundamentally through a
turning towards the things of the earth, through a sense of awe and
wonder at the reality of existence in the world, and through delight
in the life of all that exists. All existence becomes a partaking in
the divine. Indeed, Teilhard de Chardin speaks specifically of a
milieu divin, in which all existence has its being and shares in the
dynamism of God (see particularly Teilhard de Chardin, 1980, pp.
112-149).
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b. Thomas Merton.
The emphasis found in the spirituality of Teilhard de Chardin of
seeing the world as a holy place is very noticeable in the writings
of the Cistercian monk Thomas Merton. Merton's own spiritual journey
is an interesting one. After an early life that was notably non -
religious, Merton converted to Catholicism and was eventually drawn
to the contemplative order that was to become his home for the rest
of his life. The early part of this journey was recorded by Merton
in a remarkable autobiography, which received praise in both the
secular and religious worlds. In it, it is significant to note that
Merton writes of a world from which flight seems the only option
available for him. The world is a wicked place, demanding purgation
(Merton, 1981, pp. 419-423). But by the time of his death, Merton
had shifted his views considerably. In one of his last books Merton
relates how, when on a shopping errand for the monks in downtown
Louisville, Kentucky, he was suddenly and inexplicably overcome with
the notion that he loved all he saw, that human beings cannot be
alien, one to another, that the concept of holiness being something
other than the shared reality of being human was a dream. Holiness
for Merton becomes real in the very demands, social, political and
human, which make up the basic needs of humanity. The life of
perfection becomes, then faithfulness to the call of God, in every
situation of human life: to be a saint is to share with God in the
work of creating our own identities (Merton, 1964, passim; Merton,
1961, pp, 29ff.).
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c. The Second Vatican Council.
The principal contribution of the Second Vatican Council to the
Church's	 understanding of	 spirituality	 was	 to	 determine
unequivocally that spirituality was not just for priests and
religious, but for all people. Thus the opening statement of the
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Conciliurn states
with absolute clarity that the Council sought 'to impart an ever-
increasing vigor to the Christian life of the faithful...[and] to
strengthen whatever can help to call all mankind into the Church's
fold' (Sacrosanctum Concilium, art. 1, [sic]). In a similar vein the
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, speaks pointedly
of the call to holiness by which 'all Christians in any state or
walk of life are called to the fullness of Christian life and to the
perfection of love...' (Lumen Gentium, art. 40). Spirituality has
here taken on a universal character. Not only does the Catholic
Church conceive of spirituality as applying to its own members, but,
significantly it sees spirituality applying also to all Christians
of whatever denomination throughout the world.11
This intensive concentration of spirituality in the world has
with it far reaching consequences. We are already called to holiness
because the Holy Spirit is already indwelling within each of us. To
be a Christian, then, is to live in such a way that we correspond
with who we are already called to be.' 2 In what way is this
correspondence made manifest? Typically, conformity of the
individual to the calling of holiness is established through the
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presence of the 'fruits of the Spirit': mercy, kindness, humility,
meekness and patience (Col. 3: 12; Gal. 5: 22; Rom. 6: 22; see also
Lumen Gentium, art. 40).
Yet this concept of holiness, and the spirituality from which it
derives is understood by the Council to be much farther reaching
than one which simply touches upon the individual:
It is therefore quite clear that all Christians in any state
or walk of life are called to the fullness of Christian life
and to the perfection of love, and by this holiness a more
human manner of life is fostered also in earthly society'
(Lumen Gentium, art. 40).
The Council here teaches the first of the two main themes of
Conciliar spirituality: that the call to holiness is made on an
individual basis to every person, but that the call to holiness and
perfection applies also to the very notion of what it means to be a
human, and to what it means to speak of a humane society. By
striving to live the life of perfection, human society finds a basis
for living in unity by this way of love.
In addition, the subsequent article of the Constitution makes
clear the second great theme of the Council on spirituality: that
the same holiness, the call to which is open to all, is achievable
whatever the state of life of the individual. Thus the Constitution
states unambiguously
'Accordingly, all Christians, in the conditions, duties and
circumstances of their life and through all these, will
sanctify themselves more and more if they receive all things
with faith from the hand of the heavenly Father and cooperate
with the divine will, thus showing forth in that temporal
service the love with which God has loved the world' (Lumen
Gentium, art. 41).
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This concern with spirituality as it is found in the world is
similarly continued and developed in the Council's understanding of
what it is to be a missionary Church in the world. The Decree on the
Church's Missionary Activity, Ad Gentes, declares that The Church
on earth is by its very nature missionary since, according to the
plan of the Father, it has its origin in the mission of the Father
and the Holy Spirit' (Ad Gentes, art. 2). In addition, the Decree
argues that by virtue of the universal call to holiness, every
Christian participates in the Church's mission. In a similar vein
the significant Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World, Gaudium et Spes recognizes that the world is no longer a
place which is inimical to the Church, but one from which the Church
can learn much too. Thus the Pastoral Constitution speaks of the
areas in which the Church receives benefit from the world. These
areas include the experiences gained from the past, the progress of
science and the rich variety of cultures and traditions which have
developed in human society (Gaudiwn et Spes, art. 44). The Church
does not stand in opposition to the world, then, but is an active
and historically significant part of the world, reading the 'signs
of the times', and noticing the presence of God in the middle of
historical events, as well as in the lives of individuals.13
Catholic spirituality can be seen to have many themes and many,
often diverging paths along which the theologians who have attempted
to explore spirituality have travelled. Three key components exist
to form a generic structure for Catholic spirituality: God, the
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individual and the world. The great development of twentieth century
spirituality, and especially the understanding of spirituality as it
was developed by the Second Vatican Council, was the move away from
a separate, interiorized spiritual world which rarely touched the
lives of the majority of lay Catholics, to a spirituality in which
the individual is called to holiness personally, but which draws
benefit through its interaction in the world, through its mission
and its receptivity, and by its attempt to understand the world
authentically as part of the whole which is spiritual existence.
The next section of this chapter will explore the ways in which
spirituality has a place within the context of Catholic religious
education. Particular attention will be paid to the function of
catechesis with spirituality, and of the relationship of catechesis
with religious education.
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2. The place of spirituality in Catholic religious education.
Spirituality clearly has a significant place in any discussion
about Catholic theology and the Christian life. In addition, an
equally significant a place exists for spirituality within Catholic
religious education.' 4
 In particular the concept of catechesis here
plays a part. Distinct from, yet related to Catholic religious
education, catechesis will be shown to be a means - although not an
exclusive means - of enabling spirituality and religious experience
to become elements of religious education. To do this, consideration
will be made of the function of catechesis as a way of relating
faith to spirituality. A definition of catechesis will be outlined,
and the relationship that catechesis has with spirituality will be
described and explored. Then the convergence of catechesis and
spirituality to religious education, and the divergence of these
elements will be examined.
(i) Catechesis and spirituality.
Kevin Nichols gives a salutory warning to those who attempt in
one all-encompassing term to define catechesis too readily: tThese
attempts will fail not because of the difficulty of the material but
because the endeavour itself is mistaken' (Astley and Day, 1992,
p. 54).15 It is for this reason that Nichols prefers not to speak of
catechesis by using a single readily usable definition, but chooses
instead to deal with the t logical and definitive criteria' (Astley
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and Day, 1992, ibid.) found in exploring the transforming rle of
catechesis. This Nichols calls the 1ogical geography of catechesis'
(Astley and Day, 1992, ibid.).
Nichols has here in his sights the American religious
educationalist Thomas Groome. Both Nichols and Groome understand
catechesis as originating in the primacy of the Christian community.
But in Nichols's view Groome has seriously misunderstood the
function of catechesis. Of paramount concern to Nichols is that when
Groome speaks of catechesis he defines it in such a way as to remove
it necessarily from its intellectual and educational context. As
Groome himself notes, once catechesis's commonality with education
is removed, from what discipline does one draw to empower the
activity?' (Astley and Day, 1992, p. 55, citing Groome, 1980,
p . 27). Nichols asks pertinently: what is it that Groome is
intending to indicate when he speaks of the need for catechesis to
seek the means to empower itself? Not, Nichols suggests, to create a
notion of kudos for the good of catechesis which might arise from a
sense of belonging to a recognized discipline (Astley and Day, 1992,
ibid.). Instead, Nichols suspects, Groome is expressing the desire
to belong to a discipline whose coinage has universal currency'
(Astley and Day, 1992, ibid.). Perhaps this might be called the
desire for respectability.
But, for Nichols at least, catechesis is not subject to any
particular discipline. It does not need to seek the respectability
of the shelter of a recognized discipline. it is, by implication at
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least, an unique activity in its own right. Nichols admits that it
is closely connected to both education and socialization, but that
it exists separately from either of these processes. Nichols's own
criteria for education and socialization are not without
difficulties. Education requires that something worthwhile should be
transmitted, that cognitive perspectives should be developed in the
activity, and that the procedures used should be morally acceptable
in that they allow for the principle of respect for persons.
Socialization involves the conforming of the individual to the norms
of the culture and society in which they grow up. It does not
require the cognitive perspectives which education requires, nor the
freely chosen intention to be a part of the culture in which one
grows and develops. Crucially, and as opposed to his criteria for
education, socialization demands that the culture of the society
should remain definitive, regardless of whether or not the
individuals who live within that culture are collectively engaged in
the shared common life of that culture (Astley and Day, 1992,
pp. 59-60).
On their own terms alone, these criteria are contentious. If
education is a qualitative process, as Nichols seems to imply, then
this begs the question of who it is who decides what is 'worthwhile'
or not for the criteria to be fulfilled. Similarly, Nichols seems to
imply further that all education must produce cognitive results:
presumably he means by this intellectual development. Where does
this place certain aspects of physical education and music, for
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example? This thesis' own definition of education involves a more
holistic understanding of the criteria involved,' 6
 Not all
development is cognitive, but development does play a crucial
function in education.
More serious,	 and more worrying,	 perhaps,	 is Nichols's
understanding of socialization. At the heart of Nichols's comments
is the unambiguously central purpose of culture in any understanding
of socialization. The problem lies not so much in the requirement
that culture should be considered, but in the exclusive
understanding Nichols has of the action of culture. Nichols seems to
be implying that to socialize properly is to live in the sway of the
one dominant culture of the society in which one lives. This may not
have been Nichols's intention, but the claim Nichols makes for the
paramount centrality of the culture of society even if the
individuals in it are not all collectively engaged in the shared
life of the group, implies a down-grading of the many cultures which
exist today in a pluralist society in respect of the one dominant
culture in society at the time (Astley and Day, 1992, p. 61).
For Nichols education and socialization form one particular
stream which point the way to defining a criteria for catechesis. He
suggests that catechesis resembles education in that neither are
what he terms t task-specific' (Astley and Day, 1992, p. 62): each
form of activity functions in a general way. Similarly,
socialization and catechesis seem to follow parallel patterns. Each
seems to occur within the context of the cultural world in which the
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individual lives. Those cultural influences seem to play a part in
determining the development of that individual. Here Nichols
correctly raises the question of whether it is true to speak of
catechesis as being cognitive in its approach to the individual, or
whether the faith-principle which any discussion of religious
beliefs and developments must necessarily involve arises as a result
of individual participation and through experience alone. For
Nichols, a correct understanding of catechesis arises out of a
correct understanding of the formation of faith.
To enable this to happen, Nichols requires that a second stream
of approach to catechesis should come into play. This involves the
relationship of catechesis to Church traditions and the particularly
significant aspects of Church life, of the community of faith, of
the pastoral ministry of the Church and of evangelization (Astley
and Day, 1992, p. 61). Catechesis involves the interplay of the
educational and social factors described above, but it also involves
the ecciesial structures which have a concern with faith.
Nichols's view is supported here by the witness of the documents
of the Second Vatican Council. The Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verburn
places catechesis firmly within the ministry of the word, along with
all forms of Christian instruction. In doing so, the Constitution
reflects the Greek origins of the term catechesis: katechein, to
resound, to echo. Luke-Acts uses the term to indicate an instruction
in the way of the Lord (Lk 1: 4; Acts 18: 25; 21: 24). Paul uses it
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to indicate oral instruction - a handing on of all that has been
received in and through Christ (Gal 6: 6; 1 Cor 14: 19; Rom 2: 18).
The notion that faith, which for Nichols holds a central position
in any understanding of catechesis, is intimately connected with
instruction is given additional support in the Decree on the
Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, Christus Dominus. 'Bishops
should be especially concerned about catechetical instruction. Its
function is to develop in men a living, explicit and active faith,
enlightened by doctrine' (Christus Dominus, art. 14). The Decree
goes on to assert that catechetical instruction should be based on
'holy scripture, tradition, liturgy, and on the teaching authority
and life of the Church' (Christus Dominus, ibid.). It is because of
the relationship of faith and doctrine to catechesis that its
position is here so intimately connected to the traditions and
teaching office of the Church, and to the guardians of that teaching
office, the Bishops. Nevertheless, while the Bishops may have
pastoral oversight of catechesis, the actual process of the
instruction and development of faith is given to those who are
suitably qualified (presumably both by experience, life-style and
education), to adapt and review with respect to the relative ages,
abilities and other circumstances of those who receive it.
Given the ecciesial scope of catechesis, it becomes apparent
that, just as faith is intended to be a life-long experience, so too
is catechesis intended to be a life-long process of conversion and
renewal. Thus the General Catechetical Directory Ad Norman Decreti
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speaks of a Christian community of mature faith, living constantly
in the light of the promptings of the Holy Spirit a life of just
such conversion and renewal. 'Catechesis exercises the function
...of preparing people to be receptive to the action of the Holy
Spirit and to be more thoroughly converted' (Ad Norman Decreti,
art. 22). That preparation involves what Nichols has above described
as socialization: using insights on culture to read the 'signs of
the times'. In this case, however, the General Catechetical
Directory recognizes that the context in which the socialization of
faith with culture should occur is within a missionary setting: the
mission of the Church necessarily involves the proclamation and
fostering of faith in contemporary human society (Ad Norman Decreti,
arts. 1-5, 26). As Pope John Paul II has stated in his Apostolic
Exhortation Catechesi Tradendae, catechesis is best understood as a
missionary activity. Indeed, the desire of Christ that the Church
should seek to make disciples of all the nations, places catechesis
firmly within a missionary model: 'The Church has always considered
catechesis one of her primary tasks, for, before Christ ascended to
his Father after his Resurrection, he gave the Apostles a final
command - to make disciples of all nations and to teach them to
observe all that he had commanded' (Catechesi Tradendae, art. 1).
However, catechesis is not to be confused with the initial
proclamation of the Gospel which brings about the initial conversion
of the individual. Instead, the Pope identifies two objectives for
catechesis: first to mature the initial faith of the individual and
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second to educate the individual more deeply in the message and
person of Christ (Catechesi Tradendae, art. 19). Catechesis is
rooted in faith, and is to do with faith. It does not consist of a
body of dry truths but is to do with communicating the living God.
Its primary object is the mystery of Christ himself (Catechesi
Tradendae, arts. 5, 7).17 As such, catechesis is linked directly
with the forms of Catholic spirituality which have been described in
the section above.
That link between spirituality and catechesis is seen very
clearly in the application of the three principles of Catholic
spirituality (God, the individual and the world), described earlier
in this chapter to the model of catechesis explored above. Just as
the developments in twentieth century spirituality have meant that
the spiritual heritage of the Catholic Church could be experienced
in a manner that was more community focussed than hitherto was the
case, so catechesis, as the process of development among the members
of the Church of a living, explicit and active faith' (Christus
Dominus, art. 14), enables the whole community to engage in a
journey of renewal and growth. Just as the present understanding of
spirituality has succeeded in establishing for the Church a dialogue
with the world, so too catechesis today is required to be engaged in
a form of instruction and teaching which reads the tsigns of the
times' in an attempt to communicate in a world which has progressed
far along the path of secularization. There is an interaction,
therefore, between catechesis and the theology of spirituality which
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is profound and warrants comparison. It should be recognized,
however, that comparison does not imply equality.
There exists a difference between spirituality and catechesis in
the sitz un leben of each respective approach. Spirituality is
understood to be an experience of the living God's call to holiness
for each of us, fashioned in and through the world, calling us to be
the Church in and to that world. Spirituality is both of the initial
and the continuing experiential reality of God for each of us. It is
an on-going process, but one which arises at the outset of our
experience of God. Catechesis, on the other hand, presupposes an
initial, developed faith amongst those who receive it. As such, and
mindful of the etymological root of the term, catechesis should not
be confused with the initial proclamation of the Gospel, but should
be seen as an echoing' of the Gospel. As instruction, rather than
kerygma, catechesis may be usefully employed in support of
evangelization, but should not be seen as taking the place of
evangelization.	 In addition,	 catechesis cannot properly be
understood as the Christian experience of God, (as opposed to what
spirituality clearly is), but as a systematic process whereby the
understanding and faith in God which is already present might be
further renewed and developed. Thus, while clear comparisons exist
between spirituality and catechesis, clear contrasts also exist.
Spirituality and catechesis are thus related one to the other,
yet distinct from each other. Both concepts touch upon key issues of
understanding and growth. One is broadly experiential and
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existential, the other instructional and supportive. How do these
concepts, at once united yet different relate to Catholic religious
education? The following section explores precisely this question.
(ii) Spirituality, catechesis and religious education.
At the end of the second chapter of this thesis Catholic
religious education was described as a process which functioned from
its self-perception of the events of revelation. A cyclical theology
was said to operate within religious education, which determined its
presuppositions and defined its aims. God calls fallen man to return
to life in God: a call which finds its origins in revelation. Given
that the discussion above of the dimensions of Catholic spirituality
have highlighted the increasing emphasis this century on the
experiential reality of God in the world of human existence, then
spirituality and catechesis are intimately connected to Catholic
religious education by virtue of their own dependence upon just such
a cyclical theology of revelation. This is not to say, of course,
that the spiritual dimensions of Catholic education are to be found
exclusively in Catholic religious education. To suggest such a
limitation would be to put a limit on the universal quality of our
experience of God. A Catholic Education Service discussion paper
states:
Within the distinctive character of Catholic education,
spiritual and moral development are intimately connected with,
though not identical to, religious education, catechesis,
collective worship, private prayer and liturgies. However,
they are also promoted through all subjects of the curriculum
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and throughout the general life and work of the school'
(Catholic Education Service, 1995, P. 5).
Clearly, then, spirituality is perceived to have a wider
educational application than might otherwise be the case were a
theology of spirituality (and a theology of catechesis) to
concentrate purely on religious educational perspectives. Having
acknowledged this, however, it is also obvious that religious
education, spirituality and catechesis do share some similar aims
and aspirations which give warrant for comparison to be made. A
certain three-fold equivalence (that is, not an equality of
substance but rather a generalized symmetry of form) might be made
for spirituality and catechesis on the one hand and religious
education on the other, drawing upon the conclusions reached at the
end of the second chapter. This three-fold equivalence consists in
(1) the engagement of Catholic religious education with the whole of
religious tradition in equivalence to spirituality's universal call
to holiness and the life-long commitment of catechesis to the growth
of the individual in the light of the signs of the times'; (2) the
generic aims of Catholic religious education in equivalence to the
way of Catholic spirituality and the goals and aspirations of
catechesis; (3) the structural presuppositions of Catholic religious
education in equivalence to the structural presuppositions of both a
Catholic theology of spirituality and catechesis.
The first equivalence relates therefore to the scope of Catholic
religious education, theology of spirituality and catechesis.
Catholic religious education, it has been seen, engages in dialogue
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with the religious traditions of the world because it proceds from
the belief that these traditions are themselves vested in the
intrinsic goodness of God. Revelation is, after all, given to the
whole world. Insofar as religious traditions aim to help humanity
strive towards God, they are themselves good in that they share,
along with the tradition from which Catholic religious education
derives its impetus, a common dignity. However, as was also noted in
Chapter Two, there exists a basic tension here: for Catholic
religious education also claims access to a higher level of
fulfilment in the search for God, found in the guardianship and
maintenance of the deposit of faith. This places Catholic religious
education in a position where it regards itself as universally
relevant to all traditions, while at the same time sharing in a
common dignity with those traditions.
This finds an equivalence in the emphasis in Catholic
spirituality on the universal call to holiness. The experience of
God has a continuing and absolute relevance to humanity. We are all
called: the message of salvation is universal. Similar tensions to
those which are found in Catholic religious education exist,
however, with any theology of Catholic spirituality's appeal to the
world. Just as Catholic religious education recognizes the presence
of God in the world's religious traditions, but stresses still the
unique and universal character of Catholic belief, so too Catholic
theologies of spirituality, while recognizing the capacity in all
human beings to experience God (and to do this in and through the
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world), point ultimately to the heritage of Catholic tradition and
its dependence upon the initial revelation of God and the unfolding
of the divine plan of salvation for the fulfilment of God's will
towards humanity. The theology of spirituality recognizes the call
to holiness to be universal, but unique.
Catechesis too has a universal application. Taking as its task
the command of Jesus at the end of Matthew's Gospel to 'make
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey
everything that I have commanded you' (Mt 28: 19-20a), catechesis
must be seen as a part of the on-going and continual missionary
activity of the Church. However, mindful of the distinction between
kerygma and catechesis, it should be remembered that catechesis
remains a secondary activity to proclamation and evangelization.
Catechesis has been shown in this chapter to be concerned with the
growth and maturation of faith of those who are members of the
Christian community. To this extent, the demands of catechesis are
to be applied universally to the Church: growth is for all its
members, at whatever stage they may be. Once again, however, an
underlying tension, (which, in effect, is its identity), is to be
found in the relationship catechesis has with the wider world. While
the catechist is expected to read the 'signs of the times' the
message is not of the world but to the world. Catechesis seeks to
prepare people to hear afresh the Word of God, and to be stirred by
the promptings of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, although the
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techniques of pedagogy and social psychology which have evolved in
twentieth century educational practice play a part in determining
the manner of engaging in catechesis, yet should it constantly be
bourne in mind that catechesis, like the theology of spirituality
and Catholic religious education, has as its origins and point of
focus the message of salvation in God's revelation to humanity.
The second point of equivalence is that of the aims, ways and
aspirations of Catholic religious education, spirituality and
catechesis. The second chapter of this thesis contended that the
aims of Catholic religious education can best be seen in their
correspondence to the four major Constitutions of the Second Vatican
Council. Thus, in the light of revelation, Catholic religious
education seeks to reflect on that event of revelation. It aims also
to reflect on the ecciesial nature of faith. In addition, Catholic
religious education also tries to explore ways in which to make
sense of the Church's existence in the world. Finally, in union with
the whole Church, and in celebration of the events of revelation,
Catholic religious education seeks to guide those who experience it
in the life of grace and holiness.
Catholic spirituality finds an equivalence with these aims. In
seeking to communicate the experience of God as a universal call to
holiness, it recognizes the immediacy of revelation as the origin of
that experience. This experience is ecclesial, but as the
examination of the theology of Thomas Merton showed above, that
experience is mediated through the experience of living in the
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world. It cannot be separated from our experience of reality, since
reality is a part of the experience of God. Finally, the nature of
spirituality is such that to live the spiritual life is to live the
life of grace. The aim of spirituality is the call to holiness, an
aim which it shares in part with Catholic religious education.
Catechesis also shares in some of the aims and aspirations of
Catholic religious education and spirituality. Thus, catechesis aims
to guide the individual in his reflections on the events of
revelation. The significance of the function of catechesis as an
ecciesial activity has been highlighted: it is one of the ministries
of the Word, and its exercise is to be given special attention by
the Bishops of the Church who are called upon to oversee the
exercising of this ministry in their dioceses. Catechesis takes
place in the world, and as part of the Church's on-going dialogue
with the world, the process of catechesis is required to engage
fruitfully in this continuing discourse. Finally, in its assistance
to the faithful in their individual and collective pilgrimage
journeys, catechesis aims to be part of the celebration of the call
to holiness and grace made to the world. Its function, strictly
speaking, is to the Church. However, in pointing towards an
eschatological realization of human hopes, it can function in a
wider context, calling all humanity to witness to the events of
revelation.
The third equivalence between religious education, spirituality
and catechesis is that of presupposition. From all that has been
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said above, it is clear that Catholic religious education assumes a
reality to the events of revelation that is at once both profound
and moving. Modern pedagogical techniques, obtained from the fact
that religious education takes place in the world from which it
draws its educational methods, are used as part of the function of
the Church: to engage in proclamation and mission to the world in
service to God, to call humanity back to God, to be the Church.
Catholic spirituality shares fully in these presuppositions. The
experience of God is confirmation of the reality of God. As with
Catholic religious education, Catholic spirituality recognizes the
reality also of the world in that experience. Humanity functions in
the world, relating, falling, rising again. The human experience of
God takes place first and foremost in this setting. The experience
of God's reality is to this extent mediated through the world, but,
being identified within a specifically Catholic perspective, the
Church is seen to play a fundamental part in incorporating that
experience within an ecclesial position.
Finally, catechesis also shares presuppositions with Catholic
religious education and spirituality. The reality of revelation is
presumed at the outset of any catechesis. Catechesis builds upon the
initial acceptance by the individual of the Gospel. It assumes
equally that Christ has been experienced by that individual as a
reality in his life. Faith is assisted to mature. The activity is,
therefore, rightly described as being one which is faith-filled. It
is also presumed to be an ecclesial activity: Christ's command for
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the Church to make disciples is taken to heart. Catechesis lives out
that reality, and in so doing shares in the life of the Church.
From these three areas of equivalence it will be seen that
Catholic religious education shares much with the theology of
spirituality and with catechesis. Differences do exist. Religious
education remains first and foremost an educational activity. Whilst
it is the case that it shares areas of concern with the elements
discussed above, it would be wrong to draw too many strict parallels
between them. Spirituality as the experience of God may correctly
arise during the experience of religious education, but it does not
constitute the whole of religious education, as an analysis of the
first part of Chapter Two would readily show. Equally, catechesis
may occur during the experience of religious education, drawing on
the individual's initial faith-stance and thus enabling the
individual to grow in faith, but it would not be correct to claim
that religious education consisted entirely of catechesis.
Catechesis is principally an action or event of faith. Catholic
religious education clearly involves the faith of the individual in
its process, but remains principally an activity of education.
If a clear parallel can be identified to exist between Catholic
religious education, spirituality and catechesis, it is that of
development. Religious education draws the individual into a real
engagement with the events of revelation, of being the Church, and
of being the Church in the world and of celebration of the call to
holiness. It guides and assists in intellectual growth. It seeks to
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enable the individual to belong, both to the Church and to the
world. It seeks to make the cyclical theology of a return of the
fallen child to the grace of God a reality. As such, it tries to
allow the individual to develop through a process of religious
education.
Spirituality too is involved with development. The call to
holiness, the call to return to a life of grace, to journey on, back
to God, this too is a form of development. The individual is
encouraged to take to heart, to find a significance in and an
ultimacy through his experience of the reality of God. Spirituality
is the definition of an authentic life inasmuch as the individual
who experiences the reality of God lives filled with the Spirit of
God and seeks to conform ever more fully to the image of God which
the life of grace allows.
Catechesis also clearly is concerned with development. Indeed,
with its open-ended relevance to all people no matter at what stage
they may be in their journey of faith, it points to the fact that
catechesis is to be seen as the way of faith development in an
ecciesial setting. The sense of journey', which has functioned as a
motif to accompany the progress of faith can be seen here to
complement the notion of development, both as a means of imagery of
pilgrimage, but also, more pertinently, as a reality for the
individual. Faith consists of a journey back to God, a journey which
is itself given impetus by the successive faith-development and
maturation which takes place assisted by catechesis.
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The first part of this chapter has considered some of the
dimensions of spirituality and catechesis as they impinge upon
Catholic religious education. Some scriptural and theological
aspects of spirituality were explored, and the role of catechesis
examined. Parallels and differences were highlighted between these
two dimensions and Catholic religious education. Catholic religious
education does not consist wholly of spirituality, nor is it
completely a catechetical act. It does however contain elements
which share an equivalence with and a similarity to these other
areas.
The following section will consider some of the dimensions of
secular spirituality. The relationship of those dimensions to
religious education will also be explored.
A final section will compare and contrast the Catholic and
secular forms of spirituality discussed in this chapter as they
impinge upon religious education.
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i. Secular Religious Education and the Spiritual.
1. Defining t the spiritual' in secular thought.
The many dimensions of the spiritual play a key part in secular
educational thought and also in relation to secular religious
education. Although section 1 of the Education Reform Act of 1988
specified that schools should promote the spiritual development of
all pupils, no clear definition was given of what was meant by the
term. Some scholars have chosen to make a clear distinction between
the spirit' and spirituality', seeing the former as a defining
quality of what it is to be distinctively human, whilst seeing the
latter as a religious concept which is defined by the values and
belief systems of faith, and which has to do with the individual's
self-understanding in terms of his origins, identity, purpose and
destiny. The term tthe spiritual' is seen by these scholars to be a
bridge between these two concepts, and is applied to those commonly
shared aspects of human life which do not deal with the physical or
the material dimensions of experience. At the same time, those who
would give those experiences a religious interpretation would be
permitted to do so; thus the term remains ambiguous (Erricker, et
al, 1993, p. 33).
Moreover,	 within	 secular	 contexts	 the	 terms	 'spirit',
t spirituality' and 'the spiritual' have come to be applied to such a
wide range of social, psychological and aesthetic areas that an
attempt at formulating a single characteristic definition for each
259
term - and, indeed, an attempt to find distinctions between these
terms - is inevitably doomed to failure. Partly this stems from the
inability of secular and increasingly postmodern critiques of
reality to determine whether structural realities underlie our
assumptions about human self-awareness, judgement and experience.18
Experience of events which, even when understood in rational,
scientific terms, leaves the individual who has experienced them
with a deeper insight into himself, (even, indeed, when that self-
understanding arises from a delusional psychosis), nevertheless
remains 'valid' for that individual because it is subjectively
'real' to him. It identifies for him, and in him, his own
uniqueness. It makes the claim that this human being is an
individual: a person who is one amongst billions. Thus the shared
commonality of certain experiences - grief and joy, for example -
does not imply that humanity is a single amorphous entity. Each
human being experiences grief and joy as an individual first, and as
part of the human family second. In secular terms, 'spirit',
'spirituality' and 'the spiritual' are subjective expressions if
they are to mean anything.
At one level, this implies a finality to the search in
understanding the secular spirit, spirituality and the spiritual. If
these phrases represent subjective understandings of human
experience to the highest degree possible, then any meaningful
exploration into these terms is at once limited and empty. On this
basis, I can speak only of myself, and only of the subjective as it
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relates to me. In so doing, that speech will not be understood
properly by another because that other is not me. The other, after
all, will have his own subjectivity and his own understanding of his
own experiences within which to find meaning. My own subjectivity
remains mine and not that of another.
It might be objected that it is possible to speak of some common
heritage which is shared between us all. Thus, the argument might
run, grief and joy are universal experiences which we do all share
and can talk about meaningfully to others, and which do form part of
this world of the spirit',	 spirituality' and t the spiritual'.
However, whilst it might certainly be admitted that grief and joy
arise universally among all people as experiences to a variety of
events throughout the course of life, it should also be bourne in
mind that the specific meanings attributed by individuals to those
experiences remain subjective. In this sense, therefore, experience
remains relative to the individual: the understanding of each
individual's particular experiences by another must remain
approximate at best, just as much as the particular experience
remains fundamentally the experience of the individual. These
ambiguities should be kept in mind in all that follows.
All these difficulties of definition and meaning have not
prevented the assumption being made by government educational
inspectors that the approximation discussed above can be assessed,
albeit in part. In a short but significant discussion paper by the
Office for Standards in Education in 1994 the spiritual and moral
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dimensions of education are discussed within the context of the
theme of development:
'This publication is unashamedly about values[...]but also
about personal development in its fullest sense. That fullest
sense is, in the wording of the 1992 Schools Act, one which
encompasses the "spiritual, moral, social and cultural"
development of all pupils. And one of the central tasks of the
new system of inspection is to ensure schools' capacity to
encourage that development' (OFSTED, 1994, p. 1).
The discussion paper states clearly and unambiguously that
education is not merely to do with the gaining of knowledge and
essential skills, but also to do with personal development 'in its
fullest sense' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). That fullest sense, the
discussion paper goes on to state, includes the areas of spiritual,
moral, social and cultural development which affect all pupils in a
school (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).
This raises implications for the relationship between the process
of education and the society who pays for it. Society makes an
investment in education, and, OFSTED suggests, quite rightly should
expect that the goals set by society for education should be
achieved. (This naturally begs the question of whether the goals
society expects of education are indeed achievable). At the same
time, however OFSTED states that schools should not be expected to
take responsibility for any failures on the part of society, or of
individuals within that society, to uphold some kind of moral and
spiritual cohesion within society (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).
The 1992 Education (Schools) Act set up the statutory framework
for inspections under a new independent system. One of its four
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legal requirements for the inspections process, referred to by the
OFSTED discussion paper was that schools were to be inspected to see
how well they promoted the spiritual, moral, social and cultural
development of pupils (OFSTED, 1994, p. 5). Clearly this indicates
that the legislators - not necessarily the best judges in these
matters - believed that the spiritual element of education, as well
as the others listed, could be identified and assessed. However, as
the discussion paper notes, real problems arise from this assumption
(OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). Schools and inspectors alike needed to
determine what was meant by the key terms of 'development' and 'the
spiritual, the moral, the social and the cultural'. Because this
portion of the chapter is primarily concerned with 'the spiritual'
in secular educational and social thought, the first and last of
these terms will be considered as they arise in the OFSTED
discussion paper and more generally.
The concept of development is central to the 1992 Act, and thus
just as central to the tasks of school inspectors. In outline,
OFSTED speaks of development being influenced by three factors: its
close relationship to growth and maturation; that it cannot occur
without some kind of stimulus or 'nourishment'; that parents,
schools, peers and media all make contributions to this
'nourishment' (OFSTED, 1994, p. 6). However, any assessment of this
basic structure is complex and varied in its difficulty.
Educational development itself is more complicated to determine
as a process. This, the OFSTED discussion paper notes is 'because it
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is concerned both with how schools develop pupils and with how
pupils develop' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).' 9 Inspection of educational
development is held to be necessarily a two-fold process firstly of
the assessment of educational provision including the ways in which
the school has both provided and promoted a favourable environment
for development, and secondly of an assessment of pupils' learning,
experience, behaviour, attitudes and values which are determined
through the provision that has been made, and which give direct
evidence of how and why those pupils are able to develop in the ways
they do (OFSTED, 1994, pp. 7, 6). The discussion paper notes that
inspectors 'can assess the stages of development which are taking
place (process) and what pupils achieve as a result of passing
through these stages (outcome)' (OFSTED, 1994, p. 6).20 The
discussion paper notes that pupils themselves may well have
something to contribute towards this process of development.
In addition, the discussion paper refuses to allow the assumption
to be made that 'development' can progress along the same linear
pattern in all of the aspects which the paper addresses (i.e. the
spiritual, the moral, the social and the cultural). 'Social
development' might follow a pattern which is readily observed and
measured, but 'spiritual development' is not so easily assessed. The
paper notes that this is so for 'any definition of this particularly
difficult concept' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).2'
Having given a caveat to describing development in specific
terms, the discussion paper quotes, without giving a reference the
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definition of spiritual development offered by the 1993 revised
edition of the inspectors' manual Framework for Inspection. It is
worth reproducing that definition in full, since it is used by
OFSTED to guide its own understanding of the term in the discussion
paper, and is relevant to our understanding of the tofficia1
secular understanding of the term:
Spiritual development relates to that aspect of inner life
through which pupils acquire insights into their personal
existence which are of enduring worth. It is characterised by
reflection, the attribution of meaning to experience, valuing a
non-material dimension to life and intimations of an enduring
reality. t Spiritual' is not synonymous with religious'; all
areas of the curriculum may contribute to pupils' spiritual
development (OFSTED, 1994, p. 8).22
In its subsequent commentary, the discussion paper suggests that
spirituality is not a synonym for religious education. There are,
however, close connections: tspiritual development may be both an
aim for religious education and an outcome of it' (OFSTED, 1994,
ibid.). There are, suggest the authors, links between spiritual
development and religious education in the sense that just as
religious education is to be seen as seeking to increase the
awareness in pupils of tultimate questions' to do with life and
existence, so too is this a function of the process leading to
spiritual development in individuals. Religious education promotes
spiritual development, but does not encompass it. That remains 'a
responsibility of the whole school and of the whole curriculum'
(OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).23
Specifically, the OFSTED authors believe that spirituality has to
do with personal beliefs and values, 'especially on questions about
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religion' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). 24 In particular, questions about
the nature and purpose of life seem to be central to their
understanding of spiritual development. As a consequence, these
issues go to the heart of what it means to be human, and touch upon
the very basis of personal and social life and behaviour (OFSTED,
1994, ibid.). In the light of this, the discussion paper holds that
the aim of spiritual development is 'to help individuals to make
sense of those [ultimate] questions, and about what it does to help
form pupils' response to life and to various forms of experience, or
even to questions about the universe' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.).
However, the distinction of these aims from the aims which the
discussion paper suggests properly belong to religious education
(namely seeking to increase in pupils an awareness and 'scrutiny' of
questions of ultimacy) is here frankly unclear (OFSTED, 1994,
ibid. ).
The discussion paper notes also that spiritual development will
mean different things to different religious and non-religious
individuals working in the same context. Thus those with religious
convictions may find it impossible to make a division between the
'secular' parts of life and the 'spiritual' parts. Life is seen as a
complete wholist unity in which the secular is taken up into the
sacred. Non-religious individuals, the OFSTED authors note may find
it virtually impossible to assent to the idea of 'the spiritual',
seeing the world solely in reductionist or materialist terms
(OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). This problem, the discussion paper pleads,
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needs to be bridged for progress to be made: It is vital to press
towards a common currency of shared understandings' (OFSTED, 1994,
ibid.). However, how this might come about, and indeed, whether,
within a secular society, such an endeavour might be achievable, is
not addressed.
In summary, then, the OFSTED discussion paper seems to suggest a
general and wide definition for spiritual development. The spiritual
quest, the authors suggest is something that virtually all people
are able to identify with. We all seek answers - whether consciously
or unconsciously - to the question twho am I?', to where am I
travelling?' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). This quest, the OFSTED authors
add, requires intellectual curiosity. It demands in us the ability
to seek after meaning, but it presumes that meaning can be reached
and understood. The task of education becomes one in which pupils
are lead t in the direction of open-ended enquiry...[in which pupils
are invited]...to take an increasing responsibility for themselves
and their work' (OFSTED, 1994, ibid.). Unfortunately, however, and
despite the grandeur of this vision, the OFSTED authors fail to
address a central paradox that bedevils this open, generally secular
approach to spiritual development. For if the desire of the
inspectors is to see greater autonomy and individuality in the
thought processes of individual pupils, it remains the case that
this independent, almost postmodern individuality finds its
foundation in the assumptions and ideologies of the teachers, the
State and society, who bring to the process of spiritual development
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their own agendas of influence and formation. Individuality, the key
essential ingredient to mature spiritual development in the eyes of
the OFSTED authors is thus dependent upon and externally agreed
common authority, whose very basis is open to critical question and
debate.
This question of authority is touched upon only tangentially by
the OFSTED authors, who show a concern more for the assessment of
the results of spiritual development, rather than the actual
processes and ideologies that bring it about. Thus, whilst it is
acknowledged that any inspection of spiritual development places the
inspector in the position of a virtual inquisitor, and that the
underlying principle of an inner life is hard to identify, yet
assessment of spiritual development can still take place, through an
analysis of the ways in which schools provide for spiritual
development, through the values and attitudes of the school, through
the contributions made by the curriculum, through religious
education (presumably still part of the same curriculum, but
separately identified by the OFSTED authors), collective worship and
other assemblies, and through extra-curricular activities (OFSTED,
1994, p. 9). How does this provision reveal itself in the pupils who
are to be assessed? The discussion paper suggests that assessments
which touch on pupils' knowledge of the central attitudes of
religions and philosophies, understanding the ways others have
interpreted the world through story, myth and historical and
scientific endeavour, personal beliefs and the values which arise
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from them, behavioural attitudes and personal responses to questions
about the meaning of life (OFSTED, 1994, pp. 9-10). Paradoxically,
the discussion paper is keen to preface these suggestions with the
stricture that it is not the function of inspectors to assess the
spiritua1 health' of the individual pupil (OFSTED, 1994, p. 9).
However, if the personal beliefs, behavioural attitudes and personal
values of the individual are to be assessed, it becomes very hard to
determine the value and validity of a judgement about the
demonstration of a spiritual, tinner development of a pupil, which
claims to be unbiased and non-judgeinental with respect to those
beliefs, and one which assumes a certain ideology or another in
order to compare it against the spiritual development of the
individual pupil, and thus reach a judgement about that pupil's
spiritual development. Any judgement implies a set of ground-rules;
a standard against which that which is judged has to be compared.
That implies an authority which determines the rules: an ideology.
This is not discussed by the OFSTED authors, and remains a serious
weakness to their approach in understanding the term spiritual
development.
The position of the OFSTED discussion paper, looking towards a
common definition for spiritual development which, although open
both to religious and secular considerations leans more to the
latter than the former, is noted by Michael Newby (Best, 1996,
p . 95). In a paper entitled Towards a secular concept of spiritual
maturity' Newby aims to clarify what spiritual development might
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mean for a secular life lived in a non-religious environment (Best,
1996, P. 93ff.). Newby presupposes a number of additional contexts
for his analysis. Thus he assumes that spirituality should be
identified with the development of personal identity, and is to be
distinguished from moral development because, in opposition to moral
development, spiritual development focuses upon the psyche of the
developing self. This psyche may not always retain its integrity
when conforming to moral norms, and should thus be regarded as a
element of the individual which is separate to moral development.
This leads to Newby's other major assumption about spiritual
development, namely that spiritual growth can be a meaningful
concept to employ about an individual even outside the tightly-
defined religious and ideological traditions' (Best, 1996, p. 93).
This, however, raises the question of whether Newby is not here
applying his own ideology to spiritual development? Newby's
assumptions remain open to empirical scrutiny, and his assertion
that the psyche is readily identifiable is puzzling, given that he
has not established what the term might mean, nor how its
t existence' is an ontological statement. These concepts appear to
derive from Newby's own ideological assumptions about reality, and
thus form a paradox to his thought, given that ideology is claimed
by Newby to belong to the same t tightly-defined' set of beliefs from
which spirituality is to be set free (Best, 1996, ibid.).
Newby defines the non-religious context of secular life today'
as a postmodern culture which owes a debt to the pluralist post-
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traditions of late modernity. It is a culture, Newby asserts, in
which spirituality focuses increasingly upon 'the preservation of
individual, national and international identity, rather than
religious development' (Best, 1996, pp. 93, 94). It is this sense of
personal, communal and global identity which informs Newby's
understanding of spiritual development. Spiritual development is to
be defined 'as primarily the development of psychic self-identity'
(Best, 1996, ibid.). This 'requires the composition of a continuous,
coherent and creative life-narrative' (Best, 1996, ibid.).
Newby acknowledges that his approach to spiritual development
works from an ideological standpoint - although he does not apply
this term to himself. Thus he notes that his account of spiritual
development stems from 'the values shared by liberal educators
committed to an education which seeks to enable the transformation
of life-quality through the development of personal autonomy' (Best,
1996, p. 95). Here legitimate questions might be raised concerning
the basis by which we might determine our personal autonomy in this
particular context. If, as Newby later suggests, human autonomy is
defined from within the culture of the age, (a culture which has
become, moreover, 'no longer traditional'), then human autonomy must
become a necessarily amorphous and indefinable concept (cf. Best,
1996, ibid.). Furthermore, Newby is unclear about what he means when
he refers to 'tradition': how is this term to be understood? Could
it not be argued that any commonly agreed cultural norm becomes the
'tradition' of the society at that time; thus, could it not follow
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that the present postmodern culture is now the 'tradition'? Newby is
unclear about these issues.
Given Newby's insistence on making spirituality and personal
development dependent upon cultural constraints and contexts,
(namely, that the ultimate desires, aspirations and inspirations are
constantly determined and re-determined by cultural structures
within which the individual moves and lives), Newby sees a link
between culture, spirituality and the society in which these events
occur (cf. Best, 1996, ibid.).
Newby presupposes that the central feature of society today is
that it is liberal and maintains an openness of enquiry: 'Integral
to this is the valuing of critical and imaginative thought which is
not restricted by refusal to question accepted authorities' (Best,
1996, ibid.). However, even here Newby's assertion is unable to
support itself sufficiently well. What, for example, would happen to
a critical analysis of society which belonged in its mode of thought
to the 'old' tradition of metaphysics, and which would thus arise in
critical confrontation to the 'new' orthodoxy of liberal openness?
On Newby's own presupposed grounds for engagement, the 'new'
orthodoxy of liberal openness would not accept the validity of
metaphysical critiques a priori of those critiques being posed. This
would presumably be the case because the 'old' tradition of
metaphysics would belong to part of the 'accepted authorities' which
Newby alleges is open to question in the first place. This paradox
is reinforced by Newby's subsequent comments 'That this [openness]
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rules out certain religious and ideological attitudes should be
clear at the outset. For reasons of tact and discretion, it is
unwise to specify offending sub-traditions, as well as politically
and socially harmful' (Best, 1996, ibid.).25
It has already been noted that Newby is aware of the OFSTED
position on spirituality discussed earlier in this chapter. He
considers OFSTED to have a more open attitude towards spirituality
than did its predecessors, an attitude which Newby appears to
welcome in curious terms:
The recent emphasis in government consultation papers upon open
and critical enquiry attests to the insufficiency of religious
spirituality, at least as it is commonly understood. OFSTED
itself comes very close to this perception in its emphasis both
upon "what is supremely personal and unique to each individual"
and also upon the importance of "pressing towards a common
currency of shared understandings"...Spirituality is,
therefore, not simply an individual matter, but one for society
to address.' (Best, 1996, ibid.).
Newby is here a little disingenuous in his interpretation of the
OFSTED position. The relationship between secular and religious
spirituality is treated with more subtlety by OFSTED than Newby is
prepared to allow. Thus, his claim that OFSTED emphasizes that
religious spirituality is an insufficient form of human expression,
is not an accurate assessment of the true position. Certainly OFSTED
treats secular spirituality with the same status as religious
spirituality. To claim, as Newby does, that OFSTED holds a
particular bias against religious spirituality in favour of secular
spirituality is a one-sided interpretation of the facts, at the very
least.2 6
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In summary, Newby's concept of secular spirituality has the
notion of a liberal democratic and humane society at its base. This
provides the boundary for a coherent spiritual identity to be
formed. However, even as Newby notes in passing, his assertions
remain open to criticism largely because their very basis is
incapable of formulation in an incontestable form (Best, 1996,
p . 96). The difficulty of presenting an argument following Newby's
own terms arises because any structured proof which might be offered
in its support would require a clearer evidential basis that Newby
is able to provide. Argument becomes assertion, and assent an act of
faith rather than a rationally conceived structure. At the heart of
the difficulty lies the problem that must bedevil all secular
thought: the question of authority. What, for example, does Newby
mean when he refers to tdemocratic and humane principles' (Best,
1996, ibid.)? On whose authority does it depend to determine whether
society is acting according to these principles? This is a
particularly pressing issue for Newby to address, since as it
stands, only those views and beliefs which do not represent a danger
to the democratic and humane principles of liberal secular society
are permitted to be respected and allowed in Newby's system. 27 The
impression is left that rather than describing spirituality,
(something Newby claims he is doing: Best, 1996, p.106), Newby seems
instead to be replacing the notion of a purely secular personal
development with the label of t spiritual development', without
touching on the notion of ultimacy which seems to be at the core of
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most interpretations of spirituality. Newby's notion of 'spiritual
development' is greatly politicized, but seems also to be limited by
that very approach.
The next section of this chapter will explore some ways in which
spirituality has a place within the context of secular religious
education. Particular attention will be paid to the relationship
between secular spirituality and the three models of secular
religious education explored in Chapter Two.
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2. The place of spirituality in secular religious education.
The brief analysis of some of the many possible secular
interpretations of spirituality shows that its very broadness of
definition permits its application to many contexts. The following
section will reflect on the ways in which concepts of spirituality
have been applied by the three main secular traditions of religious
education considered in Chapter Two. Thus, the phenomenological
approach of Michael Grimmitt to religious education will be
reconsidered as it refers principally to his concept of development.
Next, the experientialist school of religious education will be
analysed with respect to its concept of the inner'. Finally, the
non-realism of the tSea of Faith' school of secular theology will be
reconsidered in the light of its own distinctive notion of the holy
(human) spirit'.
(i) Michael Grimmitt and spirituality.
Chapter Two considered the work of Michael Grimmitt. His attempt
to establish a proper function for phenomenology within the context
of religious education was explored, and his efforts to establish a
balance between phenomenological methodology with the applied use of
the memories, concepts and values of those who engage in religious
education.
Thus, Grimmitt was seen to employ a specific theory of religious
education, in which two kinds of knowledge are involved. These, it
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was seen, Grimmitt calls 'abilities in pure religion', and
'abilities in applied religion' (Grimmitt, 1991). Grimmitt is seen
to examine ways in which phenomenology - as a dispassionate
discipline of study - may still have value as a means of exploring
religion within an educational context, through its re-defining as a
functional tool which must take into account both the sitz im leben
of those who engage in religious education, as well as taking into
account the beliefs and values both of the child and the religious
tradition which is being studied. Grimmitt applies to this the
concept of 'human givens': the capacity in human beings not simply
of being born human, but of becoming human through the emotional and
spiritual growth which makes us who we are. 28 It is this issue which
provides an indication of some of the spiritual dimensions in
Grimmitt's theory of religious education.
The key relationship between secular spirituality and Grimmitt's
theory of religious education rests upon the way in which each can
be seen to be concerned with development. Grimmitt recognizes that
'moral, religious and spiritual consciousness is a component of
human consciousness which has the capacity to become all-embracing
in terms of human meaning-making' (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 167). These
components are contextualized within his frame of 'human givens':
they alert us and raise in us what Grimmitt refers to as 'value-
imperatives', which are found within the 'givens' (Grimmitt, 1987,
p. 368).
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This quite explicit 'humanizing ' of spirituality is made clearer
by Grimmitt elsewhere. 'All human meaning emerges in human contexts'
(Grimmitt, 1991, p. 85). Whilst this might be a truism, it reveals
also a concern with the identification of the source of human
spirituality as Grimmitt perceives it. We establish our individual
hermeneutics, through the beliefs and values we hold about the world
in which we live. In an explanation of this process, Grimmitt
identifies a four-old definition for this process, involving the
enhancement of our awareness of our core-values, an encouragement to
evaluate our experiences by interpreting our experiences sub specie
aeternitatis, the ability to hold beliefs and values as an act of
faith, and a recognition of the influence holding these beliefs and
values may have on us in the future (Grimmitt, 1987, p. 168).
Faith-responses, which Grimmitt appears to equate with a self-
transcendent point of reference by which we are able to interpret
the totality of our experiences, play a significant part in this
definition. We do not exist in a vacuum: our experiences of the
world about us bring about in us varying levels of interpretative
response. The educational process itself, Grimmitt remarks, is a
process 'directed towards bringing about change or development in
some form' (Grimmitt, 1991, p. 80). For Grimmitt, that development
forms part of the structure of human consciousness: a core human
value.
Grimmitt makes clear that in speaking of spiritual development,
he does not mean religious development. Instead, he understands
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spiritual development to be the human ability to be aware of the
possibility of transcending themselves in such a way that the
limitations of human finite identity are challenged by the exercise
of the creative imagination' (Grimmitt, 1987, P. 125). Its link to
religion remain strictly defined: it may arise as a result of a
reflection upon an individual's religious consciousness, but it does
not become dependent upon. For Grimmitt, the influence of religion
upon spiritual development is a contingent factor, not a necessary
one (Grimmitt, 1987, ibid.).
What spiritual development might mean specifically within
Grimmitt's theory of religious education, is outlined further.
Spiritual development involves the heightening of what Griminitt
calls	 the hierarchy of humans needs excelling the material'
(Grimmitt, 1987, ibid.). Love, forgiveness, powerlessness and
dispossession, the yearning for completion, for wholeness and
integration all form part of the matrix of human spiritual self-
awareness (Grimmitt, 1987, ibid.).
Within the context of Grimmitt's theory of religious education,
his concept of human spirituality retains a coherence within that
theory. Specifically, if Grimmitt's contention that every religious
tradition and phenomenon which is encountered in an educational
context, is empowered in such a way as to present to the learner -
whatever that individual's personal religious beliefs - an
educational gift, the instrumental worth of which is dependent upon
the manner in which the learner interacts with it, then those core
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values which lead the individual to reflect upon the non-material
aspects of life, (that is, those senses of spiritual development
mentioned above), begin to function as part of this process.29
In concrete terms, Grimmitt has proposed a four-fold strategy to
deliver religious education following his theoretical structures.
Although designed specifically for use with young children, it does
demonstrate in a wider context Grimmitt's more general concerns. It
highlights those areas of his thought which reflect his
understanding of spiritual development, but is set within his theory
of religious education.
Within Grimmitt's interactive model, the learner receives and
engages with the religious phenomenon which is presented to him.
This may have the effect of bringing about a confirmation in the
learner of any faith which he might possess. However, it may not
have this effect. Since it arises from the relationship of religion
to spirituality, it remains a contingent factor, not a necessary
one, in the life of the learner. However, it would be wrong to
assume from this that Grimmitt does not intend benefit to be derived
by those whose faith is not confirmed by the encounter. The
educational benefits of self-understanding and self-transcendence
from material concerns to the spiritual ones mentioned above fall
into this category (Grimniitt, 1991, p. 83).
Subsequent to the encounter and engagement, the second stage of
the process is termed by Grimmitt the 'Discovery Stage' (Grimmitt,
1991, p. 84). This stage marks the bridge between the world of the
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ordinary and the material - the world of the classroom - with the
world of the religious phenomenon which has been encountered. In a
sense, this stage sets the interpretative scene within which the
learners will begin their interaction with the religious phenomenon.
Grimmitt comments that the key concern here is given not to what
the believing religious community thinks or feels about this
material, but to the way the children themselves interact with it
(Grimmitt, 1991, ibid.).3°
Grimmitt's third stage of the process of religious education, in
which spiritual development has a part, is what he calls the
Contextualization Stage (Grimmitt, 1991, ibid.). This stage involves
the distancing of the religious phenomenon from the learner.
Although it might at first sight appear paradoxical to create
boundaries which inhibit closer contact with a phenomenon which the
learner is actively seeking to understand, Grimmitt's strategy
involves a particular concern with placing the religious phenomenon
within its own context. Almost invariably this context is one which
remains beyond that of the learner. Here Grimmitt's secular agenda
asserts itself. The learner is not undertaking religious education
in order to become part of the same context as the religious
phenomenon, but engages in religious education to reach a self-
understanding both of the phenomenon and of himself, through this
process.
The final stage of Grimmitt's religious education strategy he
calls the Reflective Stage. Here a dialogue takes place between the
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learner and the religious phenomenon. This can only occur now
because the religious material has been contextualized, the limits
having been delineated and the boundaries drawn between the learner
and the religious phenomenon. Again, what Grimmitt finds to be
specifically educational in this process is the possibility this
action presents for the learner to gain, through a religious insight
into the phenomena, the ability to become self-aware, and to
evaluate himself through a reflective encounter with the
contextualized religious phenomena (Grimmitt, 1991, ibid.).
Grimmitt's theory operates within an avowedly secular context,
and his understanding of the contribution of spiritual development
must be seen in the same light. Thus, he warns us to reject outright
the ideas of those who think that spiritual development and the
self-transcendent capacity of humans to seek the non-material in an
otherwise material world, is somehow magically parachuted down upon
the learner from some metaphysical beyond. The human context within
which interpretation and meaning are defined, the beauty and
holiness of religious material', remains a controlled activity
within a predetermined human setting (Grimmitt, 1991, pp. 84-85).
Its strengths are marked. Grimmitt's insights into spiritual
development are fascinating in the sense that, like almost all
secular notions of spirituality, the actions which bring it about
speak more about the individuals who develop, than the events which
bring about that development. It is a determinedly secular approach
to an abstract, yet seemingly living process. Its problems are,
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however, significant too. Grimmitt is careful to attempt to seek a
balance between a phenomenological methodology and the applied use
of the memories, concepts and values of those who engage in
religious education. However, the balance is one which favours the
assumption that the possibility cannot exist of an autonomy within a
religious tradition which might draw the learner into a
contextualized relationship with itself, whilst retaining its own
dynamic self-existence. The scales are, therefore, imbalanced before
the process of religious education begins to take place. The balance
which is achieved is on secular terms throughout. The possibility
that the truth-claims of any religious tradition which is
encountered in the process might have an intrinsic ontological
existence or validity, remains firmly outside the theory, and is not
a concern of Grimmitt's.
(ii) The Experiential School and spirituality.
In the previous chapter consideration was made of the religious
education theories of the experiential school of John Hammond, David
Hay and others. 31 Mention was made of Hay and Hammond's assertion
that the experiential method had to do with taking seriously one's
own experience. Two aims were identified for the method: first, that
religious education seeks to enable pupils to become aware of their
own inner experiences, and to recognize, learn and respect the
experiences of others, and second, that religious education must be
undertaken in such a way as to allow the function of the
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metaphorical language employed by those who speak about their own
experiences to be understood correctly.
These aims were shown to have arisen in order that the
experientialist methodology should enable religious education to
bring the learner to an awareness of the power of experience within
the lives of others, whilst keeping the learner outside the walls'
of confessionalism. This has been noticed also, albeit critically,
by Kevin Mott-Thornton, who suggests that the experiential approach
functions so as to promote spiritual development without introducing
a substantive set of religious or moral values into the exercise
(Best, 1996, p. 84).
The experientialist approach to religious education has
significant impact upon the way in which spiritual development is to
be understood in experiential thought. Hay and Hammond comment at
the end of their response to the critique of Adrian Thatcher that
'Religious education is about observing differences and
similarities in religious systems and noting recurring themes.
Experiential religious education emphasizes the relation of
these to our own feelings and thoughts. In this, the subject
gains its depth' (Hay and Hammond, 1992, p. 149).
It is this issue of 'feeling' that provides an indication of the
relationship of spiritual development with the experiential
religious education. Methodologically within the classroom, the
experiential approach seeks to introduce directed activities which
involve the use of fantasy, story, imagination and personal
reconstruction of external stimuli through guided meditation and
centering exercises. 32 These methods are intended to allow the
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learner to reflect upon the experiences that he has encountered, but
to recognize that those experiences are his own, belonging to no
other person (cf. Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, p. 28).
This principle arises as a natural consequence of the
experiential methodology as a whole. Stemming from the increasing
influence of British phenomenology in the 1970's, which was
perceived to have had a relevance as an educational method in
religious education, the experiential approach seeks to create a
more fair balance between description and subjectivity than had
previously been the case. 33 However, this is not to suggest that
the experientialist method attempts to supersede that of the
phenomenologists. Largely, the difference occurs in the common
understanding of many that phenomenology stood for a simple
concentration upon the externals of phenomena, regardless of
whatever prejudices the observer might have. That this was never the
real	 intention	 of	 phenomenology	 is	 recognized	 by	 the
experientialists (Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, p. 6). It is probably
more accurate to say that the experientialist school develops the
findings of the phenomenological method, without rejecting the
assumptions phenomenology uses when undertaking its tasks.
This development involves for experientialists a recognition and
analysis of what it means to speak of subjectivity. The learning
process, in which an event is encountered and reflected upon, cannot
be undertaken superficially. It must involve depth and significance
to the individual who encounters it, for it to awaken meaning in
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that individual. The process, therefore, requires the individual who
undertakes it to reflect upon the ways in which the encounter give
meaning to himself: the reflection is not of the external event
which has been encountered but of the individual in whom resonances
of depth and personal meaning now begin to reverberate. In their
significant article which replied to charges of dualism made against
them, Hay and Hammond make this concept clear:
'Experiential religious education is about using, and so
valuing and exploring, one's own experience as a way of knowing
better others' experience of religion. This is the significance
of all the "inner" talk: "inner space", "going inside", "inner
eye" and so on...Inner talk is a metaphor for attentiveness,
mindfulness' (Hay and Hammond, 1992, p. 145).
The concept of the 'inner' is thus significant. When the pupil
enters into the world of another, he does not enter, so the
experientialists suggest, as an automaton, incapable of responding
without any sense of personal reaction and emotion. The involves the
pupil as an individual in ways which may be painful, even humbling.
Recognition that my own view is not the only possible view of the
universe is not a truism, but an act of faith in myself: I recognize
that the way I see the world is not the only valid view. But in so
doing, I am able to reflect upon and respond to the ways I have
understood my existence. This takes place in the light of my
experience of events and phenomena which originally lay outside my
own perspectives, but which have now, in my encounter with them,
entered into my world (cf. Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, p. 6). It is in
this sense that the experientialist views the concept of spiritual
development.
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A number of questions can be raised, however, against the
experientialist approach, particularly over whether or not spiritual
development can actually take place using the methodology that has
been proposed. Thus, it is acknowledged by experientialists that the
principle concern of the method is to induce reflection in the pupil
that is both self-referring and non-specific. However, this in
itself depends upon the ability both of teacher and pupil to reach
an understanding of the experience in terms of self-evident axioms
which retain a neutrality of assumption and prejudice, with the
exception of the values and attitudes already inherent within the
pupil or teacher. Spiritual development becomes reduced to an
individualism which acts both as the source and the reflection of
the source, within the encounter. This, however, means that the
notion of development' is less clear than might be expected: rather
than undertaking a non-specific process with a defined and
identifiable learning and developmental outcome, the experiential
method appears to depend instead on a peculiarly defined and
specific set of assumptions, namely, those of the individual pupils
which are brought into the encounter. If it should be the norm, as
the experientialist methodology clearly intends, that no re1igious'
confessionalism should occur in the experience of a pupil with a
religious phenomenon, within an educational context, then the
spiritual growth or development of the pupil remains decidedly
static. Reflection is not development. One might learn tmore about
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oneself, but one does not thereby 'acquire' the external experience.
As Mott-Thornton comments:
'the de facto spiritual forces which reign in the lives of
pupils as they enter the classroom would continue to do so as
they leave it. In that case the school would be wasting
valuable time and energy on spiritual development in the first
place' (Best, 1996, p. 86).
Thus, the implications for spiritual development in the
methodology of the experientialists are ambiguous. The strengths of
the method are clear. The re-introduction of reflective analysis
into religious education, and the recognition that the study of
religious phenomena must involve more than a descriptive and rather
dry pedagogy can only be welcomed by religious education
practitioners. Similarly, the efforts by the experientialists to
take the views, beliefs and experiences of pupils seriously is also
to be welcomed, since it enables pupils to have an active part in
the learning process. However, questions remain as to whether that
process is particularly meaningful. The only real experiences that
seem to be involved in the process are the same ones that entered
the classroom before the event was encountered. The pupil leaves,
unaltered by the external reality of the encounter, but altered only
by a self-reflection brought about in the pupil by the encounter
with the religious phenomenon.
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(iii) The Non-Realist 'Sea of Faith' School and spirituality.
The previous chapter identified the religious education aims of
the postmodern non-realist tradition of the 'Sea of Faith'
theologians. They are intensely subjective: religious education is a
process only insofar as it becomes my process. In non-realist terms
my very existence is dependent upon my own interiorized subjective
actions. The learning process is not one in which an external
reality becomes appropriated to myself: instead, I interiorize, I
learn about myself, I tell myself my own 'story'. The meanings of
these stories are not found outside the 'text', but are vested
within the 'text'. Religious traditions, rather than expressing
underlying realities about themselves, reflect instead one or other
element of the human 'story' in which we all share. Non-realist
religious education looks into a mirror, which reflects images of
humanly constructed meanings. In parts of the language game which
make up this 'story', humans have been able to construct sacred
meanings for their actions. These sacral aspects should not be
understood, however, to have an objective reality. Instead, they
mirror those moments of ultimacy which provide depth and passion in
each human culture.
Clearly the concept of a non-realist spirituality will be closely
connected to this notion of 'story'. Equally clearly, any notion of
'story' must involve human consciousness. Given the auto-reflexive
nature of the non-realist aims for religious education summarized
above, that idea of human consciousness must be specifically human
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self-consciousness. If we interiorize, if the 'text' is our 'story',
then all we can know and believe to be true must be part of our
subjectivity, not that of another. Understanding the self must be
crucial to understanding non-realist concepts of spiritual
development.
In one of his most imaginative and arrestingly refreshing works,
the 'Sea of Faith' theologian par excellence Don Cupitt attempts to
outline the philosophical motifs which have underpinned his whole
approach to life, and, more recently, his facing up to death. In a
deceptively simple conversational style, yet with an engaging
subtlety, Cupitt takes up the theme of self-consciousness:
'As an exercise, lie in bed tonight in the darkness and
silence. Reduce all external stimuli to the minimum, but remain
alert and attentive until you can hear first the beating of
your own heart and then in time the slow surgings of the rest
of your physiology. That's life. Now wait and listen out for
the E-vent, the forthcoming of Becoming. You are acutely
conscious, with open eyes, but you are not at all
self-conscious. You are indeed undistracted by thoughts of the
self or by awareness of any boundary between the self and the
not-self' (Cupitt, 1995, p . 13)
Cupitt goes on to make the point, consistent with his earlier
approaches to knowledge discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis,
that our knowledge of our 'Becoming' referred to above, is
determined through our language. We are, he suggests, 'languagey'
beings: 'You are such a languagey being that in you the very
forthcoming of Becoming is already formed and facilitated by
language' (Cupitt, 1995, ibid.).
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But Cupitt has already warned the reader that there is a certain
amount of word-play in the text, and a few deliberate giveaways for
you to spot' (Cupitt, 1995, p . 4). Thus, just as I might lie in the
darkness, listening to the beating of my heart, trying to observe
the E-venting, the coming forth of Becoming, what I notice instead,
Cupitt argues, is a flux, or change which is illuminated through
language: both language that is semantic and thus form-fulfilling,
and language that is semantic, and thus continuity-giving. For
Cupitt, words are life-giving. They tcreate. They are the shape of
events and E-vents (Cupitt, 1995, p. 14).
For this reason, any concept of spiritual development which might
arise from non-realist religious education involves first and
foremost the religious language game, in which distinctions between
the Conscious and Unconscious are like distinctions between text and
subtext: it is a distinction that can be made within the language
and body-language that appears and moves on your surface' (Cupitt,
1995, ibid.).34
A similar argument is posed by Lloyd Geering (Geering, 1994, p.
45ff.). The world, he suggests, first exists in our heads.35
However, we do not usually consider its reality in this way, because
we tend to make an appeal to sensory data to support our normal
contention that we should identify the world absolutely with
reality. However, we need to take a step back from this, and
recognize with what Geering describes as quite a high degree of
sophistication', that we need to draw a distinction between the way
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we see reality, and reality as it t is' in itself (Geering, 1994,
p . 45).
The collection of sensory data, then, requires the subtlety of
interpretation for us to begin to construct a world of
consciousness. The tool of that interpretation is language. Thus,
whilst it is to be acknowledged that we each view the world from our
own individual perspective, and that no two individuals can have the
same particular experience, we are yet able to construct worlds of
shared commonality, because we are able to use a common language,
but a language which remains always self-referring in terms of the
individual who uses it (see especially, Geering, 1994, pp. 46-48).
Cupitt goes further still. The Kantian concept of reality, upon
which Geering, initially at least, seems to depend, lays open the
possibility of realism to assert itself into the theory. If reality
is distinct from our interpretation of it, then that reality must
still exist beyond' our perception of it. This, as Cupitt warns, is
the way of bad philosophy (Cupitt, 1995, p. 15).36
Rather than retain a t ghost in the machine', Cupitt demands that
we should rid ourselves of the notion that there is such a tthing
as mind, consciousness or unconsciousness (Cupitt, 1995, ibid.). The
old distinction between inner and outer, act like prisons. They trap
the individual in a lonely state of self-delusion, in which everyone
lives in their own isolated world of reality, never sharing a
commonality of understanding. Cupitt's imagery here is startlingly
effective. The individual becomes t locked up in solitary
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confinement. That's foul. So let's forget it: unmake the prison'
(Cupitt, 1995, ibid.).
Where does this leave the notion of spiritual experience and
development? If consciousness is not an internal reality, then in
what sense can the non-realist speak of spiritual development?
First and foremost, non-realist subjective consciousness should
no longer be considered to be distinct and interior. Instead, it
becomes part of the public commonality of the outside. Cupitt takes
the example of objects on his desk before him as he writes. A pen,
keys, the wood of the desk - and his consciousness of these things -
are not situated in some privatized interior, but out there. Cupitt
sees them there. But it is by spreading out a sense of consciousness
and a valuation of these things over them as they are, out-there,
that a life-world is constituted. By sharing in the same language we
are all capable of sharing that same consciousness. In a beguiling
aside Cupitt comments that
'I'm telling you only things you already know: that's what I
mean by a democratic metaphysics of ordinariness. I'm not
trying to sell you anything; I'm only trying to show you that
you are fine as you are. No news is good news, so my evangel is
that there is no news' (Cupitt, 1995, p. 16).
Consciousness, then, is the illumination, the lighting up of the
flux of things. 37
 When part of the E-venting strand becomes
language-formed, it becomes intelligible. In doing so, it becomes
conscious and articulated. Once such an association begins, language
takes over. New resonances attach themselves, linguistic allusions
form and accrete. Sign-formation creates ripples in the flux, trains
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of thought, light. 'That's consciousness', suggests Cupitt, 'and I
call it phosphorescence, a lighting-up of the flux' (Cupitt, 1995,
p. 17).38 Rather than speak of consciousness as a spiritual essence
that is added on to the physical biology of a human being, then, it
should be understood as a moment of articulacy: the ability to bear
witness, to speak with meaning, and so to create the world.
Our development is thus dependent upon our articulacy. Set within
the theoretical concepts of non-realist religious education, the
process is not one in which an independent event is experienced and
reflected upon, but one in which the very experience of living is
illuminated, articulated and ultimately created by our language. In
this sense, non-realism goes much further than either of the two
previous models discussed above. For here something happens. We
become conscious. We create meaning. We shine.
However, some pertinent questions arise over the validity of the
assumptions upon which non-realist notions of consciousness and
spirituality depend. The assumption is made that non-realism can be
applied universally to all individuals. Of course this is not
necessarily the case, since individuals may wish to assert a set of
belief values which are based upon ideals which are constituted by a
realist view of metaphysics. The application of non-realism in such
a context would act to alienate those who retained a sense of
realism in their day to day lives. More significant perhaps is that
non-realism would, on its own admission, define truth-claims as
matters of belief: the flux of things is interpreted according to
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the enlightenment of my language, in other words, to how I believe.
However, the notion of belief must have its own origins too. Since
non-realism demands that any talk of a world tout there' which
retains a reality independent of our interpretation of it must be
rejected, it becomes unclear where the notion of 'belief' might find
its justification. Non-realism retains within it seeds of
deconstruction. Cupitt's 'last philosophy' may not yet live up to
its name.
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iii. Discussion and Conclusion.
A great diversity of elements have come together in this chapter
to enable an appreciation to be made of the profound complexities of
spiritual development within the context of Catholic and secular
religious education. This section will compare and contrast briefly
some of the themes which have presented themselves. It will seek
both to bring together those themes which are shared by Catholic and
secular traditions and to draw out the differences between them. A
final conclusion to this chapter will then be reached.
Despite their divergent natures, both Catholic and secular
traditions share a common set of attitudes and presumptions. In
their efforts to understand the nature of spiritual development,
both traditions seek after the meaning and significance of human
spirituality, attempting to set the venture beyond what is purely
biological or mechanical. There is, on the part of Catholic
tradition on the one hand, and the distinct secular approaches of
Grimmitt, the experientialists and the non-realists on the other, a
genuine concern for depth and honesty in the attempt.
Catholic tradition shows itself to be profoundly concerned with
the scope of this effort. In particular, Catholic tradition
recognizes the value of the universal character of its nature.
Within the context of religious education, spirituality and
catechesis, that universality is expressed (1) educationally, in the
constant desire to seek after that which is higher, to a reality
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beyond our individual understanding, but part of the wholeness of
existence, epitomized in revelation; (2) spiritually, in the
encounter with God, in which the call to holiness is made
universally and without exception; (3) catechetically, in the
universal call to the Church to continue a universal missionary
activity within the world.
Secular	 tradition,	 represented	 here	 by	 Grimmitt,	 the
experientialists and the non-realists also share universal concerns
which function for each of these representatives in the same
absolute manner as they do for Catholic tradition. Thus, both
Grimmitt's approach to religious education and spiritual development
and that of the experientialists have a universal effect: all of us
are capable of responding, the theories suggest, to the
instrumentalism of the methodology, (Grimmitt), or to attempts to
reach self-reflection (experientialism). In each case, the process
enables more to be learned about the individual who undertakes it,
than about the event experienced. This does, however enable all
individuals to participate in the activity: all views are valid,
none to be denied. In a not dissimilar way, the non-realist approach
depends upon the commonality of our understanding for its success.
We are able to share, to be conscious of each other's concerns,
because we are capable of sharing an agreed hierarchy of language.
Language becomes the universal factor.
Clear differences exist between Catholic and secular traditions,
however. Principally, these relate to the underlying assumptions
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that are prevalent in each tradition. Catholic tradition functions
with specifically metaphysical constraints. The basis of these
constraints rests in the realist structures which underpin the
Catholic Church's understanding of God, humanity and the world. Not
only is revelation understood to be an event - indeed, the event -
of human history, but also it is understood to be self-referring. It
ruptures the web of time, but stands beyond time itself. It points,
unremittingly, back to itself. It announces that reality is even
greater than the world can imagine. This is because, as the first
chapter shows, revelation cannot be contextualized into a pre-
determined set of human constructs. Reality itself is caught up in
the God of revelation.
As a form of self-reference, the experience of God becomes the
reality of God. Catholic spirituality is thus shown to be a
recognition of the reality of God in the world. Catholic catechesis
demonstrates that this experience becomes part of the journey back
to God: by becoming Church we fulfil, at least in part, the call to
oneness in God, to wholeness, to redemption, to life. This all flows
from the initial premise of Catholic tradition that God is a reality
distinct from our own reality, yet closer to us than we can possibly
comprehend.
Secular tradition, on the other hand, cannot share these
presumptions. For both Grimmitt and the experientialists, the place
of spiritual development within religious education is determined in
a specific context. The process of religious education and spiritual
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development is controlled by its human setting. For Grimmitt, any
questions concerning the validity of the truth-claims of a religious
tradition are placed beyond the scope of the phenomenological and
instrumental theory which Grimmitt has constructed. Thus, whilst not
necessarily denying that a religious tradition might have valid
truth-claims to make, his educational process retains a disinterest
in those claims. The mechanism is not permitted within the theory to
do otherwise. In this action, Grimmitt's secular assumptions are
made clear. For the experientialists, similar restrictions operate.
The experiential method is concerned directly with the reflective
structural development of the pupil, but that development is
determined solely on the pupil's own terms. The pupil enters and
leaves the encounter untouched by any external reality which might
exist on the part of the religious tradition. The alteration in the
pupil that might come about through the encounter is directly
considered by the experientialists to be auto-reflexive. The secular
assumptions are equally clear: any external truth-claims by the
religious tradition are secondary insofar as religious education and
spiritual development is concerned solely with self-reflection on
the part of the pupil. Here both clearly differ from the assumptions
of Catholic tradition.
The non-realist concept of spiritual development within religious
education highlights most clearly the differences between its
assumptions and those of Catholic tradition. Whereas Catholic
tradition asserts the reality of God, non-realism asserts that there
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is no external reality beyond the reality that our language
constructs for us. Despite this, non-realism cannot be said to be a
propositional philosophy, because the language used does not refer
to anything real, rather, treality is constructed by the language
that is used. Here Catholic theology differs. Although it can be
argued that words are employed in Catholic theology in an imperfect
sense, (thus it could be claimed that theology is an exercise in
reconstruction, rather than reflection), the language remains
propositional in the sense that it constantly refers back to a
reality distinct from that of those who express the language. For
Cupitt, however, this is anathema: language cannot refer to another
reality. It creates. It does not reflect. It is the illuminator, not
the mirror. To this extent, Catholic tradition and non-realism can
never agree.
In conclusion, the concepts of Catholic and secular spirituality to
be found within the context of religious education share
similarities, but differ in their underlying presuppositions.
Catholic tradition asserts its faith in the reality of God, and in
the validity of our experience of that reality. Secular tradition
either relegates questions about the validity of the truth-claims of
religious traditions to a place beyond the scope of its theories of
religious education and spiritual development, or it denies their
reality in total.
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NOTES
1 See, for example, the article by Catherine Mowry LaCugna and
Michael K. Downey, 'Trinitarian spirituality', in Downey, 1993, pp.
968-82.
2 Although it would be more correct to speak of the spirituality of
the Hebrew Bible and its influence on the spirituality of the New
Testament, such an undertaking would go far beyond the particular
concerns of the present thesis. It should be said, however, that
both for Pauline and Gospel communities all understanding of
religious experience, including that learnt from their heritage in
the Hebrew Bible is to be known in the light of those communities'
experiences of the risen Christ. For that reason - but not that
reason alone - this portion of the chapter will consider certain
aspects of spirituality as it is made manifest in the New Testament.
On the influence of the Old Testament on Paul's theology of the
Spirit, and on Paul's somewhat ambiguous use of his spirit
terminology, see NJBC. 82: 61 and its accompanying literature.
This probability arises because of the witness of Papias, but also
because of the presence of a number of Latin tloanwords, (e.g.
measures and currency), Roman legal concepts, (e.g. the notion of a
wife divorcing her husband, which could not happen under Jewish law
[Mk 10: 12]), and the atmosphere of impending persecution with which
chapter thirteen of the Gospel is imbued.
The present form of Matthew's Gospel is probably a mature
synthesis of material, combining Mark and an early collection of
sayings of Jesus (called Logion-Quelle or Q), shared with the Gospel
of Luke. A number of puzzles remain as to origins and subsequent
development of the Gospel into its final form. It may well have been
written within the context of a Jewish community. See NJBC. 42: 2-3,
26).
6 Since the Gospel presupposes the destruction of Jerusalem in
AD 70, but seems not to indicate an awareness of the persecutions
which Christians suffered during the latter part of Diocletian's
reign (AD 81-76), nor the re-organisation or Judaism by the
Pharasaic party at Jamnia in AD 85-90, which also resulted in
increased hostility towards the Church, a date for the Gospel might
be given tentatively of AD 80-85, possibly originating from Syrian
Antioch (NJBC. 43: 2-3).
7 Dating and describing the sources for John's Gospel present the
biblical scholar with some complexities. John has clearly drawn upon
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some traditions which are shared by the synoptics. Thus, for
example, both the synoptics and John share stories about healings,
they both mention the multiplication of loaves and speak of the
rescue of the disciples from a storm. (See also NJBC. 61: 3 for more
details of major concurrences between the synoptics and John).
References to authentic Palestinian detail which has not been found
in the synoptics, along with an emphasis on the rle of John the
Baptist seem to indicate that the Gospel - or at least the Johannine
community for whom the Gospel was written - found its origins in the
diverse Palestinian sects of Judaism (NJBC. 61: 10), perhaps in
those of Asia Minor, and written possibly in the late 90's AD (NJBC.
61: 18).
8 This section of the chapter will consider Catholic spirituality as
it is to be understood in general terms in the twentieth century,
concentrating largely on the periods before and during the Second
Vatican Council.
It is relevant to ask at this point whether it is strictly correct
to speak of the scholastic approach being in conflict with a
liturgically based spiritual tradition. Both approaches contain
elements of each others concerns and claims.
10 McBrien criticizes Tanquerey's spirituality for having taken a
different route to present day Catholic thought because of what
McBrien sees as Tanquerey's dependency upon a scholastic
methodology. For Tanquerey, the human person is conceived of as
being a one which has lost something originally intended for it by
God. Human existence becomes a process of struggle between the
higher and lower faculties of human beings, and does not depend upon
individual development. See McBrien, 1980, Vol. 2, pp. 1070f.
11 See, for scriptural support Mt 5: 48.
12 Here we are justified to ask whether there exists a moral
compulsion for our existence beyond the purely ontological concept
of personhood. Our calling which pre-exists our understanding of
that calling defines our humanity. Not only do we conform to who we
are, we also conform to who we should be. See the particularly
interesting discussion on ontology and personhood by John Zizioulas
in Schwobel and Gunton, (1991), pp. 33-46.
13 To that end Joann Wolski suggests that cChristian
spirituality...becomes more authentically biblical, discerning God's
presence in the midst of the events of history as well as in the
movements of one's inner spirit' (Komonchak, et a], 1990, p. 980).
14 See, for example, the preliminary discussions on the rle of
spirituality within the context of celebration in religious
education, in Chapter Two, above.
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15 See in addition Mayr, 1988, PP. 34-36.
16 See the second part of Chapter One of this thesis.
17 Thus the Catechism quotes, vitually without additional
commentary, from Catechesi Tradendae article 5, citing the clear and
unambiguous Christocentric heart of catechesis as it is there
envisaged: "At the heart of catechesis we find, in essence, a
Person, the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, the only Son from the
Father...who suffered and died for us and who now, after rising, is
living with us forever."[...] Catechesis aims at putting "people
...in communion...with Jesus Christ[...]"' (CCC art 427).
18 Evidenced, for example, by discussions held at the Centre for the
Study of Contemporary Issues in Education Seminar held on 3 March
1997 at the University of Hull, where questions concerning the idea
of moral authority in society pointed towards an inability to
identify the basis for any such authority, in secular terms. By
extension, this would imply also that the structural assumptions we
might have about the reality of events which give meaning to our
lives may well be just as indeterminate. Personal meaning, to
express a tautology, is subjective, after all. If moral authority
cannot be satisfactorily identified, it too becomes a subjective
experience.
19 original emphases removed.
20 Original emphases removed.
21 original emphasis removed.
22 This can be compared with the comments of the National Curriculum
Council who suggest that 'The term [spirituality] needs to be seen
as applying to something fundamental in the human
condition...[having to do]...with the search for meaning and purpose
in life and for values by which to live' (National Curriculum
Council, 1993, p. 2).
23 This similarity yet distinction of rles between religious
education and spiritual development only holds good, of course, if
it can be both shown that, on the one hand, the aims of religious
education have to do with this seeking after ultimacy, and that
spiritual development arises out of a process that shares this
quest, and on the other hand that spiritual development contains an
identifiable other' or 'more' which extends beyond this quest, or
is at least shared across the whole curriculum and in the life of
the school.
24 This stress on religion might seem to be somewhat paradoxical, in
the light of what was commented upon just before!
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25 Why tact and discretion should play a part in mitigating against
any offence caused by the exclusion of metaphysical orthodox
traditions from consideration by society, is curious. On Newby's own
terms, metaphysical thought is automatically ruled out, and is, as a
result, presumably an anathema to society. His assertion that those
sub-traditions [Newby's definition of this is unclear] which
subscribe to the kind of religious and ideological attitudes which
Newby condemns, should still receive our tactful and discrete
respect, whilst the larger traditions from which these arise -
master traditions which exhibit an authority that 'inhibit[s] change
by repressing unrestrained enquiry' - should be condemned, seems
largely illogical, given that those sub-traditions worthy of tactful
and discrete treatment draw their very existence, according to
Newby, from the larger traditions which are condemned. See Best,
1996, p. 95.
26 For this reason also, the arguments put forward by Thomas Carey
do not stand up to close scrutiny. His criticism of OFSTED rests
upon the view, shared by Newby, that OFSTED favours the secular when
speaking of spirituality because its description of spirituality
'has no obvious religious content in the sense that no specific
reference is made to "God" or "the Absolute"' (Carey, 1996, p. 31).
However, OFSTED is clearly more nuanced in its approach than Carey
suggests. 'Religious' is not a synonym for 'spirituality', OFSTED
indicates. The implication remains, however, that a 'religious'
experience could also be considered a tspiritual one. It should be
noted that Carey's criticisms of OFSTED relate directly to its
presentation of spirituality in the Handbook, not in the discussion
paper discussed earlier in this chapter. See, Carey, 1996, ibid.;
also OFSTED, 1994a, pp. 86ff.
27 Newby does suggest that it is for the government to decide when
this is, in fact, the case' (Best, 1996, ibid.). This naturally
raises the question of who determines whether the government acts
contrary to the principles of humane, democratic liberalism.
Society, which might be said to act with period checks and balances
upon government is a diverse structure containing people who may
hold opposing views, including those who might not support
democratic and humane principles. When such individuals come to the
fore in a legitimate way, such as those who brought about the onset
of Nazi Germany, the principles which underline the authority of the
government appear be horribly contradicted by the results. Newby
seems to be exercising a circular argument.
28 See pp. 64ff. of this thesis.
29 See Grimmitt's comments about his work with colleagues at CREDAR,
in Grimmitt, 1991, p. 82.
° Interestingly, Grimmitt adds that he here sees links between his
own approach and the spirituality of Ignatius of Loyola. Ignatian
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contemplation, which Grimmitt defines as the engagement of the whole
person through the active use of the imagination as it touches upon
issues such as commitment and feeling, is a view which Grimmitt
suggests underlies his own understanding of spiritual development.
See Grimmitt, 1991, p. 87f.
31 Mention should here be made of the work of Stone, 1992, and
Mackley, 1993.
32 See, for example, Hammond, Hay et al, 1990, pp. 31-176, where
various descriptions of the kinds of lesson plans envisaged by the
experiential method are outlined, explored and reviewed. Cf.
Mackley, 1993, passini.
3 Grimmitt's phenomenological approach sought to achieve the same
kind of balance, albeit using a different method to that of the
experientialists, to develop the phenomenology of the seventies.
Italics in original.
Presumably Geering means by this that we first create our world
in our mind. Perhaps he chooses the word theads to avoid the charge
that he is perceiving self-consciousness in dualist terms: if a
p1ace' for consciousness is identified too specifically by Geering,
he could be charged - with some justification - with the non-realist
sin of Cartesian dualism.
36 That is, a warning against those who might adopt a realist
position. Cupitt is not criticizing Geering, since Geering himself
argues to a non-realist position through his concept of symbolic
meaning, which he introduces later into the argument (Geering, 1994,
p. 119ff.).
Cupitt has increasingly moved towards a philosophy of light' in
recent years. One of his lightest and most optimistic books so far
has been given the significant title Solar Ethics. See Cupitt,
1995a.
38 Italics in original.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has shown that a number of similar concerns exist
between Catholic and secular traditions in their approaches to
religious education. Chapter One demonstrated that Catholic and
secular traditions share a need to propose sets of pre-existing
conditions to be first put in place, before their respective models
of education might function. They both affirm the relevance of the
existence of society in order that education might happen. With the
exception of postmodern criticism, both traditions accept implicitly
that the educational venture is a credible and possible exercise.
Chapter	 Two	 developed	 these	 similarities	 further,	 by
demonstrating that within the particular concerns of religious
education, both traditions again assume that certain structural
preconditions must exist for their individual models of religious
education to function. It was shown that Catholic religious
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education assumes the reality of revelation. It was shown further
that Catholic religious education must function in a recognizably
ecclesial structure: Catholic religious education is first and
foremost a function of the missionary life of the Church, in which
pedagogical methods are employed to engage with the religious
traditions of the world, but which also includes the effort to seek
after a deeper understanding of Catholic faith itself.
It was also shown in Chapter Two that secular religious education
also operates with presupposed assumptions. The phenomenology and
instrumentalism of Grimmitt's approach is shown to assume the
existence of human	 givens'. The experiential methodology is
demonstrated to assert that human self-experience and self-
validation are the only possible experiences that can be
meaningfully encountered in the religious education process. Non-
realism is shown to presuppose that realism has failed, and that
objectivity is impossible.
Chapter Three demonstrated that both Catholic and secular
traditions are able to share common ideals about the validity of
placing spiritual development within religious education. Both
traditions assume this possibility, and both seek ways to
demonstrate this. This chapter was able to indicate through
demonstrating this concern that spiritual development has a
particularly important place within religious education. The
possibility of development which each model believes to be feasible
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indicates that religious education is considered to be a
significantly valuable locus for this to occur.
However, clear differences exist too, between Catholic and
secular traditions. Catholic theology presupposes that reality is to
be based upon a theistic concept of nature and supernature. This is
not shared by secular traditions, which, as Chapter One has shown,
deny the legitimacy of that reality as a means of understanding
human existence. Similarly, in Chapter Two, differences between
traditions exist. Catholic religious education uses a set of
assumptions to structure its model of religious education.In doing
this it does share a certain commonality with the secular traditions
of religious education, which diversely operate their models of
religious education using preconceived assumptions. However, those
assumption themselves are so divergent, with the theistic stance of
Catholic theology standing in opposition to the secular assumptions
of Grimmitt, the experientialists and the non-realists, that
agreement between the traditions is seen to be so far apart, to be
virtually meaningless. This difference is continued in Chapter
Three. Because of its presuppositions about nature, Catholic
tradition is required to assert its faith in the objective reality
of God. In doing this, it is shown also to be making a statement
about the reality of the human experience of God, which places it
into the position of a subject of study by secular tradition, rather
than a partner on the secular quest for a fuller and more meaningful
religious education and spiritual development. Secular tradition
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relegates questions about the validity of the truth-claims of
religious traditions to a place outside the scope of their theories
of religious education and spiritual development, or, in the case of
non-realism, denies that reality altogether.
In final conclusion, then, it must be said that Catholic and
secular traditions do share the need to operate with assumptions.
What this thesis has done, however, is to demonstrate that those
assumptions rule each other out: they cannot both be right. The
differences outweigh the similarities. Catholic and secular
traditions are ultimately divergent in their approach to religious
education and to the place of spiritual development within that
process.
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